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UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
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FRIEDRICH  EDUflRD  BENEKE 


THE  MAN  AND  HIS  PHILOSOPHY 


AN    INTRODUCTORY    STUDY 


BY 

FRANCIS  BURKE  BRANDT,  A.  B. 


SUBMITTED   IN   PARTIAL   FULFILMENT   OF   THE   REQUIREMENTS 

FOR   THE   DEGREE   OF   DOCTOR   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

IN  THE 

Und/ersity  Faculty  of  Philosophy 
Columbia  College 


NEW  YORK 
May,  1895 


3 

B13 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE 


WHILE  the  following  work  in  form  is  in  no  sense  deliber- 
ately polemic,  it  will  be  found  in  spirit  to  contain  as  its  un- 
derlying thought  the  contention  that,  if  German  idealistic 
philosophy  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  systematic  development, 
the  true  development  after  Kant  is  to  be  found,  not  in 
Fichte,  Schelling  and  Hegel,  but  in  the  philosophical  sys- 
tem of  Friedrich  Eduard  Beneke.  This  is  only  to  say  in 
other  words  that  in  the  philosophy  of  Beneke  we  have  both 
in  outcome  and  in  method  the  profoundest  metaphysical 
insight  of  our  century.  While  this  may  seem  a  bold  claim 
on  behalf  of  a  philosopher  comparatively  obscure,  it  is  be- 
lieved that  the  evidence  of  the  following  pages  will  justify 
the  assertion.  The  reasons  for  Beneke's  accidental  obscura- 
tion are  there  set  forth.  That  this  has  not  been  due  to  the 
inherent  deficiency  of  Beneke's  system,  is  also  amply  proved 
by  the  progressively  increasing  recognition  of  its  significance 
and  importance  on  the  part  of  German  historians  of  philos- 
ophy. For  example,  in  the  earlier  histories,  as  Schwegler's 
(Stuttgart,  1847),  E.  Reinhold's  (Jena,  1854),  Beneke  is  not 
even  mentioned.  In  more  recent  works,  like  those  of  Erd- 
mann  and  Windelband,  he  is  practically  neglected  and  his 
significance  unappreciated.  It  is  therefore  significant  that 
in  a  most  recent  German  history  of  philosophy,1  not  only  is 

1  Bergmann:  Gesckichte  der  Philosophie,  Berlin,  1893.  2  vols.  (Vol.  II.: 
Die  dentsche  Philosophie  von  Kant  bis  Be7ieke.s)  This  work  first  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  writer  just  as  the  present  volume  was  going  to  press. 

(v) 


. 


vi  INTR OD  UCTOR  Y  NO  TE 

German  philosophy  made  to  end  with  Beneke,  but  in  a  work 
which  assigns  forty  pages  to  Hegel,  Beneke  is  given  an 
equal  space. 

It  may  be  added  that  the  following  pages  do  not  pretend 
to  give  a  full  presentation  of  Beneke's  views  in  their  coercive 
completeness.  Beneke's  philosophical  system  is  too  ex- 
tended to  be  brought  with  convincing  force  into  so  narrow 
a  compass.  This  work  therefore  hopes  to  serve  chiefly  as 
an  introductory  statement  which  may  prove  of  value  both 
in  exhibiting  the  spirit  and  significance  of  the  system,  and 
in  stimulating  to  such  further  study  as  may  result  not  merely 
in  a  juster  appreciation  of  a  neglected  man,  but  also  in  a 
truer  conception  of  metaphysical  truth. 


CONTENTS 


PART  I— THE   MAN 


CHAPTER  I 


PAGE 

Early  Life  and  Opening  Career I5_25 

I.  Boyhood  and  Early  Education 15 

II.  Interdiction,  and  Sojourn  at  Gottingen 18 

CHAPTER  II 

Life  Activity  at  Berlin 26-37 

I.  Intellectual  Development 26 

(1)  Formative  Philosophical  Influences 26 

(2)  Relation  to  Kant 28 

(a)  Critic  of  the  Kantian  Philosophy  ....       28 

(b)  Pioneer  of  "the  Movement  back  to  Kant."     29 

II.  Life  Effort  and  Literary  Activity 31 

( 1 )  Opposition  to  the  Philosophical  Tendencies  of  the 

Times 31 

(2)  Lectures  and  Writings 33 

III.  Character 36 

(vii) 


viii  CONTENTS 

PART  II— THE  PHILOSOPHY 


CHAPTER  I 


PAGE 


Historical  Basis  and  Theory  of  Knowledge 38-52 

§  1.  General  Introduction 38 

I.  Doctrines  of  Perception  before  Kant. 40 

§     2.  Shortcomings  of  Earlier  Doctrines 40 

II.  The  Kantian  Theory 41 

§    3.  General  Character  of  the  Problem 41 

§    4.  Aim  of  the  Kantian  Philosophy 43 

§  5.  The  Kantian  Theory  Stated  by  Beneke  ...  44 
§     6.  Kantian  Distinction  of  Knowledge  Independent 

of  Experience 45 

§     7.  Beneke's  Criticism  of  this  Theory 47 

§    8.  Resolution   of   the    Inherent  Contradiction  of 

the  Kantian  Theory 49 

§    9.  Internal  Sense  Yields  Knowledge  of  a  Thing  in 

Itself 50 

§  10.  Permanent  Value  of  the  Kantian  Analysis    .    .  51 

CHAPTER  II 

Beneke's  System  in  General  Outline 53—71 

I.   The  Scope  and  Method  of  Psychology  .        53 

§  n.  Starting  Point  of  Empirical  Psychology    ...  53 

§  12.  Subject  Matter  of  Empirical  Psychology  ...  54 

§  13.  Psychology  as  Distinguished   from  Outer  Sci- 
ences   55 

§  14.  The  Method  of  Psychology 55 

II.  The  Relation  of  Soul  and  Body 55 

§  15.  The  Method  of  Natural  Science  is  Not  Mater- 
ialism    55 

§  16.  Opposition  of  Soul  and  Body  One  in  and  for 

Consciousness 56 

§  17.  Psychical   and   Corporeal    Processes   Likewise 

Distinctions  for  Consciousness 57 

§  18.  The  Real  Relation  between  Soul  and  Body  .    .  58 


CONTENTS  ix 


PAGE 


III.  The  Origin  of  Consciousness 60 

§  19.  Meaning  of  "Origin  of  Consciousness."  ...  60 

§  20.  Metaphysical  Method  of  Solution 60 

§  21.  Psychological  Method  of  Solution 62 

§  22.  Source  of  the  Notion  that  Self-Consciousness  is 

Materially  Conditioned 64 

IV.  The  Unity  of  Mind  or  Consciousness 65 

§  23.  Beneke  Compared  with  English  and  with  Ger- 
man Thinkers 65 

§  24.  The  Soul  as  a  Hierarchy  of  Faculties   ....  66 

§  25.  The  Soul  as  a  "Simple,"  or  Abstract  Unity  .    .  67 

§  26.  The  Soul  as  a  Concrete  Psychical  Organism    .  70 

CHAPTER  III 

Beneke's  Empirical  Psychology — Introduction  ....       72-86 

I.  Psychology  as  a  Natural  Science 72 

§  27.  Introduction 72 

§  28.  Inner   Experience    the    Immediate    Object    of 

Psychology 72- 

§  29.  The  Objective  Method  Dealing  with  the  Inner 

Experience  of  Others 73 

§  30.  The   Subjective  Method   Dealing  with  the  Ex- 
perience of  One's  Own  Self 74 

§  31.  Possibility  of  Applying  the  Method  of  the  Ex- 
ternal Sciences  to  Inner  Experience  ....  74 
II.   General  Nature  of  the  Psychological  Problem     ....  76 

§  32.  The  Problem  Stated 76 

§  33.  Previous  Attempts  at  Solution 76 

§  34.  The  Problem  as  Conceived  by  Beneke  ....  81 

III.  Beneke's  Doctiine  of  Traces 82 

§  35.  Transition 82 

§  36.  The   Fact  of  Psychical  Persistence  and   How 

Known 82 

§  37.  Nature  of  Unconscious  Persistence 84 

§  38.  The  Philosophical  Significance  of  Memory  .    .  85 


X  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  IV 

PAGE 

The  Psychology  of  Inner  Experience 87-110 

I.   General  Introduction 87 

§  39.  Transition 87 

§  40.  Knowledge  both  Product  and  Process  ....  87 
§  41.  Changes   to    Consciousness    and    Changes    in 

Consciousness 88 

II.  Inner  Experience :   Origin  of  Individual  Facts  ....  89 

§  42.  The  Facts  of  Inner  Experience 89 

§  43.  The  Origin  and  Growth  of  Ideas 89 

(1)  Memories.    .    .            90 

(2)  Concepts 91 

(3)  Judgments 92 

(4)  Inferences  . 93 

§  44.  First  Fundamental  Psychological  Process    .    .  94 

III.  Inner  Experience :  A  Continuous  Process  of  Redistri- 

bution   '. 95 

§  45.  Introduction 95 

§  46.  Alteration  in  Inner  Experience  a  Change   in 

Activity 95 

§47.  Beneke's  Doctrine  of  "Movable  Elements."  .    .  96 
§  48.  Immediately  Active   Inner   Consciousness   the 

Resultant  of  a  Dynamic  Process 98 

§  49.  Why  Forms  Immediately  Present  in  Inner  Con- 
sciousness become  Inactive 100 

""***"'  §  50.  Second  Fundamental  Psychological  Process  .  .  10 1 

IV.  Inner  Experience :  A?i  Association  of  Ideas 101 

§  51.  Introduction  . 101 

A. — The  Connections  Between  Ideas 102 

§  52.  Nature  of  the  Problem 102 

§  53.  Nature  of  the  Union  between  Like  Psychical 

Forms 102 

§  54.  Effect  of  Conscious  Activity  on  the  Inner  Char- 
acter of  the  Trace 103 

§  55.  Effect  of  the  Inner  Character  of  the  Trace  on 

Active  Consciousness 105 


CONTENTS  xi 

PACE 

§  56.  Laws  of  Quantitative  Differences  of  Presenta- 
tions          106 

§  5  7.  Nature  of  the  Union  between  Unlike  Psychical 

Forms 106 

§  58.  Connections  between  Conscious  Forms  Strength- 
ened by  Repetition 108 

B. — Direction  Followed  in  the  Transference  of  Con- 
scious Activity 109 

§  59.  Law  of  the  Direction  of  Consciousness    ...     109 

§  60.  The  Law  Applied  to  the  Old  Laws  of  Association.  109 

CHAPTER  V 

The  Psychology  of  Outer  Experience 111-120 

§  61.  Introduction 111 

I.   Outer  Experience :   Origin  and  Growth  of  Percepts  .    .     n  1 
§  62.  Fundamental  Characteristics  of  the  Perceptive 

Consciousness 111 

§  63.  The  Origin  of  Sense-Perceptions 112 

§  64.  Sense-Perceptions   as    Products   of   Subjective 

and  Objective  Factors 113 

§  65.  Nature  and   Meaning  of  "Original   Sense-Im- 
pressions."      114 

§  66.  Significance  of  Original   Minimal  Sensations  as 

Inevitable  Hypotheses 115 

§  67.  Beneke's  Doctrine  of  Primary  Powers  ....  116 
** —  §  68.  Third  Fundamental  Psychological  Process  .  .  117 
II.   Outer  Experience :   Objective  Relations  of  Percepts    .    .     117 

§  69.  Introduction 117 

§  70.  Nature  of  the  Problem 118 

§  7 1.  Objective  Relations  Depend  on  Original  Organic 

Relations  of  the  Primary  Powers 118 

§  72.  Objective  and  Subjective  Connections  Distin- 
guished      120 


xii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  VI 

PAGE 

Conclusions  Relating  to  both  Inner  and  Outer  Conscious 

Experience 1 21-139 

I.   The  Character  and  Kinds  of  Active  Consciousness   .    .  121 
§  73.  Character  of  Consciousness  as  Determined  by 

Methods  of  Excitation 121 

§  74.  The  Nature  of  Voluntary  Action 122 

§  75.  Character  of  Consciousness  as  Determined  by 

Kinds  of  Primary  Powers 123 

§  76.  Immediate  Consciousness  as  Determined  by  the 

Relation  of  Power  and  Stimulant 124 

§  77.  The  Threefold  Nature  of  Consciousness   ...  125 

II.   The  Span  of  I  nun  edi ate  Consciousness 126 

§  78.  Introduction 126 

§  79.  The  Span  of  Inner  Consciousness 126 

§  80.  The  Span  of  Outer  Consciousness  .  .    ...    .    .  128 

§  Si.  The  Relation  between  Sleeping  and  Waking    .  129 
§  82.  Why  the  Activity  of  Various  Systems  Monopo- 
lizes Immediate  Consciousness       129 

1;  8^.  Fourth  Fundamental  Psychological  Process  .    .  131 

III.   The  Nature  and  Meajiing  of  Consciousness 132 

§  84.  Introduction 132 

A. — Consciousness  as  Presented  Contents 132 

§  85.  Consciousness  Distinguished  as  Presented  Con- 
tents    132 

§  86.  Grades  of  Clearness  of  Presented  Contents  .  .  133 
§  87.  "Unconsciousness"  Distinguished  as  (1)  Less 

Clear,  and  as    (2)   Non-presented  Contents.  134 

B. — Consciousness  as  Presentative  Process 136 

§  88.  Consciousness    Distinguished    as    Presentative 

Activity 136 

§  89.  Clear  Consciousness  as  a  Grade  of  Presentative 

Activity 136 

§  90.  Grades  of  Presentative  Activity 138 

§  91.  "Unconsciousness"  Distinguished  as  Non-ex- 
citation     139 


CONTENTS  xiii 

CHAPTER  VII 

PAGE 

Applied  Psychology — Metaphysics 140-156 

§  92.  Introduction 140 

I.  The  Original  Nature  and  Being  of  the  Soul 141 

§  93.  Psychological  Summary  of  the   Nature  of  the 

Soul 141 

§  94.  Unity    of    Consciousness    Distinguished    from 

Unity  of  Being 142 

§  95.  The  Soul  a  Concrete  Psychical  Organism  .  .    .  143 

II.  The  Nature  and  Limits  of  Knowledge 144 

§    96.  The  Intuition  of  Self 144 

§     97.  The  Origin  and  Content  of  "Inner  Sense."  .  145 

§    98.  The  Soul  the  Only  Being  Known  In  Itself.  .  .  147 

III.  Knowledge  of  Beings  Other  than  Self 148 

§    99.  Fundamental  Starting  Point 148 

§  100.  How  Knowledge  of  the  Existence  of  Other 

Beings  is  Attained 148 

§  101.  The  Being  of  Other  Men 150 

§  102.  The  Being  of  Material  Things 151 

§  103.  The  External  World,  So  Far  as  Concerns  Our 
Fellow-Beings,  Neither  Unknown  Nor  Un- 
knowable   152 

IV.  God  and  Immortality 153 

§  104.  Introduction 153 

§  105.  The  Existence  of  God 153 

§  106.  Immortality 154 


CONCLUDING  CHAPTER 


I.  Brief  Critical  Estimate 157 

II.  Permanent  Influence  and  Followers 161 

III.  Bibliography 164 


Part  I 

THE    MAN 


CHAPTER  I 

Early  Life  and  Opening  Career 

The  life  of  Friedrich  Eduard  Beneke  naturally  divides  into 
two  important  periods.  The  first  period  includes  the  early 
life  and  career  of  Beneke  up  to  the  close  of  his  sojourn  at 
Gottingen,  where  after  the  interdiction  of  his  early  lectures 
at  Berlin  he  found  a  welcome  refuge.  The  second  period 
begins  with  his  return  to  Berlin,  where  the  remainder  of  his 
long  career  was  spent  in  active  work  at  the  great  University. 
The  present  chapter  is  concerned  with  the  first  period. 

I    BOYHOOD   AND    EARLY   EDUCATION 
Beneke  had  the  privilege  of  spending  his  boyhood  days 
under  the  kindly  eyes  of  his  parents   at  Berlin,  where  on 
February  17th,  1798,  he  was  born.     His  father  was  a  Com- 
missioner of  Justice  and  Attorney-General.     His  mother  was 
the  sister  of  a  preacher  named  Wilmsen,  well  known  as  the 
writer  of  stories   for  young   people.     No  particular  facts  re- 
lating to  either   father  or  mother  seem   extant,  but  of  the 
uncle  it  is  said  that  his  stimulating   nature  was  not  without 
permanent  influence  on  the  later  life  of  the  young  Beneke. 
In  his  early  education  Beneke  had  the  advantage  of  the 
281]  15 


1 6  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  [282 

best  schools  at  Berlin.  So  rapidly  did  he  advance  in  his  pre- 
paratory studies  that  by  his  twelfth  year  he  was  ready  to 
enter  the  upper  third  class  of  the  Friedrich  Werner  Gym- 
nasium, then  under  the  direction  of  Bernhardi.  Here  he 
showed  earnest  love  of  study  and  developed  a  marked  inter- 
est in  mathematics.  His  versatility,  however,  went  much 
farther.  It  extended  to  metrical  translations  of  the  classical 
poets,  as  well  as  to  the  production  of  some  original  poetic 
flights.  Both  of  these  performances  made  him  known  among 
his  associates  as  "  the  poet."  During  this  period,  too,  he 
developed  a  keen  interest  in  gymnastic  exercises  and  out- 
door sports.  This  resulted  in  a  vigorousness  of  body  that 
served  him  in  good  stead,  when,  in  181 5,  he  left  school  to 
enlist  as  a  volunteer  in  the  German  war  of  independence. 

The  war  having  ended,  Beneke,  at  Easter,  18 16,  began 
his  university  career  with  the  study  of  theology  at  Halle. 
Here  he  came  under  the  influence  of  the  theologians  Knapp 
and  Gesenius.  So  successful  was  he  in  his  theological  studies 
that  he  twice  gained  a  prize  of  honor.  His  interest  at  this 
time  was  to  no  small  degree  philosophical  also,  and  this  inter- 
est it  was,  perhaps,  that  brought  him  back  the  following  year 
to  Berlin.  The  young  theologian  then  took  his  first  exami- 
nations, and  in  order  to  qualify  himself  for  practical  work, 
became  a  hearer  of  the  best  pulpit  orators  in  Berlin,  among 
whom  was  Schleiermacher,  whose  church  every  Sunday  was 
the  assembling  place  of  the  most  cultivated  church-goers.  It 
was  while  attending  these  discourses  that  the  young  theolo- 
gian first  became  clearly  conscious  of  his  true  mission. 
"That  was,"  says  Dr.  Schmidt,  "to  open  up  anew  path  in 
the  province  of  philosophy."1  This  insight  into  the  nature 
of  his  mission  was  doubtless  partly  the  result  of  Schleier- 
macher's  stimulation,  and  partly  the  result  of  the  searching 
conversations  which  Beneke  was  accustomed   to   hold  with 

1  Padagogisches  Jahrbuch  fur  /Sj6,  p.  8. 


2gol  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  \j 

his  brother,  as  the  two  wended  their  way  to  hear  the  great 
preacher.  At  any  rate,  this  mission  became  at  this  time  the 
resolution  of  his  life,  and  the  following  two  years  were  spent 
in  active  preparation  for  his  work. 

In  the  winter  of  1820,  Beneke  began  as  privat  docent,  his 
first  lectures  at  the  University  of  Berlin.  In  his  inaugural 
dissertation,  De  verts  philosophies  initiis,  he  struck  the  key- 
note of  the  "  pioneer  movement"  which  he  contemplated. 
This  new  philosophical  standpoint  had  indeed  already  been 
indicated  in  two  small  works,'2  previously  published  this  year, 
but  in  the  inaugural  it  was,  as  Dressier  says,  still  "  more 
clearly  demonstrated."  The  new  standpoint  contended  for 
in  the  three  works  mentioned,  questioned  most  deeply  the 
matter  of  philosophical  method,  and  the  prevailing  theory  of 
knowledge.  As  to  the  first  point,  in  its  declarations  against 
the  a  priori  method  it  was  most  emphatic,  setting  over  against 
this  method  a  purely  empirical  one,  and  holding  that  the 
fundamental  basis  for  all  knowledge  must  be  experience — 
inner  experience.  This  was  directed  in  part  against  the 
Kantian  a  priori  "forms"  of  knowledge,  in  part  against  the 
prevailing  attempt  to  reach  a  knowledge  of  the  absolute  de- 
ductively. As  to  the  second  point,  it  criticised  sharply  the 
Kantian  doctrine  of  the  "  internal  sense,"  which  regarded 
this  form  of  experience  as  also  phenomenal,  and  so  as  yield- 
ing no  absolute  knowledge  of  the  Soul  or  Ego  in  itself.  In 
opposition  to  this,  it  enunciated  the  important  principle  that 
in  inner  experience  we  gain  absolute  knowledge  of  a  thing  in 
itself,  and  that  thing  the  soul.  Or,  to  put  it  in  the  words  of 
Falckenberg,  who  has  most  compactly  and  clearly  sum- 
marized Beneke's  position  as  set  forth  in  these  works : 

2  Outlines  of  the  Theory  of  Knowledge  (Erkenntnisslehre  nach  dem  Beivusst- 
seiti  der  reinen  Vernunft  in  ihren  Grundziigen  dargelegt,  Jena,  1820). 

Empirical  Psychology  as  the  Basis  of  all  Knowlege  {Erfahrungsseelenlehre  ah 
Grundlage  alles  Wissens  in  ihren  Hauptzugen  dargestellt,  Berlin,  1820). 


FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE 


[284 


"  The  root  and  basis  of  all  knowledge  is  experience  ;  meta- 
physics is  itself  an  empirical  science ;  it  is  the  last  in  the 
series  of  philosophical  disciplines.  Whoever  begins  with 
metaphysics,  instead  of  ending  with  it,  begins  the  house  at 
the  roof.  The  point  of  departure  for  all  cognition  is  inner 
experience  or  self-observation ;  hence  the  fundamental 
science  is  psychology,  and  all  other  branches  of  philosophy 
nothing  but  applied  psychology.  By  the  inner  sense  we 
perceive  our  ego  as  it  really  is,  not  merely  as  it  appears  to 
us  ;  the  only  object  whose  per  se  we  immediately  know  is  the 
soul ;  in  self-consciousness  being  and  representation  are 
one."3 

When  it  is  remembered  that  the  prevailing  philosophy  at 
Berlin  at  this  time  was  that  of  Hegel,  and  that  the  influence 
of  Fichte  had  by  no  means  yet  passed  away,  one  is  able  to  ap- 
preciate the  Herculean  task  to  which  Beneke,  nothing  daunted, 
had  set  himself.  But  the  young  twenty-four-year-old  privat 
docent  soon  found  that  his  real  difficulties  were  to  come  not 
from  a  fair  and  inherent  conflict  of  thought  with  thought,  in 
which  truth  would  be  given  opportunity  to  prevail,  but  from 
personal  and  preconceived  opposition,  backed  by  the  keen 
edge  of  governmental  authority. 

II  INTERDICTION  AND  SOJOURN  AT  GOTTINGEN 
Early  in  the  summer  of  1822,  Beneke's  lectures  at  Berlin 
were  brought  to  a  sudden  close.  Notice  was  sent  that  dur- 
ing the  comming  summer  semester  his  lectures  must  not  be 
continued.  Beneke  was  astounded.  With  a  good  deal  of 
persistence,  he  sought  again  and  again  from  the  authorities 
some  explanation  of  the  interdiction,  but  in  vain.  Finally  he 
appealed  to  the  government.  At  last,  to  one  of  the  many 
remonstrances  made  by  him,  he  received  from  Minister  Von 

3  Falckenberg,  History  of  Modern  Philosophy  (tr.  by  A.  C.  Armstrong,  New 
York,  1893),  p.  510. 


28c]  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  jg 

Altenstein,  under  date  of  March  5,  1822,  a  letter*  in  which 
it  was  stated  that  his  recently  published  book,  "  Ground- 
work of  the  Physics  of  Morals,"  had  caused  some  doubt  as 
to  his  fitness  to  teach,  and  until  some  decision  could  be 
reached  on  this  point,  his  lectures  could  not  be  received. 
Further,  that  the  matter  had  been  turned  over  to  Chancellor 
Schultz,  to  whom  he  must  apply  for  any  further  explanation. 
Many  efforts  were  made  to  see  Chancellor  Schultz,  but  he 
was  a  hard  man  to  get  at.  Finally,  after  a  long  delay, 
Beneke's  uncle  succeeded  in  getting  a  letter  from  him,  dated 
July  15,  1822,  in  which  he  said  that  maturer  investigation 
had  only  confirmed  his  originally  hasty  impression,  viz. : 
that  Minister  Von  Altenstein  had  sufficient  reason  to  refuse 
Beneke's  lectures.  "  Ina  ccordance  with  my  duty  and  con- 
science," he  writes,  "  I  cannot  therefore  propose  anything 
else  than  that  henceforth  permission  to  deliver  philosophical 
discourses  at  this  place  continue  denied  to  Dr.  Beneke."5 

One  learns  with  a  good  deal  of  indignation  of  the  efforts, 
official  and  personal,  which  were  made  to  stifle  the  opposing 
thought  of  the  promising  young  philosopher.  There  seems 
good  reason  for  believing  that  these  efforts  were  ultimately 
traceable  to  the  influence  of  Hegel,  whose  overweening  belief 
in  the  superiority  of  his  own  philosophical  system  had  made 
him  inimical  even  to  the  privilege  of  a  hearing  for  an  oppos- 
ing thinker.  While  the  ostensible  cause  for  Beneke's  exclu- 
sion from  the  University  was  his  "  Physics  of  Morals,"  and 
the  formal  objection  to  this  was  contained  in  the  use  of  the 
term  "  Physics,"  back  of  this  lay  a  far  deeper  reason,  to 
which  indeed  this  word  "Physics"  was  the  keynote.  For 
Beneke  had  used  the  term  as  a  sharp  antithesis  to  "  Meta- 
physics," meaning  thereby  to  differentiate   his   own  method 

4  Given  in  the  Piidagogisches  Jahrbuch,  1856,  pp.  9-10. 

3  Pada%o%isches  Jahrbuch,  1856,  p.  II.     The  letter  is  given  in  full. 


20  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [286 

from  the  metaphysical  one  of  Kant,  Fichte,  Schelling,  and 
Hegel.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  was  Beneke's  intelligent  op- 
position to  this  method  that  the  government,  under  the 
influence  of  Hegel,  endeavored  to  crush. 

Ueberweg  goes  no  further,  it  is  true,  than  to  say  that 
"  Beneke  pretended  to  have  discovered  that  this  interdict 
resulted  from  the  representations  made  by  Hegel  to  his 
friend,  Minister  von  Altenstein,  and  that  Hegel's  object  was 
to  prevent  the  propagation  and  reception  at  the  University 
of  Berlin  of  any  philosophy  hostile  to  his  own  and  akin  to 
the  doctrine  of  Schleiermacher  and  Fries."6  Falckenberg, 
however,  expressly  concedes7  that  Hegel  was  "unfavorably 
disposed  toward"  Beneke,  and  there  seems  to  have  been 
good  ground  for  Beneke's  belief.  For  that  the  opposition 
to  him  did  not  originate  with  the  government,  but  had  its 
source  within  the  University,  appears  evidenced  by  the  fact 
that  Minister  Von  Altenstein,  in  his  first  letter  to  Beneke, 
tried  to  shift  at  least  the  complete  explanation  of  the  whole 
matter  upon  the  shoulders  of  the  University  authorities, 
to  whom  Beneke  was  referred  for  "further  explanation."8 
More  than  that,  at  the  time  when  Beneke  first  received  notice 
that  his  lectures  were  prohibited,  and  sought  out  the  author- 
ities for  some  cause,  "A  person  somewhat  important  at  the 
time,"  says  Dr.  Schmidt/  "  who  was  approached  by  Beneke's 
anxious  relatives  for  advice  and  help  in  behalf  of  the  young 
man,  whose  whole  career  seemed  blighted  by  the  exclusion, 
advised  them  in  confidence  that  he  should,  howsoever  sour 
it  might  be  for  him,  teach  the  Hegelian  philosophy  for  a  few 
years    for   appearance    sake,    so   that   later,  when   his   place 

6  History  of  Philosophy  (Jr.  by  Morris,  New  York,  1 888),  Vol.  II,  p.  283. 

7  History  of  Modem  Philosophy,  p.  510. 

8  For  this  letter  in  full  see  Piidagogisches  Jahrbuch,  1856,  p.  10. 

9  Ibid.,  pp.  8-9. 


287]  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  21 

seemed  assured,  he  might  gradually  bend  around  again  to 
his  own  system."  One  is  not  surprised  to  find  Dr.  Schmidt 
adding  that  Beneke  "  rejected  this  proposition  with  scorn." 
For  he  was  more  bent  on  ultimate  truth  than  on  the  propa- 
gation of  any  system  as  system,  even  his  own. 

That  the  real  source  of  the  opposition  to  his  lecturing  was 
Hegelian,  Beneke  finally,  after  many  written  remonstrances, 
succeeded  in  wringing  from  Minister  von  Altenstein  himself.. 
"The  Minister  himself,"  says  Dr.  Schmidt,  "repeatedly  ex- 
plained to  Beneke  in  person  that:  'No  single  proposition  of 
his  philosophy  had  given  offence,  but  the  whole  of  it ;  a 
philosophy  which  did  not  deduce  everything  from  the  abso- 
lute, which  did  not  explain  everything  in  relation  to  the 
absolute,  was  in  general  no  philosophy,  and  could  not  be 
tolerated  as  philosophy.'"10  Beneke  was  unable  to  refrain 
from  giving  vent  to  his  opposite  convictions ;  but  his  bold- 
ness in  contradicting  a  philosophical  doctrine  supported  by 
a  Minister  of  State  made  matters  only  worse.11 

Not  satisfied  with  prohibiting  his  lectures  at  Berlin,  Von 
Altenstein,  "irritated,"  says  Ueberweg,  "by  the  further 
steps  on  the  part  of  Beneke,  found  means  to  force  the  Saxon 
government,  which  had  designated  him  for  a  regular  profes- 
sorship of  Philosophy,  not  to  appoint  to  that  position  a  pri- 
vat  docent,  from  whom,  although  politically  unsuspected,  in 
Prussia  the  Venia  legendi  had  been  withdrawn.12     The  full 

10  Padagogisches  fahrbuch,  p  12. 

11  It  is  a  matter  of  historical  interest  to  compare  this  governmental  aid  to  the 
Hegelian  system  with  the  return  service  of  that  system  to  the  Government.  On 
this  point  the  judgment  of  Schvvegler  is  interesting.  In  his  Handbook  of  the  His- 
tory of  Philosophy  (tr.  by  Stirling,  Edinburgh),  speaking  of  Hegel  after  his  call  to 
Berlin,  he  says  (p.  322),  "  Here  too,  he  acquired  from  his  connexion  with  the 
Prussian  bureaucracy,  as  well  politcal  influence  for  himself,  as  the  credit  for  his 
system  of  a  State-philosophy :  not  always  to  the  advantage  of  the  inner  freedom  of 
his  philosophy,  or  of  its  moral  worth." 

12  History,  Vol.  II,  p.  283. 


22  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [288 

details  of  this  persecution  of  Beneke  are  given  by  Dr. 
Schmidt  in  the  biographical  notice  already  referred  to.  It 
appears  that  the  authorities  at  the  University  of  Jena  had 
already  set  their  eyes  on  Beneke  for  a  full  professorship,  and 
in  November,  1822,  wrote  to  Von  Altenstein,  asking  whether 
a  professorship  in  their  University*  might  be  transferred  to 
him.  Beneke  learned  of  the  matter  first  in  March,  1823. 
He  then  received  a  letter  from  General  Superintendent  Rohr, 
informing  him  of  the  affair,  and  saying  that  up  to  that  time 
no  answer  had  been  received  from  the  Minister. 

The  Saxon  government  had  been  forced  to  make  this  ap- 
plication to  the  government  at  Berlin,  because  of  what  Ue- 
berweg  calls  the  "forced  interpretation"  of  "certain  illiberal 
resolutions  of  the  German  Confederation."  Ueberweg  speaks 
as  though  this  interpretation  was  made  by  Von  Altenstein, 
although  Dr.  Schmidt  says  that  it  had  been  rendered  to 
Rohr  by  "  a  person  high  in  authority  in  Weimar."13  This 
person  had  said  to  Rohr:  "I  should  be  very  willing  to  help 
our  Jena,  and  consequently  Dr.  Beneke ;  only  I  do  not  see 
how  this  is  possible,  as  long  as  the  anathema  in  Berlin  is  not 
withdrawn,  or  at  least  is  not  mitigated  to  us  by  an  explana- 
tion. The  prohibition  of  a  privat  docent  to  teach  is  the  same 
as  the  removal  of  an  officially  appointed  professor.  We 
must  assume — this  much  one  goverment  owes  to  another — ■■ 
that  the  royal  Prussian  government  has  acted  for  a  cause, 
and  in  a  legitimate  way.  And  now,  there  is  the  familiar  res- 
olution of  the  Diet,  steadfast  adherence  to  which  His  Royal 
Highness  the  Grand  Duke  imposed  upon  us  as  our  duty  from 
the  moment  when  it  was  settled  as  a  resolution  and  a  law  of 
the  Confederation.  As  usually  the  last,  here  the  first  word 
decides  :  '  An  excluded  teacher  may  not  be  reinstated  by  an- 
other confederated  state  in  any  public  institution  of  learn- 
ing.'    lIta  lex  scripta  est!  "     There  was  therefore  nothing  for 

^Padagogisches  Jahrbuch,^.  12. 


289]  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BENEKE  2  3 

the  authorities  at  Jena  to  do  but  first  get  permission  of  Von 
Altenstein  to  bring  Beneke  to  Weimar.  But  their  letter 
containing  this  request  that  honorable  Minister  had  seen  fit 
to  ignore. 

Shortly  after  the  receipt  of  Superintendent  Rohr's  letter, 
Beneke  applied  to  Minister  Von  Altenstein  for  a  testimonial 
showing  that  there  was  no  accusation  against  him  which  pre- 
vented his  taking  a  situation  abroad.  Von  Altenstein  re- 
plied promptly,  but  this  is  what  he  said :  "  In  reply  to  your 
memorial  of  the  5th  inst.,  I  hereby  inform  you  that,  al- 
though I  have  found  myself  obliged  to  prohibit  entirely  the 
continuance  of  your  philosophical  lectures  at  the  University 
of  this  place,  partly  because,  in  consequence  of  your  writings 
becoming  known  to  me,  in  general  I  was  not  able  to  have 
confidence  in  the  maturity  of  your  insight,  a  thing  which 
should  distinguish  the  teacher  of  a  philosophical  discipline, 
partly  because  in  particular  I  was  obliged  to  criticize  in  you 
an  onesidedness  of  consideration,  which  could  easily  have 
influenced  to  their  great  disadvantage  young  men  who  were 
to  be  introduced  to  the  study  of  philosophy  by  you, — still, 
in  other  respects,  I  have  found  not  the  least  thing  to  object 
either  against  your  conduct  or  your  sentiments."14 

Of  course  such  a  "testimonial"  not  only  absolutely  pre- 
vented Beneke  from  getting  the  position  at  Jena,  but  tended 
to  do  him  positive  harm. 

It  is  interesting  to  note,  however,  that  this  ministerial 
opinion  was  not  shared  at  Jena.  Von  Altenstein  had  been 
so  outspoken  in  his  opinion  that  of  course  there  was  no  al- 
ternative for  the  Saxon  government ;  but  Rohr,  in  a  letter 
to  Beneke,  made  very  plain  the  feeling  of  disappointment  at 
Jena  over  the  outcome  of  the  negotiations.  In  this  letter, 
dated  September  16,  he  further  said:  "Had  not  the  minis- 
terial testimonial  given  to  you  expressly  said  your  philoso- 

u Padagogisches  yahrbuch,  1856,  p.  13. 


24  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [290 

phy  could  easily  influence  to  their  detriment  young  students, 
one  would  perhaps  easily  have  decided  in  your  favor;  but 
such  decided  suspicions,  necessarily,  in  consideration  of  the 
circumstances,  caused  the  better  private  convictions  of  our 
Ministry,  which  were  grounded  on  your  writings,  to  remain 
silent."15  I  have  italicised  some  of  the  last  few  words  to  em- 
phasize how  Beneke's  thought,  considered  in  itself,  was  re- 
garded by  others. 

Since,  in  very  consequence  of  this  deliberate  and  resolute 
attempt  to  stifle  his  philosophy,  Beneke  desired  only  the 
more  to  continue  as  a  University  teacher,  he  finally,  in  the 
beginning  of  the  year  1824,  repaired  to  Gottingen,  where  he 
remained  for  three  years.  Here  his  system  grew  rapidly 
under  his  facile  pen,  and  as  a  result  of  his  activity  during 
this  period,16  we  have  two  of  his  best  works,  the  "  Psycholo- 
gical Sketches,"  (Psychologische  Skizzen),11  in  two  volumes, 
and  the  "Relation  of  Soul  and  Body"  (Das  Verhaltniss  von 
Seele  und  Leib). 

Dressier  speaks  in  the  highest  praise  of  the  Skizzen.  He 
says :  "  These  are  no  mere  outlines  of  psychological  science, 
but  in  them  this  knowledge  is  presented  in  complete  detail, 
and  one  finds  here  a  richness  of  psychological  observation 
such  as  only  a  Beneke  can  supply.  No  nation  has  a  like 
work  which  can  bear  comparison  with  it,  and  it  is  not  too 
much  to  assert  that  in  it  we  have  the  discovery  of  an  entirely 
new  world  (the  discovery  of  the  inner  world).  What  the 
feelings  truly  are,  wherein  they  differ  from  the  other  activi- 
ties of  the  soul,  no  one  before  Beneke's  time  was  able  to  de- 

lbPiidagogisches  Jahrbiich,  p.  14. 

16  Before  going  to  Gottingen,  and  while  he  was  waiting  for  the  removal  of  the 
dark  cloud  overhanging  him,  Beneke  put  forth  two  other  works :  "  An  Apol- 
ogy for  my  Groundwork  of  the  Physics  of  Morals;"  and  "Contributions  to  a 
purely  Psychological  Theory  of  Psychological  Pathology." 

17  These  two  volumes  were  first  published  separately  under  different  titles. 


2q  i  -]  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  2  5 

termine ;  further,  how  consciousness  arises,  changes  and 
raises  itself  to  higher  forms,  likewise  was  first  proven  agree- 
able to  nature  by  him   *   *   ."I8 

Early  in  1827  Beneke  was  given  permission  to  resume  his 
lectures  at  Berlin.  "  Whether,"  says  Schmidt,  "  the  latter 
(his  system)  had  now  gained  authority  alongside  of  others 
also  in  Berlin,  or  Beneke's  significance  itself  had  become 
more  recognized,  or  one  thought  to  make  good  to  Beneke 
the  neglect  occasioned  through  misunderstanding — whatever 
it  was,  it  happened  that  his  earlier  relations  with  the  Univer- 
sity of  Berlin  were  restored,  when,  at  Easter,  1827,  he  re- 
turned to  Berlin,  where  his  presence  at  that  time  was  required 
by  family  circumstances."19 

Beneke's  later  life  in  Berlin  will  be  considered  in  the  next 
chapter. 

18  Ktirze  Charakteristik  der  Sammtlichen  Werke  Beneke's,  p.  294.  Given  as 
an  appendix  to  the  fourth  edition  of  Beneke's  lehrbuch,  Berlin,  1877. 

19  Pddagogisches  Jahrbuch,  p.  15. 


CHAPTER   II 

Life  Activity  at  Berlin 

With  his  return  to  the  University  of  Berlin  in  1827, 
Beneke  began  a  long  active  career,  which  lasted  till  his  death 
in  1854.  In  treating  of  this  period  I  shall  speak  of  his  intel- 
lectual development,  of  his  life  effort  and  literary  activity, 
and  finally,  of  his  character. 

I     INTELLECTUAL    DEVELOPMENT 

I.  Formative  Philosophical  Influence — It  is  a  matter  of 
interest  both  to  inquire  the  nature  of  the  intellectual  equip- 
ment with  which  Beneke  began  his  renewed  career  at  Berlin 
and  to  indicate  the  lines  of  his  philosophical  development. 
The  early  writings  of  Beneke  themselves  bear  ample  testi- 
mony to  the  formative  influences  at  work  upon  the  prom- 
ising young  philosopher;  but,  if  it  were  needed,  we  have  the 
personal  testimony  of  Beneke  himself.  In  later  years  some 
German  critics,  especially  Drobisch,1  savagely  attacked  the 
character  of  Beneke,  claiming  that  he  was  little  more  than  a 
Herbartian  pure  and  simple ;  that  he  had  sought  to  give  the 
appearance  of  originality  to  his  system  more  through  new 
terms  than  new  ideas ;  and  that  he  had  given  himself  a  good 
deal  of  uncalled-for  trouble  in  trying  to  differentiate  himself 
from  Herbart.  Beneke,  in  a  valuable  comparison  of  his  own 
psychology  with  that  of  Herbart,"'  took  occasion  in  a  histor- 

1  See  Die  Neue  Psydwlogie,  pp.  76-77. 

2  Ibid.     Dritter  Aufsatz  :  "  Ueber  das  Verhaltniss  fneiner  Psychologie  ztir  Her- 
bart 'schen"  pp.  76-144. 

26  [292 


293]  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BENEKE  2  7 

ical   preliminary  to  answer    the   unfounded  charge   against 
both  his  character  and  his  system. 

So  far  as  the  influence  of  Herbart  on  Beneke  is  concerned, 
to  see  its  lack  one  has  only  to  recall  the  inherent  character 
of  his  earliest  three  writings,  to  the  fundamental  principles 
of  which  Beneke,  as  he  himself  claimed,  remained  true 
throughout  his  whole  career.  These  principles  were  indeed 
so  opposed  in  method  to  that  of  Herbart  that  the  "  empiri- 
cism "  of  Beneke  was  in  his  early  days  the  very  ground  of 
his  being  regarded  a  resolute  opponent  both  of  Herbart  and 
of  the  speculative  or  metaphysical  method  for  which  he 
stood.  It  is  true  that  Beneke  later  read  with  grateful  appre- 
ciation Herbart's  works,  with  some  conclusions  of  which  his 
own  results  in  part  coincided.  But  the  germs  of  his  devel- 
oped system  were  already  almost  all  clearly  indicated  in  the 
works  mentioned,  and  at  the  time  of  writing  these  Beneke 
knew  little  or  nothing  of  Herbart's  philosophy.  On  this 
point  Beneke  has  left  an  interesting  record.  He  says  :  "  In 
the  time  of  my  real  mental  formation,  in  the  time  when  my 
previously  thoroughly  fleeting  and  changing  spirit  began  to 
assume  a  definitely  fixed  form  and  build  up  the  fundamental 
tendencies  which  it  afterwards  for  the  most  part  followed 
throughout  my  whole  life  almost  unchanged,  Herbart  was 
entirely  unknown  to  me.  I  had  made,  in  addition  to  the 
admirable  English  philosophers,  German  philosophical  in- 
vestigators, particularly  Kant,  Jacobi,  Fries  (at  the  sug- 
gestion of  De  Wette),  Platner  and  Garve,  the  object  of 
laborious  study.  The  influence  of  all  these,  in  my  first  three 
writings,  in  the  'Theory  of  Knowledge,'  'Empirical  Psy- 
chology,' and  '  Doctor's  Dissertation,'  is  not  to  be  mis- 
taken ;  of  any  influence  of  Herbart  not  a  trace  is  found.  *  *  * 
Of  course  there  are  to  be  found  already  in  these  incomplete 
youthful  essays  various  traces  of  what  the  direction  of  my 
psychological   investigations   made  common  to  me  and  to 


FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE 


[294 


Herbart,  e.  g.,  of  the  polemic  against  innate  abstract  psy- 
chical powers.  But  how  differently  is  this  grounded,  and 
how  differently  carried  out!  Compare  especially  pages  54— 
73  of  the  '  Empirical  Psychology.'  The  rejection  of  the 
previous  theory  and  the  definition  of  what  is  to  be  put  in  the 
place  of  it  was  accomplished  inductively,  on  the  basis  of  a 
comparison  of  the  products  of  inner  observation,  without  the 
slightest  intermixture  of  speculative  foundations."3 

The  more  positive  influences  on  his  early  development 
Beneke  has  set  forth  in  the  passage  just  quoted.  Perhaps  a 
word  further  deserves  to  be  said  of  the  influence  of  English 
thought  upon  him.  He  had  a  complete  mastery  of  the  Eng- 
lish tongue ;  corresponded  in  English  with  many  English 
philosophers  and  educationalists,  among  them  Sir  William 
Hamilton  and  Dr.  Arnold  of  Rugby ;  and  his  works  are  a 
lasting  monument  to  his  extended  scholarship  not  only  in 
English  philosophy*  but  in  English  literature  as  well.  To 
mention  all  the  philosophical  works  with  which  he  showed 
personal  acquaintance  would  be  to  enumerate  about  all  the 
English  philosophers  from  Bacon  and  Locke  down  to  John 
Stuart  Mill.  His  writings  show  that  he  was  perhaps  more 
directly  influenced  by  Locke  and  Hume,  and  by  the  con- 
temporary Scottish  philosophers,  in  whose  works,  especially 
those  of  Brown  and  Stewart,  he  took  a  keen  critical  interest. 

2.   Relation    to   Kant — (a)   The    connecting   clue    to    the 

3  Die  Neue  Psychologie,  pp.  80-81.  On  this  point  compare  also  Ueberweg,  Vol. 
II,  p.  282. — "  Not  until  his  first  three  works  (Outlines  of  the  Science  of  Cogni- 
tion, Empirical  Psychology  as  the  Basis  of  all  Knowledge,  and  De  veris  philoso- 
phic initiis,  his  Doctor's  Dissertation)  had  already  appeared  (in  1820)  did  he 
become  acquainted  with  one  of  Herbart's  works;  that  work  was  the  second  edi- 
tion of  the  Introduction  to  Philosophy  (1821);  until  then  he  had  possessed  only 
a  superficial  knowledge  (acquired  perhaps  through  Stiedenroth's  Theorie  des 
Wissens,  GSttingen,  1819,)  of  Herbart's  views." 

*  See  an  interesting  sketch  by  Beneke  of  the  contemporary  philosophical  stand- 
point in  England  in  Die  Neue  Psychologie,  pp.  300-336. 


2  g  c  ]  FRIEDR1 CH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  2  9 

philosophical  development  of  Beneke  during  the  days  of  his 
activity  at  Berlin  is  the  philosophy  of  Kant.  Of  this  system 
Beneke  from  the  outset  showed  himself  a  keen  critic.  And 
in  no  point  keener  than  in  his  discussions  of  the  "  internal 
sense  "  and  of  the  employment  of  the  a  priori  method.  His 
attitude  towards  Kant  in  these  respects,  however,  will  be  con- 
sidered with  more  detail  in  the  subsequent  exposition  of  his 
philosophy. 

(b)  There  is  one  point,  however,  in  respect  to  Beneke's 
relation  to  Kant,  that  calls  for  special  emphasis.  The  his- 
torical importance  of  Beneke  as  the  real  pioneer  of  "the 
movement  back  to  Kant,"  has  never  been  sufficiently  recog- 
nized, or  more  than  that,  it  has  not  been  recognized  at  all.5 
While  Beneke,  single  handed,  spent  much  of  his  effort  in  re- 
futing Kant,  and  especially  the  a  priori  method  as  it  was 
afterwards  developed  in  the  philosophies  of  Fichte,  Schelling 
and  Hegel,  nevertheless,  for  him,  in  the  Kantian  system  was 
to  be  found  the  true  foundation  and  starting  point  for  philos- 

5  Falckenberg,  in  his  History,  p.  589,  speaking  of  the  more  modern  "  movement 
back  to  Kant,"  says :  "  The  Kantian  philosophy  has  created  two  epochs :  one  at 
the  time  of  its  appearance,  and  the  second  two  generations  after  the  death  of  its 
author.  The  new  Kantian  movement,  which  is  one  of  the  most  prominent  char- 
acteristics of  the  philosophy  of  the  present  time,  took  its  beginnings  a  quarter  of 
a  century  ago'.  It  is  true  that  even  before  1865  individual  thinkers  like  Ernst 
Reinhold  of  Jena  (died  1855),  the  admirer  of  Fries,  J.  B.  Meyer,  of  Bonn,  K.  G. 
von  Reichlin-Meldegg,  and  others,  had  sought  a  point  of  departure  for  their 
views  in  Kant;  that  K.  Fischer's  work  on  Kant,  i860,  had  given  a  lively  impulse  to 
the  renewed  study  of  the  critical  philosophy;  nay,  that  the  cry,  "Back  to  Kant," 
had  been  expressly  raised  by  Fortlage  (as  early  as  1832,  in  his  treatise,  The  Gaps 
in  the  Hegelian  System),  and  by  Zeller." 

Falckenberg  thus,  while  tracing  the  movement  even  so  far  back  as  to  Fortlage, 
ignores  Beneke.  But  the  real  "  opening  gun"  of  this  movement  was  Beneke's 
little  Kantian  Memorial,  in  celebration  of  the  fiftieth  anniversary  of  the  Critique 
of  Pure  Reason.  While  the  imprint  of  the  book  is  1832,  as  the  prefatory  note 
shows,  it  had  been  written  and  finished  before  November,  1831.  Fortlage,  more- 
over, who  had  been  one  of  Beneke's  students,  and  was  an  ardent  admirer  of  him 
and  his  system,  doubtless  had  imbibed  many  of  his  views  on  this  point. 


30  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [296 

ophy.  In  a  little  book,6  which  has  deserved  a  better  fate  at 
the  hands  of  historians  of  German  philosophy,  and  which  is 
perhaps  destined  to  become  of  permanent  historical  value7 
for  its  picture  of  the  philosophical  situation  of  the  times,  he 
expressly  advocates  the  need  of  a  return  to  a  criticised 
Kantian  basis,  and  indeed  towards  this  end  much  of  his  life's 
activity  was  directed.  Beneke's  express  statement  is  con- 
tained in  the  closing  paragraph  of  the  introduction,  in  which 
he  pictures  the  condition  of  a  philosophical  Germany  be- 
come, in  the  terms  of  Sir  James  Mackintosh,  "  metaphysi- 
cally mad."  He  says  :  "  It  is  also  high  time  that  we  became 
conscious  of  the  confusion  which  for  so  long  a  time  now  has 
prevailed  with  the  highest  and  most  venerated  among  us, 
under  the  pretext  of  representing  the  inner  being  of  all 
things  in  their  purest  truth.  If  we  do  not  wish  to  expose 
ourselves  to  the  danger  of  having  the  sore,  which  has  been 
healed  on  the  one  side,  break  out  again  on  the  other  in  only 
more  perilous  form,  we  must  direct  our  criticism  not  to  the 
daughter  and  granddaughter  philosophies,  but  to  the  Kantian 
philosophy  itself,  in  order  where  possible  to  lay  bare  the  very 
root  of  the  evil  in  this,  and  to  stop  at  the  source  the  stream 
which  threatens  to  inundate  Germany  with  an  intellectual 
barbarism."8 

6  Kant  und  die  philosopkische  Aufgabe  unserer  Zeit.  Eine  Jubeldenkschrift 
auf  die  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft.     Berlin,  1832. 

"An  interesting  confirmation  of  the  judgment  here  expressed  is  to  be  found  in 
Bergmann's  Geschichte  der  Philosophie  (Berlin,  1893).  Bergmann  in  his  article 
on  Beneke  has  palpably  and  expressly  made  valuable  use  of  the  Kant  Memorial. 
It  may  be  scarcely  necessary  to  repeat  (see  Introductory  Note  J  that  the  present 
work  was  planned  and  completely  written  entirely  without  any  knowledge  of 
Bergmann's  History,  which  only  fell  into  the  writer's  hands  as  the  work  is  going 
to  press. 

8  Kant  und  die  philosopkische  Aufgabe,  p.  II. 


297]  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  3! 

II     LIFE   EFFORT   AND    LITERARY   ACTIVITY 

I .  Opposition  to  the  Philosophical  Tendencies  of  the  Tijnes 
— Beneke's  little  memorial  on  "Kant  and  the  Philosophical 
Problem  of  our  Time,"  has  a  peculiar  significance,  because 
it  is  indicative  of  what  was  really  his  life  effort — a  profound 
critical  opposition  to  the  philosophical  tendencies  of  the 
times.  This  opposition  was  not  one  directed  against  either 
an  individual  or  individuals;  it  was  an  earnest  and  serious 
effort  to  bring  back  the  German  mind  to  the  narrow  path  of 
truth,  from  which  in  Beneke's  view  it  was  sadly  erring.  In 
pursuance  of  this  object,  Beneke  had  issued  the  book  above 
mentioned,  the  second  but  most  important  work  issued  by 
him  after  his  return  to  Berlin.  In  this  book,  which  was  in- 
tended as  a  commemoration  of  the  semi-centennial  of  Kant's 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  first  issued  in  1 781,  he  set  forth  in 
no  uncertain  terms  his  attitude  towards  the  prevailing  ten- 
dencies. The  purpose  of  the  Kantian  Memorial  was  three- 
fold:  1.  To  examine  the  fundamental  tendencies  of  the 
Kantian  Critique,  and  discover  the  inherent  reasons  for  its 
failure  to  accomplish  its  avowed  purpose;  2.  To  show  in 
general  outline  the  character  of  the  later  German  systems  as 
conditioned  on  the  Kantian  point  of  view;  3.  To  glance  at 
the  future  outlook. 

Beneke  is  very  severe  in  his  denunciation  of  the  purely 
metaphysical  character  of  the  later  German  systems.  He 
says:  "When  Fichte  regards  the  Ego  as  going  out  of  itself 
in  an  unending  activity,  as  setting  before  it  a  barrier  or  the 
Non-ego,  and  returning  from  this  to  itself,  what  else  have 
we  here  but  a  metaphor? — for  in  no  proper  sense  can  we  pos- 
sibly assign  to  an  entirely  non-spatial  spirit  such  movements 
in  space.  When  later  the  Schellingian  school  talk  of  the 
poles  of  the  absolute,  of  the  disuniting  of  these,  of  a  decay- 
ing of  ideas ;  or  Hegel  speaks  of  the  going  forth  from  itself 
of  the  abstract  to  its  non-being,  and  of  a  return  of  the  same 


32  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [298 

into  itself;  these  are  all  symbols  which  it  can  enter  into  the 
minds  of  no  one  to  apply  as  truly  scientific  predicates,  from 
the  construction  of  which  a  true  conception  of  scientific 
knowledge  can  be  gained."  9 

Beneke  too  is  very  summary  in  his  rejection  of  the  view, 
then  very  prevalent,  that  German  philosophy  was  to  be  re- 
garded as  a  systematic  development  ending  with  Hegel.  The 
claims  of  the  later  systems  to  a  Kantian  foundation  were  re- 
garded by  him  as  utterly  false.  "  We  have,  it  is  asserted," 
he  says,  "  not  merely  philosophical  systems,  such  as  no 
other  people  have,  but  also  a  systematic  evolution  of  philoso- 
phy itself  from  Kant  to  Schelling  and  Hegel ;  and  so  perhaps 
must  the  same  fundamental  ideas  return  ever  in  new  form. 
A  fine  repetition  of  our  systems  is  the  systematic  develop- 
ment of  our  philosophy !  Does  it  call  itself  the  follower  of 
Kant?  Does  it  assert  that  it  is  his  spirit  that  suggests  its 
speculation  to  it?  Nothing  could  be  more  desirable  than 
that  people  should  once  for  all  give  a  clear  account  of  pre- 
cisely what  they  understand  by  this.  Kant  taught  on  every 
page  that  only  on  the  foundations  of  experience  could  true 
knowledge,  knowledge  of  reality,  be  acquired ;  whereas  it 
pushes  the  knowledge  gained  through  experience  con- 
temptuously into  the  background,  in  order  to  possess  a  far 
higher  kind  of  knowledge  in  the  pure  imagination,  and  in  its 
chimercal  process  of  construction.  Kant  is  ever  coming 
back  to  this  point,  that  out  of  mere  concepts  no  knowledge 
of  the  existing  is  possible,  that  all  speculative  reasoning 
leads  only  to  chimeras,  that  the  suprasensible  can  never  for 
us  men  become  the  object  of  intuition  or  of  contemplation, 
can  never  be  known  by  us,  but  only  comprehended  through 
moral  faith  ;  whereas  this  derides  faith  in  the  suprasensible 
as  a  minor  accomplishment  belonging  to  the  spirit;  and 
their  whole  philosophy  is  from  beginning  to  end  a  theory  of 

9  Kant  ttnd  die  Philosophischc  Aufgabe,  pp.  41-42. 


2g9l  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  33 

the  suprasensible,  which  it  asserts  itself  to  be  able  to  know 
in  its  inner  being ;  and  therefore  it  employs  itself  also  with 
speculation,  which  Kant,  as  being  unattainable  for  all  time  to 
the  human  spirit,  wished  to  have  banished  from  all  philoso- 
phy. Kant,  although  he  was  called  back  by  them,  made,  as 
did  Socrates  and  his  school,  morality  the  central  point  of  all 
philosophy ;  whereas  it  has  so  placed  morality  in  the  shade 
that  people  have  rightly  doubted  whether  perhaps  it  could 
be  introduced  in  the  construction  of  their  phisolophical  sys- 
tems, except  as  a  most  unpardonable  inconsistency.  Such  a 
system  then  is  in  the  fullest  opposition  to  Kant."10 

Almost  before  the  ink  was  dry  on  the  manuscript  pages  of 
the  book  just  quoted,  Hegel  died.  This  was  on  November 
14,  1 83  1.  Beneke  was  a  man  of  too  much  character  to  incur 
even  the  suspicion  that  his  book  had  been  immediately  writ- 
ten as  a  vindictive  stab  at  the  dead  Hegel.  Undoubtedly, 
therefore,  it  is  Hegel's  death  to  which  he  refers  in  the  follow- 
ing short  prefatory  note  to  the  volume :  "  In  order  to  avoid 
all  misinterpretation,  I  may  remark  that  the  present  volume 
by  no  means  first  originated  in  consequence  of  recent  events, 
but  already  in  August  of  this  year  was  ready  for  publication, 
but  this  was  prevented  at  that  time  by  the  outbreak  of  cholera 
in  our(state.     As  for  the  rest,  the  book  speaks  for  itself."" 

Lectures  and  Writings — It  certainly  is  significant  of  the 
chief  source  of  opposition  to  Beneke  that  in  a  very  short  time 
after  Hegel's  death,  i.  e.,  in  1832,  he  was  appointed  a  pro- 
fessor extraordinarins  (although  not  till  nine  years  after  did 
he  receive  any  salary).1"    While  the  keen  edge  of  the  oppo- 

10  Ibid,  pp.  83-84.  u  Ibid.      Vorerinnerung. 

12  Compare  the  remarks  of  Dr.  Schmidt,  Padagogisches  Jahrbuch,  1856,  p.  15. 
So  lasting,  however,  was  the  Hegelian  opposition,  that  a  petition  to  make  Beneke 
a  regular  professor,  signed  by  over  800  members  of  a  schoolmasters'  convention, 
held  in  Dresden  in  1848,  and  some  200  others,  gotten  up  unknown  to  Beneke  by 
Dressier,  and  sent  by  him  to  Minister  Rodbertus  at  Berlin,  proved,  notwithstand- 
ing Beneke's  twenty-one  years  of  continuous  and  unremitting  service,  unsuccessful. 
Cf.  Dressler's  article,  Padagogisches  Jahrbuch,  pp.  31-32. 


34  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  (joq 

sition  to  him  was  thus  removed,  nevertheless  throughout  the 
rest  of  his  career  he  was  overshadowed  by  the  accredited 
Hegelian  system,  and  there  is  something  almost  pathetic  in 
the  way  in  which,  in  his  lectures  and  writings,  he  endeavored, 
single-handed  and  alone,  to  stem  the  overwhelming  current 
of  the  prevailing  philosophical  speculation. 

Dressier  has  left  an  interesting  note  regarding  Beneke's 
lectures,  which,  on  his  first  personal  acquaintance  with 
Beneke  in  1841,  he  attended.  "He  had  very  attentive 
hearers,"  he  says,  "  but  their  number  was  small ;  in  the  year 
1 84 1,  and  following,  only  what  proceeded  from  Hegel  had 
any  influence,  and  he  often  had  to  undergo  the  experience 
of  having  advanced  students  leave  him,  after  one  lecture  to 
which  they  had  listened,  with  the  remark :  '  That  indeed  is 
nothing  more  than  sound  common  sense.'  Since  the  stu- 
dents knew  on  whom  they  would  be  examined,  on  whom 
not,  who  had  influence  for  their  promotion,  and  who  not, 
whose  philosophy  was  thought  proper  high  up,  whose  was 
put  down  with  a  black  mark,  they  did  what  accorded  with 
their  worldly  interest,  and  the  teacher  whom  they  much 
more  willingly  would  have  listened  to  they  left  almost  de- 
serted. When  it  is  known  what  a  wretched  delivery  many 
professors  had  whose  lecture  rooms  nevertheless  were  always 
filled,  Beneke  seems  like  a  true  martyr."  l3 

Beneke's  writings  are  by  no  means  merely  destructive 
criticism.  They  offer  in  the  place  of  that  which  they  attempt 
to  destroy  positive  constructive  work.  I  shall  not  attempt 
to  enumerate  here  all  of  even  the  important  works  which 
Beneke  put  forth  during  this  period.  He  had  the  usual  vol- 
uminousness  of  all  the  German  philosophical  writers,  and 
there  is  a  certain  profusion  and  repetition  about  a  good  deal 
of  his  writing,  due  to  the  fact  that  his  whole  system  centered 
about  his  fundamental  psychological  principles,  which  thus 

13  Dressier,  Padagogisches  Jahrbuch,  1856,  pp.  25-26. 


3  o  I  ]  FRIEDRICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  3  - 

in  each  work  receive  new  statement  and  application.  The 
central  work  of  all  Beneke's  writings  is  the  Lehrbuch  der 
Psychologic  als  Naturwissenschaft,  first  published  in  1833. 
The  permanent  value  of  this  book  may  be  inferred  from  the 
fact  that  it  has  reached  four  editions,14  two  after  the  death  of 
Beneke.  It  is  the  central  work,  because,  as  Dressier  says, 
"  it  presents  with  the  greatest  precision  the  principles  of  the 
new  psychology,"  and  because,  we  may  add,  the  new 
psychology  was  the  fundamental  basis  of  Beneke's  whole 
system.  Die  nene  Psychologic  (Prlautemde  Aufsatze  zur 
Zweitcn  Aiiflage  meines  Lehrbuchs  der  Psychologic  als  Natur- 
wissenschaft, Berlin,  1845),  is  important  for  its  further  eluci- 
dation of  Beneke's  psychological  principles,  and  also  for  the 
comparison  with  Herbart,  already  alluded  to. 

Beneke's  metaphysical  standpoint  is  to  be  found  in  part  in 
almost  all  his  writings,  but  his  complete  views  are  gathered 
together  in  the  System  der  Metaphysik  und  der  Religions 
PJiilosophie,  aus  den  naturlichcn  Grundverhaltnissen  des 
menschlichen  Geistes  abgeleitet,  Berlin,  1840. 

The  most  important  applications  of  his  system  are 
to  be  found  in  his  Erziehungs  und  UnterricJitslehre,  two 
volumes,  the  third  edition  of  which  was  edited  by  Dress- 
ier in  1864;  and  in  the  "  Grundlinien  des  naturlichcn  Sys- 
temes  der  praktischen  Philosophic."  The  latter  consisted  of 
three  volumes :  I.  General  Ethics ;  II.  Special  Ethics ;  III. 
The  Outlines  of  Natural  Law,  of  Politics,  and  of  the  Philoso- 
phy of  Criminal  Law.  Dressier  says  Beneke  regarded  his 
Ethics  as  his  most  successful  work.  One  other  most  in- 
fluential application  of  his, system  was  the  "  System  der  Logik 
als  Kuntslchre  des  Deukens,"  Berlin,  1842.  This  was  on  the 
basis  of  the  Lehrbuch  der  Logik,  which  Beneke  issued  in 
1832,  and  in  which  he  had  already  anticipated  by  a  number 

14  Second  edition,  1845;   3d  ed->  1861;   4th  ed.,  Berlin,  1877,  edited  and  with 
an  appendix  characterizing  Beneke's  whole  works,  by  Johann  Gottlieb  Dressier. 


36  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  ("302 

of  years  the  new  logical  theories  over  the  discovery  of  which 
Sir  William  Hamilton  and  de  Morgan  got  into  controversy.15 

Ill     CHARACTER 

Throughout  the  whole  trying  period  of  his  life  activity  at 
Berlin,  the  character  of  Beneke  stands  out  in  shining  relief. 
Pure  and  manly  in  his  life,  loving  and  affectionate  among  his 
intimates,  faithful  and  strong  in  his  friendships,  forbearing 
towards  his  enemies,  zealous  for  the  truth,  he  won  the  love 
and  admiration  of  all  who  came  in  close  contact  with  him. 

It  is  interesting  to  compare  the  loving  tributes  of  his 
friends  on  these  points.  Diesterweg  in  his  tribute  says :  "As 
a  man  he  was  what  the  ancients  called  an  anima  Candida 
(a  pure  soul)  ;  I  believe  that  he  went  forth  from  this  world 
as  unspotted  as  a  pure  girl."  1B  Schmidt  says:  "That  he  felt 
and  lived  in  the  spirit  of  Christianity,  he  showed  in  the  fact 
that  he  forgave  his  enemies,  defended  his  antagonists,  and 
where  necessity  demanded,  hastened  to  bring  consolation 
and  assistance."  17  Dittes,  in  a  letter  to  Dressier,18  speaks  of 
his  "  frank  rejection  of  what  was  untenable ;  his  friendly  re- 
cognition of  success ;  his  earnestness  in  the  apprehension  of 
life,  and  his  affectionate  interest  in  my  whole  being,  inner 
and  outer."  Fortlage,  in  the  course  of  a  long  and  glowing 
tribute,  says : 

"There  still  rings  in  my  ears  the  sound  of  the  melodious 
and  gentle  voice  with  which  he  always  in  his  lectures,  with- 
out passion  or  violence,  answered  even  the  most  irritating 
invectives  against  his  assertions.  The  ability  to  attach  him- 
self to  others,  or  to  form  a  coterie  about  him,  was  as  foreign 
and  unintelligible  to  him  as  personal  enmity.  Moreover,  he 
knew  very  well  his  separate  and  forlorn  position  among  the 
scientific  factions,  but  he  stuck  by  it  with  the  most  tenacious, 

15  See   Dressler's   Kurze    Charaktertstik,  appended   to   the    fourth  edition   of 
Beneke's  Lehrbuch  der  Psychologie,  p.  299. 

16 Pddagogisches  Jahrbuch,  1856,  p.  I.         n  Ibid.,  p.  19.  2*Ibid.,  p.  23. 


303]  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  3  y 

yet  mildest  pertinacity,  so  that  in  very  truth  he  broke  his 
path  through  no  other  means  than  those  of  his  own  single 
self.  *  *  *  Slight  and  public  neglect,  which  usually  in 
others  has  aroused  rage  and  resentment,  died  away  in  his 
harmonious  soul  with  a  feeling  of  sorrow  for  the  blind  fas- 
cination with  which  his  age  still  shut  itself,  up  entirely  from 
a  knowledge,  in  the  perfecting  of  which  mankind  still  has  to 
await  the  most  preferable  remedy  for  its  wounds  and  infirm- 
ities. But  although  no  feeling  of  wrath  ever  secured  a  place 
in  his  soul,  still  any  yielding  to  fate  or  placability  towards 
the  ruling  intellectual  tendencies  was  just  as  little  known 
to  it."  1U 

To  sum  it  up  in  the  words  of  Dressier  :  "  One  of  the  most 
prominent  traits  of  his  noble  character  was  his  great  forbear- 
ance towards  his  often  malicious  opponents,  to  whom  he 
occasioned  more  disquiet  than  perhaps  was  exactly  agreea- 
ble, and  I  could  furnish  several  authentic  proofs  on  this  point 
if  higher  considerations  did  not  preclude  this.  Not  that  he 
did  not  feel  deeply  the  injustice  done  him,  but  his  lofty  spirit, 
his  pure  soul,  soon  raised  him  again  above  the  pain  and 
taught  him  to  laugh  at  the  apparent  triumph  of  the  world."20 

Beneke  met  his  death  in  a  mysterious  way.  On  March 
1,  1854,  he  suddenly  disappeared.  His  brother  (with  whom, 
since  he  never  married,  he  lived  in  Berlin),  Diesterweg,  and 
other  friends,  made  most  protracted  searches  for  him,  but  to 
no  avail.  He  had  suffered  much  in  recent  years  from 
insomnia,  and  it  was  finally  believed  that  he  had  wandered 
off  and  taken  his  own  life.  Not  until  June,  1856,  was  his 
body  recovered.  It  was  then  found  in  the  canal  near  Char- 
lottenburg  by  some  workmen.  The  exact  time  and  manner 
of  his  death  ever  remained  a  mystery. 

19  Fortlage,  Acht  Psychologische  Vortriige  :  Fierier  Vortrag,  "  Ueber  den  Char- 
akter"  Jena,  1872,  pp.  170-172. 

^Piidagogisches  yahrbuch,  1856,  p.  32. 


Part  II 
THE  PHILOSOPHY 


CHAPTER  I 

Historical  Basis  and  Theory  of  Knowledge 

§  i.  General  Introduction — The  exposition  of  Beneke's 
philosophical  system  which  follows,  being  intended  rather  as 
an  introduction  to  the  further  study  of  Beneke,  concerns 
itself  more  particularly  with  the  foundation  principles.  These 
principles,  as  has  already  been  pointed  out,  are  to  be  found 
in  completest  statement  in  the  Lehrbuch  der  Psycliologie, 
which,  therefore,  is  made  the  basis  of  the  text.  Where,  how- 
ever, for  the  fuller  elucidation  of  various  parts  of  the  system, 
it  has  seemed  necessary,  further  reference  has  been  made  to 
Beneke's  other  works,  duly  indicated  in  the  foot-notes.  A 
comparison  of  the  text  following  with  that  of  the  Lehrbuch 
will  show  that  while  Beneke's  form  of  statement  in  many 
particular  paragraphs  has  been  closely  followed,  the  general 
method  of  exposition  has  been  radically  different.  The 
Lehrbuch,  being  practically  a  compendium  of  the  whole  sys- 
tem, necessarily  fails,  by  its  dogmatic  deductive  method,  to 
preserve  the  inherent  coerciveness  of  the  fundamental  theory. 
The  attempt,  therefore,  has  been  made,  by  a  more  inductive 
statement,  to  minimize  the  apparent  arbitrariness  of  some  of 
38  [304 


305]  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  39 

the  fundamental  conclusions.  It  is  hoped  that  this  plan  may 
thus  help  to  reveal  something  of  the  true  significance  of 
Beneke's  thinking  in  the  development  of  German  idealism. 

Among  the  Germans,  Beneke's  significance  has  been 
largely  psychological,  but  psychological  in  the  sense  of  im- 
mediate applicability  to  pedagogics.  His  chief  following, 
therefore,  has  been  among  the  school-masters  of  Germany, 
and  the  superior  value  of  his  psychology,  in  its  pedagogical, 
logical  and  ethical  applications,  has  made  this  psychology 
not  only  a  formidable  rival  of,  but  in  high  educational 
circles,  preferable  to  the  Herbartian.1  For  while  possessing 
all  the  distinct  psychological  merits  usually  attributed  to  the 
Herbartian  system,  Beneke's  psychology  enjoys  the  addi- 
tional merit  of  an  even  profounder  metaphysical  basis, 
reached  by  a  more  satisfactory  and  tenable  method.  And 
indeed,  since  Beneke's  real  importance  in  this  respect  has 
never  been  recognized  either  in  Germany  or  elsewhere,  it  is 
the  metaphysical  significance  of  his  system  that  the  follow- 
ing pages  distinctly  aim  to  bring  out. 

In  pursuance  of  the  aim  and  plan  indicated,  the  present 
chapter  takes  up  the  consideration  of  the  historical  basis  of 
the  system  with  the  view  of  setting  in  a  clear  light  its  start- 
ing point. 

]  Diesterweg,  who  especially  in  his  Padagogisches  yahrbuch,  has  exerted  a 
powerful  influence  in  the  education  of  German  teachers,  and  who  for  years  was  a 
leader  of  educational  affairs  in  Berlin,  was  an  ardent  admirer  and  advocate  of 
Beneke's  system.  In  the  course  of  his  tribute  to  Beneke,  in  the  Jahrbuch  fur 
1856  (p.  4),  Diesterweg  sums  up  the  essence  of  German  pedagogy  in  a  sentence 
which  deserves  to  be  preseved,  because  it  is  the  keynote  of  all  pedagogics :  "  Who 
would  educate  and  ?>iould  the  human  soul,  must  know  it ;  who  would  educate  and 
mould  individuals,  must  possess  the  power  to  comprehend  their  individuality"  I 
quote  this  to  give  force  to  the  statement  which  almost  immediately  follows.  After 
expressing  the  conviction  that  without  rational  psychology  there  can  be  no  scien- 
tific pedagogics,  he  adds :  "  Inasmuch  as  in  our  estimation  the  Benekian  psych- 
ology does  more  in  these  respects  than  any  other,  until  that  '  other '  appears,  we 
shall  hold  fast  to  it,  and  recommend  it  for  study  to  the  teachers  who  feel  the  need 
of  acting  with  a  clear  consciousness  of  what  they  are  doing." 


40  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [306 

I  DOCTRINES  OF  PERCEPTION  BEFORE  KANT 
§  2.  Shortcomings  of  Earlier  Doctrines  of  Perception — Not- 
withstanding the  shortcomings  of  the  doctrine  of  perception 
up  to  the  time  of  Kant,  from  all  this  early  analysis  there 
comes  a  clear  gain  which  shows  itself  in  the  recognition  of 
all  individual  experience  as  a  form  of  consciousness,  and  in 
the  sharp  distinction  of  this  experience  into  two  strikingly 
contrasted  aspects — "  external"  consciousness  and  "  inter- 
nal" consciousness.  This  distinction  Hume  attempted  to 
indicate  by  the  terms  "  impressions"  and  "  ideas"  ;  Berkeley 
had  recognized  it  in  the  terms  "  ideas  of  sensation"  (also 
"  real  things")  and  "ideas  proper"  ;  thus  both  Berkeley  and 
Hume,  although  recognizing  the  conscious  character  of  both 
impressions  and  ideas,  attempted  to  rescue  the  word  "  idea" 
from  the  reprehensible  use  to  which  Locke  had  put  it  by 
making  it  do  service  for  both  things  and  thought.  But  val- 
uable as  these  distinctions  undoubtedly  are,  they  fall  far  short 
of  a  complete  accounting  for  experience.  The  full  import 
of  the  philosophical  question  which  experience  presses  on  us 
for  solution,  seems  never  to  have  completely  dawned  on  the 
earlier  English  philosophers.  Locke,  it  is  true,  recognized, 
although  only  in  a  descriptive  way,  the  synthetic  function  or 
activity  of  mind  in  originating  complex  ideas,  but  he  failed 
to  see  that  a  like  activity  was  implied  also  in  the  so-called 
simple  ideas  or  sensations  ;  as  a  result  he  never  gets  beyond 
the  natural  history  of  some  particular  idea  to  the  fundamental 
question  how  an  idea  is  at  all  possible.  Berkeley,  too,  utterly 
failed  to  grasp  the  problem  involved  in  perception.  For  him, 
"things,"  while  existing  in  the  mental  realm  of  the  given 
perceiving  individual,  were  "  mere  aggregations  of  sensa- 
tions." "Thus,  for  example,"  he  says,"  "  a  certain  color, 
taste,  smell,  figure  and  consistence  having  been  observed  to 

2  Principles  of  Hitman  Knowledge,  p.  36  (Fraser's  Selections  from  Berkeley, 
Oxford,  1884). 


307]  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  4! 

go  together,  are  accounted  one  distinct  thing,  signified  by  the 
name  of  apple  ;  other  collections  of  ideas  constitute  a  stone, 
a  tree,  a  book,  and  the  like  sensible  things.  But,  as  Professor 
Fraser,  in  commenting  on  the  passage  quoted,  acutely  re- 
marks:3 "Is  mere  'observation'  enough  to  account  for  this 
synthesis,  in  which  ideas  or  plienomena  are  aggregated,  and 
thus  converted  into  things  f"  How  such  "  collections  of  ideas" 
could  take  place  at  all  without  some  such  synthesis,  is  by 
Berkeley  entirely  overlooked.  It  is  in  Hume  that  this  over- 
sight becomes  completest.  For  to  Hume,  both  the  group- 
ings of  conscious  states  called  "things"  or  impressions,  as 
well  as  the  ideas  which  were  supposed  to  be  faint  copies  of 
the  original  impressions,  did  not  possess  even  that  small  de- 
gree of  unity  or  coherence  which  Berkeley  at  least  implied 
for  them  by  assigning  them  an  existence  within  a  spiritual  sub- 
stance or  soul.  Individual  experience,  so  far  as  it  could  be 
called  individual,  was  to  Hume  "  but  a  bundle  or  collection 
of  different  perceptions  which  succeed  each  other  with  incon- 
ceivable rapidity,  and  are  in  a  perpetual  flux  and  move- 
ment."4 With  this  conception  of  experience  as  a  mosaic  of 
co-existent  but  fleeting  discrete  feelings,  Hume  brought  the 
whole  problem  of  perception  to  the  sharpest  issue.  And  it 
was  the  needed  solution  to  this  problem  that  Kant  attempted 
to  supply. 

II  THE  KANTIAN  THEORY 
§  3.  General  Character  of  the  Problem  as  Presented  to  Kant 
— While  the  general  character  of  the  philosophical  problem 
as  it  presented  itself  to  the  mind  of  Kant  was  thus  already 
predetermined  for  him  by  English  thinkers,  it  was  also 
largely  determined  by  the  preceding  metaphysical  specula- 
tion on  the  continent.  The  Scylla  and  Charybdis  through 
which  Kant  had  to  steer  his  philosophic  course  was  really 

3  Ibid.,  p.  36,  note.  , 

4  Treatise  of  Hitman  ATature,  p.  252  (Ed.  Selby-Bigge,  Oxford,  1 


42  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENE  KB  [308 

on  the  one  hand  the  skepticism  of  Hume,  on  the  other,  the 
rationalism  of  Wolf. 

As  against  Hume,  the  doctrine  of  Kant  confirms  all  expe- 
rience as  a  form  of  consciousness  or  knowledge  in  a  sense 
which  shows  the  utter  inadequacy  of  the  psychological 
atomism  of  Hume  to  do  service  even  as  a  description  of 
experience  such  as  we  know  it.  Outer  experience,  on  the 
one  hand,  it  demonstrates  is  utterly  unintelligible  and  even 
impossible  as  a  "mere  aggregate"  of  sensations.  Unrelated 
feelings  could  never  constitute  or  alone  yield  knowledge. 
Only  so  far  as  the  manifold  of  sense  is  apprehended  as  a  unit 
does  experience  in  the  sense  of  a  perceptive  consciousness 
become  possible.  Inner  experience,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
shown  to  be  likewise  impossible  as  a  mere  collection  of  ideas 
or  abstractions  from  the  perceptive  consciousness.  The 
essential  characteristic  of  inner  experience  is  that  it  too  is  the 
apprehension  of  the  many  as  one,  and  this  is  only  to  say  that 
the  essential  condition  of  the  existence  of  every  idea  is  the 
unifying  activity  necessarily  implied  in  it. 

As  against  Wolf,  the  doctrine  of  Kant  insisted  on  the  im- 
possibility of  reason,  through  mere  explication  of  its  alleged 
innate  ideas,  ever  reaching  metaphysical  truth.  Inner  ex- 
perience, or  the  conceptive  consciousness,  since  the  days  of 
Descartes,  had  been  elevated  to  the  position  not  merely  of 
sole  philosophical  criterion,  but  of  a  criterion  valid  apart 
from  all  experience,  so  far  as  that  word  refers  to  external 
perceptions.  Clearness  of  conception  was  for  the  Cartesians 
the  test  of  truth,  so  that  within  the  idea  itself  was  implicitly 
contained  the  whole  measure  and  content  of  truth.  This 
doctrine  and  its  concomitant  one  of  innate  ideas  reached  its 
climax  in  Wolf,  who,  for  example,  in  his  Logic  (c.  1,  §  6,) 
says  :5  "  Whether  our  notions  of  external  things  are  conveyed 

5  Quoted  by  St.  John.     See  his  edition  of  Locke's  Essay  Concerning  Human 
Understanding,  p.  140,  note.     (  Works  of  Joint  Locke,  London,  li 


309]  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  43 

into  the  soul  as  into  an  empty  receptacle,  or  whether  rather 
they  be  not  buried,  as  it  were,  in  the  essence  of  the  soul,  and 
are  brought  forth  barely  by  his  own  powers,  on  occasion  of 
the  changes  produced  in  our  bodies  by  external  objects,  is  a 
question  at  present  foreign  to  this  place.  In  my  '  Thoughts 
on  God  and  the  Human  Soul,'  chap,  v.,  I  shall  there  only  be 
able  to  show  that  the  last  opinion  is  the  more  agreeable  to 
truth." 

Thus,  then,  as  against  the  attempt  of  Hume  to  interpret 
experience  as  an  empirical  chaos  of  sense  impressions,  so 
against  this  effort  of  the  traditional  philosophy  to  evolve 
knowledge  of  reality  from  mere  inner  consciousness,  Kant 
was  obliged  to  revolt. 

§  4.  Aim  of  the  Kantian  Philosophy — The  fundamental 
aim,  therefore,  of  the  Kantian  philosophy,  as  Beneke  points 
out, 6  was  first  a  purely  negative  one.  Its  chief  effort  was 
spent  in  "  thoroughly  grounding  and  establishing  this  prop- 
osition :  that  through  mere  concepts  no  knowledge  of  an  exist- 
ing thing  is  possible,  nor  is  there  possible  any  proof  of  the 
existence  of  the  thing  thought  in  this  concept."  Thus  as 
against  the  traditional  philosophy,  which  out  of  mere  con- 
cepts believed  itself  able  to  demonstrate  the  existence  of  its 
objects,  and  the  inner  nature  of  things,  the  existence  of  God, 
etc.,  Kant  urged  the  distinction  between  knowledge  and  mere 
thinking.  "  For  mere  thinking  we  have  enough  in  our  con- 
cept, but  in  this  we  acquire  nothing  but  mere  thought-forms, 
in  order  out  of  the  given  intuitions  to  make  knowledge. 
Knowledge,  on  the  contrary,  in  so  far  as  it  asserts  an  existence, 
is  given  only  through  the  perception  ( Wahrnehmung)  of 
that  which  exists."  7  Or  to  put  Kant's  opposition  between 
the    Understanding    and    Sense    in    his    own    words :    "  Der 

6  Kant  und  die  philosophische  Aufgabe  unserer  Zeit,  p.  12. 

7  Ibid,  p.  13. 


44  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [jjq 

Versiand  vermag  nidits  anzuschauen,  tind  die  Sinne  nichts 
zudenken.  Nur  daraus,  das  sie  sich  vereinigen,  kann  Er- 
kentniss  entsflringen."  *  Or  again:  "Without  sensibility  no 
object  would  be  given  to  us,  without  understanding  none 
would  be  thought.  Thoughts  without  content  are  empty, 
perceptions  without  conceptions  are  blind."9 

But  this  negative  result,  Beneke  further  points  out,  was 
reached  by  Kant  only  to  pave  the  way  for  "  two  highly  im- 
portant positive  aims."  First,  to  bring  the  ruling  mental 
power,  which  by  its  method  had  lost  itself  in  the  unraveling 
of  an  insoluble  metaphysical  problem,  back  to  experience, 
and  thereby  concentrate  its  energy  on  empirical  knowledge 
(Erfahrnngs-erkcnntniss),  which  promises  a  richer  and 
quicker  progress.  Second,  "  Kant  wished  '  to  get  rid  of 
knowledge  in  order  to  make  room  for  faith.'  Since  for  us  on 
knowledge  of  supra-sensible  is  possible,  the  belief  in  God, 
Immortality,  and  Freedom  possesses  certainty  for  us  only  as 
postulates  of  the  Practical  Reason."  10 

§  5 .  The  Kantian  Theory  of  Knowledge  as  stated  by  Beneke 
— Beneke  thus  had  a  clear  conception  of  the  aim  of  the 
Kantian  philosophy,  and  he  states  its  theory  of  knowledge 
thus: — "According  to  Kant's  oft  repeated  statements  we 
must  look  upon  all  human  knowledge  as  a  product:  as  a 
product,  on  the  one  side,  of  the  material  of  knowledge,  or  of 
sensuous  impressions  furnished  by  the  object;  on  the  other, 
of  the  forms  arising  from  the  knowing  subject,  which  forms 
again  are  twofold, — the  pure  forms  of  intuition  of  space  and 
time,  and  the  pure  forms  of  the  understanding,  or  categories. 
It  is  in  virtue  of  the  first  named  factors  that  our  knowledge 
finds  its  truly  objective  foundation :  for  through  sense  im- 
pressions is  something  supplied  to   it  from  the  object;  but 

s  Quoted  by  Beneke,  ibid.,  p.  13. 

9  Watson's  Selections  from  Kant,  p.  41  (Glasgow,  1 

10  Kant  und  die  philosophische  Aufgabe,  p.  17. 


aj  i  ]  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  45 

still  we  do  not  apprehend  the  objects  as  they  are  in  and  for 
themselves  independent  of  our  perceptions  of  them,  but  only 
in  relation  to  our  faculty  of  knowledge,  or  (in  other  words) 
as  they  appear  to  us  (i.  e.  as  phenomena).  To  phenomena 
we  are  limited  in  all  our  knowledge :  for  indeed  we  are  in  no 
manner  able  to  resolve  this  product  into  its  simple  factors; 
and  the  object  in  itself  consequently  remains  for  us  neces- 
rarily  a  thing  absolutely  unknown,  and  of  which  we  can  only 
surmise,  not  assert  anything  absolutely.  According  to 
Kant's  oft  repeated  explanations,  this  holds  just  as  true  of 
the  existence  of  our  own  soul,  as  of  the  existence  of  outer 
being.  *  *  *  *  Even  ourselves  consequently  we  know 
only  as  phenomena;  and  the  being  of  our  own  soul,  how  it 
exists  in  and  for  itself  and  independent  of  this  way  of  know- 
ing it,  for  us  remains  forever  entirely  unknown.11 

§  6.  The  Kantian  Distinction  of  Knowledge  Independent  of 
Experience — To  understand  Beneke's  criticism  of  the  theory 
of  knowledge  just  stated,  it  is  necessary  first  to  get  clear 
Kant's  pseudo-distinction  of  knowledge  independent  of  ex- 
perience. With  the  English  introspectionists  Kant  recog- 
nized all  experience  as  a  mode  of  knowledge  implying  in- 
telligence. But  he  differed  from  Locke,  Berkeley  and 
Hume,  in  seeing  that  this  intelligence  "  has  a  rule  of  its  own, 
which  must  be  an  a  priori  condition  of  all  knowledge  of  ob- 
jects presented  to  it."12  The  perceptive  consciousness,  then, 
is  not,  as  Locke  and  Berkeley  maintained,  mere  groupings  of 
simple  sensations  or  collections  of  ideas ;  nor  as  Hume,  a 
mere  chaos  of  disconnected  separate  sense  phenomena ;  it  is 
an  indeterminate  manifold  which  has  been  brought  under  the 
unity  of  certain  determinate  relations.  "Perception,"  says 
Kant,  "  can  become  knowledge  only  if  it  is  related  in  some 
way  to  the  object  which  it  determines."      Perception,  then,  is 

11  Ibid.,  pp.  26-27. 
12  Watson's  Selections  from  Kant,  p.  4. 


46  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [3^ 

really  the  determination  of  an  object,  and  this  determination 
becomes  effected  through  conceptions.  Only  then  in  so  far 
as  objects,  not  actually  present  to  consciousness  (whatever 
we  may  mean  by  such  so-called  "  objects"),  "conform  to  the 
constitution  of  our  faculty  of  perception,"13  can  they  enter 
the  conscious  plane  or  become  knowledge  for  us.  Objects 
of  experience,  then,  and  by  these  Kant  seems  to  mean  ob- 
jects within  the  perceptive  consciousness  (objects  of  outer 
experience),  are  to  be  taken  in  two  distinct  senses, — "on 
the  one  hand,  as  a  phenomenon,  and  on  the  other  hand,  as  a 
thing  in  itself."  Criticism  establishes  our  unavoidable  ignor- 
ance of  things  in  themselves,  and  limits  all  we  can  know  to 
mere  phenomena. 

But  since  experience,  inner  or  outer,  is  a  form  of  con- 
sciousness, and  so  of  knowledge,  and  since  knowledge,  it  is 
alleged,  is  a  product  of  two  factors,  it  is  surprising  to  find 
Kant,  on  the  basis  so  far  outlined,  raising  in  the  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason  the  question,  "  as  a  question  which  cannot  be 
lightly  put  aside,"  "  whether  there  is  any  knowledge  that  is 
independent  of  experience,  and  even  of  all  impressions  of 
sense."14  If  experience,  consciousness,  is  made  up  of  two 
elements,  sense  material  and  mental  form,  what  can  it  mean 
to  inquire  concerning  knowledge  "  absolutely  independent  of 
all  experience?"  It  must  mean  either  of  two  things:  1st. 
Is  there  any  knowledge  that  is  not  a  product  of  two  factors? 
or,  2nd.  Is  there  any  knowledge  of  which  one  of  the  factors 
is  not  sense  material?  To  emphasize  this  point  is  to  bring 
into  clear  light  a  most  important  confusion  which  results 
from  Kant's  juggle  with  the  word  "  experience."  The  word 
experience,  so  far  as  that  word  is  intended  to  mean  knowl- 
edge of  the  existence  of  an  object,  is  limited  again  and  again 
by  Kant  to  the  perceptive  consciousness  (outer  experience). 
The  conceptive   or  purely  subjective   consciousness   (inner 

13  Ibid.,  p.  3.  "  Ibid.,  p.  8. 


2!  3]  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  47 

experience)  is  recognized  by  him  only  far  enough  to  show 
its  impotency  to  yield  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  things 
in  themselves  (Dingcn-an-sich) ,  or  of  the  thing  thought 
(Noumenon).  But  without  deciding  at  the  moment,  whether 
in  external  sense  perception  we  get  at  the  existence  of  the 
thing  known,  whereas  (as  Kant  contends),  in  internal  sense 
perception,  we  do  not,  this  much  at  least  we  may  insist  on, 
that,  regardless  of  the  content  or  meaning — regardless  of  the 
existence  or  non-existence  of  that  to  which  they  refer — the 
facts  of  inner  experience  (memories,  imaginations,  concepts), 
as  psychical  existences,  are  just  as  much  parts  of  or  data  of 
the  individual  experience  as  any  of  the  sense  perceptions  of 
outer  experience. 

§  7.  Beneke's  Criticism  of  the  Kantian  Theory  of  Knowl- 
edge— It  is  the  recognition  of  this  confusion  in  Kant's  use  of 
the  word  experience,  in  the  sense  of  knowledge  of  existence, 
that  constitutes  the  basis  of  Beneke's  criticism  of  his  theory. 
Beneke  insists  on  the  inherent  contradiction  of  Kant's  gen- 
eral position.  This  contradiction  lay  on  the  one  hand  in 
regarding  knowledge,  perceptive  and  conceptive,  as  phe- 
nomenalistic,  and  yet  pretending  to  a  knowledge  of  the  fac- 
tors by  which  it  was  produced.  If  knowledge  is  to  be  re- 
garded as  mere  appearance,  as  a  product  of  two  factors,  the 
sense  material  and  the  forms  of  the  understanding,  then  for 
the  strictly  logical  Kantian,  the  latter  must  remain  as  un- 
knowable as  the  former.  Or,  as  Beneke  puts  it:  "The  pure 
intuitions  of  space  and  time  are  on  the  part  of  the  subject  to 
form  the  simple  basal  elements  of  our  phenomenalistic 
knowledge.  It  is  impossible  moreover  that  they  can  them- 
selves become  again  appearances.  Knowledge  of  appear- 
ances, as  product,  has  for  factors,  on  one  side,  the  sense  im- 
pressions of  the  object,  on  the  other,  the  knowledge  forms  of 
our  soul ;  and  just  as  the  objective  cause,  or  that  through 
which    feeling    is    effected,    is    a    thing-in-itself,    so    beyond 


48  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [j^ 

doubt  must  also  the  pure  forms  of  intuition  and  the  pure 
concepts  of  the  understanding  which  form  the  subjective 
cause,  be  things-in-themselves.  How  too,  would  it  be  pos- 
sible to  acquire  a  knowledge  of  these  subjective  causes 
through  experience,  since  experience  in  truth,  according  to 
the  Kantian  system,  permits  nothing  to  be  known  but  ap- 
pearances, and  so  is  as  little  able  to  bring  at  all  within  its 
reach  things-in-themselves,  not  merely  in  respect  of  our 
own  soul's  existence  but  in  respect  of  the  outer  world  as 
well?"15 

Beneke  rejects  a  suggestion,  which  he  himself  makes,  that 
the  basal  forms  of  human  knowlehge  might  have  been  intro- 
duced by  Kant  as  hypotheses,  for  the  acceptance  of  which  we 
must  make  further  comparison  with  experience,  "  just  as  in 
the  natural  sciences  we  introduce  the  force  of  gravitation,  the 
force  of  electricity,  and  in  general  all  forces,  which  indeed  no 
one  has  power  to  see  or  otherwise  experience  as  forces,  but 
which  we,  in  order  to  gain  some  coherency  among  our  expe- 
riences, first  hypothetically  assume,  and  then  corroborate 
through  comparison  of  consequences  deduced  from  them 
with  genuinely  given  experiences."  Ifa  But  Beneke's  reason 
for  not  accepting  this  suggestion,  not  to  mention  Kant's  ex- 
press rejection  of  hypothesis  in  critical  philosophy,  is  that 
inasmuch  as  experience,  according  to  Kant's  own  principles, 
could  never  at  all  attain  to  the  in-itselfness  of  the  thing  (An- 
sich  der  Dinge),  it  never  could  reach  it  even  intermediately, 
and  so  could  not  corroborate  it  at  all. 

The  fundamental  error  then  of  the  Kantian  system,  to 
Beneke's  mind,  lay  in  regarding,  on  the  one  side,  the  objective 
in-itselfness,  the  x  of  the  thing,  on  the  other,  the  subjective 
forms,  which  also  are  things  in  themselves,  as  working 
together  for  the  production  of  knowledge.  In  so  doing 
Kant  was  already  surreptitiously  applying  the  causal  relation 

15  Kant  und  die philosophische  Aufgabe,  pp.  28-29.  :6  Ibid.,  p.  31. 


3  I  5  J  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  *g 

to  things-in-themselves,  "  which  Kant  in  the  most  exact  lan- 
guage," says  Beneke,  "  shows  as  utterly  inadmissible." 
Thus  then  the  Kantian  theory  contained  within  itself  an  irre- 
solvable contradiction.  While  pretending  to  know  those 
powers  and  forms  of  the  mind  which  constituted  the  very 
conditions  of  experience,  according  to  its  own  fundamental 
view,  these  powers  and  forms  were  in  no  manner  knowable ; 
neither  immediately  through  experience,  since  this  is  limited 
to  product  or  appearance,  and  so  cannot  reach  either  unity 
or  in-itselfness;  nor  independent  of  experience  (i.  e.  through 
the  conceptive  consciousness),  for  of  the  existence  of  what  is 
constructed  in  this  way  out  of  mere  concepts  we  have  no  as- 
surance. 

§  8.  Beneke' s  Resolution  of  the  Inherent  Contradiction  of  the 
Kantian  Theory — Beneke  attempts  to  resolve  the  funda- 
mental contradiction  inherent  in  the  system  of  Kant  first  by 
the  restoration  of  "  inner  experience  "  to  at  least  a  parity 
with  "  outer  experience."  The  word  experience  he  insists 
must  be  made  to  include  inner  as  well  as  outer  experience. 
The  facts  of  inner  experience,  memories,  imaginations,  con- 
cepts, etc.,  are  as  truly  realities  for  any  given  individual  as 
the  sense  perceptions  of  his  outer  experience.  The  object  of 
any  given  idea,  the  content  of  some  particular  concept,  may 
indeed  be,  in  one  case,  e.  g.,  the  analytic  unity  which  the 
understanding  gives  to  concepts,  or  in  another,  the  synthetic 
unity  which  it  gives  to  percepts.  This  unity,  this  "  form  of 
the  understanding,"  may  be  indeed  in  itself  unknown ;  so  far 
as  it  is  what  is  meant,  or  what  is  known  by  the  particular 
concept,  it  only  appears.  But  the  given  concept,  apart  from 
its  content,  is  still  to  be  recognized  as  2l  psychical  existence; 
it  is  still,  in  the  passing,  as  much  a  reality  in  the  conscious 
experience  of  an  individual  as  any  given  perception.  And, 
moreover,  it  is  in  virtue  of  the  nature  of  its  content  that  we 
classify  it  as  a  fact  of  inner  experience  rather  than  of  outer. 


5  o  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  [  3  j  6 

Therefore,  even  though  we  regard  for  the  moment  the  facts 
of  inner  experience  also  as  mere  appearances,  it  is  a  great 
gain  if  we  clearly  recognize  that  both  aspects  of  experience, 
inner  and  outer,  are  forms  of  consciousness,  or  knowledge, 
and  in  this  respect  at  least  are  on  an  equal  plane. 

§  9.  Internal  Sense  Yields  Knowledge  of  a  Tiling  in  it- 
self1'1— But  while  both  forms  of  conscious  experience,  outer 
and  inner,  as  existences,  or  as  having  being,  are  to  be  re- 
garded on  an  equal  plane, — in  their  phenomenal  aspect,  that 
is,  in  respect  to  the  knowledge  which  they  yield,  these  two 
forms,  Beneke  claims,  are  essentially  different.  In  inner 
experience,  in  "  inner  sense,"  we  have  no  mere  knowledge  of 
phenomena,  but  of  a  thing  as  it  is  in  and  for  itself.  The 
claim  of  the  new  idealism,  he  says,18  "  that  our  perceptions 
of  our  own  psychical  existence  have  not  the  least  superiority 
over  our  perceptions  of  the  outer  world,  since,  in  the  former 
case  as  well  as  the  latter,  it  is  impossible  to  compare  the 
perceived  being  with  our  perception  of  it,  has  on  closer  ob- 
servation no  other  ground  than  a  false  parallel  between  the 
outer  sense  and  the  so-called  inner  sense :  which  now,  be- 
cause it  too  is  called  "  sense,"  must,  it  is  supposed,  stand  in 
like  relations  to  the  perceived  thing  as  the  former.  The 
thing  perceived  through  outer  sense  we  cannot  of  course 
(in  accordance  with  our  previously  gained  conviction)  ap- 
prehend in  its  complete  truth,  because  we  are  not  able 
to  go  out  of  ourselves  to  the  thing.  But  this  reason  in- 
deed falls  to  the  ground  in  respect  to  the  perception  of  our 
own  selves  :  we  have  the  presented  psychical  existence  imme- 
diately in  our  power,  inasmuch  as  we,  the  perceiving  exist- 
ence, are  at  the  same  time  also  that  which  is  perceived ;  and 
consequently,  since  that  which  is  perceived  is  just  as  near 
and  as  inner  as  that  which  does  the  perceiving,  there  is  no 

17  Compare  further  §  §  97  and  98. 

18  Das  Verhaltniss  von  Seek  and  Leib,  (Gottingen,  1826),  p.  43. 


317]  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  r{ 

need  of  demanding  of  us  the  impossible  feat  of  going  out  of 
ourselves  to  become  another." 

§  10.  Permanent  Vahie  of  the  Kantian  Analysis — The 
permanent  gain  resulting  from  the  Kantian  analysis,  thought 
Beneke,  is  the  clear  recognition  of  knowledge,  perceptive 
and  conceptive,  as  a  process  as  well  as  product,  and  the  irre- 
sistible emphasis  which  in  spite  of  itself  it  lays  upon  inner 
experience.  The  first  wide  opposition  between  the  Kant- 
ian and  other  theories  of  knowledge  was  that  the  former  re- 
garded empirical  psychology  as  entirely  useless  for  furnish- 
ing it  with  a  foundation,  Empirical  psychology,  according 
to  it,  had  value  only  as  applied  philosophy,  to  which  pure 
philosophy  handed  over  its  principles  a  priori.  In  spite  of 
his  fundamental  contention  that  conception  can  yield  no 
knowledge  of  existence,  and  that  the  existence  of  the  object 
is  given  only  in  the  perceptive  consciousness,  philosophic 
knowledge  for  Kant  "  was  altogether  the  Knowledge  of 
Reason  through  concepts,  a  knowledge  a  priori  of  all  experi- 
ence, without  any  empirical  source,  inner  as  well  as  outer." 
And  yet,  whatever  we  may  say  as  to  the  objective  existence 
of  the  forms  of  intuition  and  the  categories,  this  is  only  to 
emphasize  the  existence  of  concepts,  of  which  they  are  the 
meaning  or  contents.  And  these  concepts,  as  such,  are  facts 
of  inner  experience.  As  Beneke  says  :  "  How  now  did  Kant 
attain  to  these  universal  rules  which  he  sets  up  for  our  knowl- 
edge? Since  he  represents  these  as  having  objective  valid- 
ity, as  truly  grounded  in  the  nature  of  the  human  spirit, 
incontestably  he  got  them  only  through  inner  experience." 
Again,  "  only  through  inner  self-consciousness  also  could 
Kant  become  certain  of  the  power  which  brings  the  human 
mind  to  the  forms  of  its  knowledge ;  only  through  the  inner 
self-consciousness  could  he  become  certain  of  the  process 
through  which  knowledge  is  builded  by  these  powers."  And 
again,  "  only  on  the  basis  of  inner  experience  can  philoso- 


5  2  FRIEDRICH  ED  UARD  BENEKE  [  3  j  8 

phy,  and  in  particular  scientific  knowledge  of  the  human 
soul,  be  established  with  certainty  and  steadfastness."  All 
this  is  only  to  give  special  prominence  to  inner  conscious- 
ness as  a  fundamental  datum  of  individual  experience.  And 
with  the  recognition  of  this  fact  we  reach  the  fundamental 
starting  point  of  Beneke's  psychology  and  philosophy. 


CHAPTER  II 
Beneke's  System  in  General  Outline 

i   the  scope  and  method  of  psychology 

§11.  Starting  Point  of  Empirical  Psychology — We  are 
now  in  a  position  to  see  what  Beneke  regarded  as  the  start- 
ing point  of  Empirical  Psychology.  That  starting  point  is 
individual  experience,  and  the  insight  that  individual  expe- 
rience is  a  perceptive  and  a  conceptive  consciousness  exist- 
ing combined  in  an  organic  unit.  Accepting  the  English 
interpretation  of  experience  as  phenomenalistic,  and  agree- 
ing with  Kant  that  only  through  the  unity  of  the  soul  is  any 
experience  at  all  possible,  Beneke  still  finds  himself  at  vari- 
ance with  both  his  English  and  his  German  predecessors. 
With  the  English,  as  to  their  exclusively  introspective  or 
descriptive  method,  resulting  in  the  conception  of  the  soul 
as  a  hierarchy  of  faculties ;  with  Kant  and  his  successors,  as 
to  their  purely  a  priori  method,  resulting  in  the  conception  of 
the  soul  as  a  purely  formal  or  abstract  unity.  His  own 
method  entirely  precludes  the  criticism  to  which  both  the 
above  are  open,  and  particularly  the  criticism  of  Mr.  Spen- 
cer on  Kant,  that  the  latter  treats  only  of  the  adult  con- 
sciousness. Beneke  insists  on  the  distinction  between  the 
developed  and  the  undeveloped  soul.  It  is  the  developed 
soul  that  distinguishes  its  experiences  into  the  twofold  aspect 
of  perceptive  and  conceptive  consciousness,  or  outer  and 
inner  experience.  It  is  the  developed  soul  alone  that  can 
be  for  us  the  source  of  our  knowledge  of  the  undeveloped 
soul.  Beneke  again  and  again  insists  on  this.  "  Experi- 
319]  S3 


54  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  jj2o 

ence,"  he  says,  "  gives  us  at  first  only  what  happens." 
Therefore  "  we  are  able  to  acquire  a  knowledge  of  the  pro- 
cesses of  the  soul  not  yet  attained  to  consciousness  only 
throrigh  our  knowledge  of  the  developed  soul."1  Of  our  own 
earliest  development  self-consciousness  tells  us  nothing;  and 
whatever  we  know  of  others  (children)  is  very  obscure. 

§  12.  Subject  Matter  of  Empirical  Psychology — The  im- 
mediate subject  matter,  therefore,  of  empirical  psychology 
is  to  be  found  in  the  facts  of  inner  experience.  This  of 
course  is  not  to  exclude  the  investigation  of  the  facts  of  outer 
experience,  so  far  as  these  are  phenomena  in  consciousness. 
But  the  reason  for  beginning  with  the  facts  of  inner  experi- 
ence is  that  if  we  are  to  know  anything,  we  must  be  able  to 
know  the  nature  of  knowledge  itself.  True  knowledge, 
Beneke  concedes,  can  be  grounded  only  on  perceptions. 
But  this  means  that  such  knowledge  is  the  experience  gained 
from  perceptions  by  comparison,  and  the  interpretation  of 
one  in  terms  of  another.  And  this  knowledge  falls  entirely 
within  the  realm  of  ideas,  or  what  has  been  called  inner  ex- 
perience or  self-consciousness.  And  it  has  become  possible 
only  in  so  far  as  the  soul  has  taken  up  and  held  fast  the 
elements  supplied  by  perception.  Hence,  urges  Beneke, 
"  knowledge  must  bear  on  it  indelibly  the  stamp  of  the  soul, 
and  the  highest  basis  for  knowledge  of  the  soul,  will  be  the 
highest  basis  for  all  knowledge."  2  The  immediate  object, 
therefore,  of  psychology  is  what  one  finds  in  his  self-conscious 
experience.  And  "  however  difficult  may  be  the  real  limi- 
tation of  the  soul  in  comparison  with  what  is  corporeal,  for 
the  grounding  of  our  knowledge,  we  have  a  thoroughly  clear 
and  sharply  defined  boundary  line.  The  object  of  psychology 
is  all  that  we  apprehend  through  inner  perception  and  sense. 

1  Lehrbuch  der  Psychologie  ah  Naturwissenschaji  (2d  ed.,  Berlin,  1845),  §  2I- 
This  edition  is  the  basis  of  all  the  following  references  to  the  Lehrbuch. 

2  Erfahrungsseelenlehre  als  Grundlage  alles  Wisse?is  (Berlin,  1 820)  pp.  7-8. 


22 1 1  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BENEKE  5  5 

What  we  apprehend  through  outer  sense  is  at  least  not  at 
once  and  immediately  suitable  to  be  consumed  by  it,  but  if 
it  is  to  become  useful  for  it,  must  be  explained  upon  the 
apprehension  of  the  first  species."'5 

§  13.  Psychology  as  Distinguished  from  Other  Sciences — 
If  now,  in  accordance  with  the  previous  analysis,  we  regard 
all  that  we  perceive  through  outer  sense  as  pertaining  to 
body,  and  all  that  we  perceive  through  inner  sense  as  per- 
taining to  soul,  psychology  distinguishes  itself  from  the  outer 
sciences,  not  as  to  its  immediate  object,  for  in  each  case  is 
the  immediate  object  a  form  of  conscious  experience,  but  as 
to  its  indirect  object,  or  that  to  which  conscious  phenomena 
are  referred.  But  while  the  observation  of  outer  sense  expe- 
rience is  thus  given  over  by  psychology  to  the  outer  natural 
sciences,  the  knowledge  resulting  from  such  observation, 
since  this,  as  an  existence,  is  found  in  inner  experience,  is  still 
regarded  by  it  as  falling  entirely  within  its  province,  and  so 
open  to  its  criticisms  and  explanations. 

§  14.  The  Method  of  Psychology — Beneke's  conception  of 
empirical  psychology  as  a  natural  science  will  be  considered 
at  length  when  we  come  to  the  detailed  statement  of  his  psy- 
chological system.  Here  it  will  suffice  to  note  his  conten- 
tion that,  while  psychology  is  to  be  distinguished  from  the 
external  sciences  by  its  indirect  object,  in  method  it  is  one 
with  the  natural  sciences.  That  is  to  say,  the  methods  of 
induction,  hypothesis,  and  experimentation,  which  have 
proved  so  valuable  in  the  external  sciences,  are  equally  ap- 
plicable to  the  facts  of  inner  consciousness. 

II     THE   RELATION   OF   SOUL  AND   BODY 
§  15.    To  Adopt  the  Method  of  Natural  Science  is  not  Ma- 

3  Lehrbuch  der  Psychologic  ah  Naturwissenschaft  (Berlin,  1845);  Einlcitung, 
I  I. 


56  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BEX  EKE  [322 

terialism — Beneke  is  careful  to  insist4  that  the  adoption  of 
the  method  of  Natural  Science  is  a  very  different  thing  from 
Materialism.  Indeed  the  analysis  of  experience  just  com- 
pleted, resulting  in  the  conception  of  it,  in  any  given  case,  as 
'an  individual  consciousness  which  discriminates  itself  into  a 
twofold  aspect,  inner  and  outer  experience,  brings  forward 
in  an  entirely  new  light  the  long  vexed  question  of  the  rela- 
tion of  body  and  soul.  Beneke  has  discussed  this  question 
in  an  elaborate  work  of  some  three  hundred  pages,  "Das 
Verhaltniss  von  Seele  and  Leib,"  and  has  also  set  forth 
clearly  his  main  conclusions  on  this  point  in  the  Lehrbuch? 
His  great  merit  in  this  respect  is  the  thoroughgoing  fashion 
in  which,  on  the  basis  of  the  critical  philosophy,  he  disposes 
of  the  opposition  as  conceived  by  the  old  metaphysics,  and 
the  new  light  in  which,  in  disposing  of  the  older  materialistic 
parallelism,  he  places  our  conception  of  the  relation  between 
corporeal  and  physical  processes. 

§  16.  Opposition  of  Son  I  and  Body  one  in  and  for  Con- 
sciousness— The  first  point  upon  which  Beneke  insists  is  the 
fact  that  the  opposition  of  sonl  and  body,  matter  and  mind,  is 
one  which  exists  alone  in  and  for  consciousness.  Theory  of 
knowledge,  at  its  phenomenalistic  stage,  has  analyzed  ex- 
perience into  a  perceptive  and  a  conceptive  consciousness, 
into  an  outer  experience  and  an  inner  experience.  But  this, 
it  is  to  observed,  is  a  classification  as  to  contents.  Xhe  con- 
tent of  the  perceptive  consciousness  is  things;  the  content  of 
the  conceptive  consciousness  is  thoughts?  Outer  experience 
is  knowledge  of  material  objects  in  space.  Inner  experience 
is  knowledge  of  immaterial  thoughts  in  time.     Now  a  given 

4  Cf.  Die  neue  Psychologie,  p.  6.  5  Lehrbuch,  Ch.  I,  part  III. 

6 1  have  occasionally  used  the  terms  "  perceptive  (or  objective)  consciousness," 
and  "conceptive  (or  subjective)  consciousness,"  to  cover  the  distinctions  of  "ex- 
ternal sense,"  and  "  internal  sense,"  or  what  Beneke  denominates  simply  as 
"  outer  experience,"  and  "  inner  experience." 


323  J  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  r-j 

"thing"  of  the  perceptive  consciousness,  and  a  given 
"thought"  of  the  conceptive  consciousness,  may  each  be- 
come the  object  of  other  conscious  states  or  ideas.  In  other 
words,  we  may  have  knowledge  about  a  thing,  which  origi- 
nally formed  part  of  the  perceptive  consciousness,  and 
knowledge  about  a  thought,  which  originally  formed  a  link  in 
the  conceptive  consciousness ;  and  both  kinds  of  knowledge, 
as  being  ideas  in  the  restricted  sense  of  the  term,  it  is  to  be 
observed,  fall  entirely  within  the  conceptive  consciousness.7 
And  so,  not  only  so  far  as  these  two  original  forms  of  con- 
sciousness, but  also  so  far  as  these  two  forms  of  conceptive 
consciousness,  are  clearly  opposed,  they  are  opposed,  as 
Beneke  says,  in  the  one  case,  "  for  our  apprehension,"  in  the 
other  for  our  "knowledge  grounded  thereon."6  Since  outer 
experience,  as  to  content,  yields  knowledge  of  objective  ma- 
terial things,  and  inner  experience,  as  to  content,  yields 
knowledge  of  subjective  immaterial  things,  even  if  provision- 
ally, on  the  basis  of  the  Kantian  theory,  we  regard  both 
forms  of  knowledge  as  phenomenalistic,  we  may  define  both 
body  and  soul,  matter  and  mind,  in  the  manner  already  fore- 
shadowed:  "All  that  we  perceive  through  self-consciousness 
pertains  to  the  knowledge  of  the  soul,  and  all  that  we  per- 
ceive through  outer  sense  pertains  to  the  knowledge  of 
body."9 

§  17.  Psychical  and  Corporeal  Processes,  Likewise  Opposi- 
tions in  and  for  Consciousness — But  now  the  perceptive  con- 
sciousness reveals  more  than  things — it  discloses  among  the 
coexisting  material  phenomena  movements,  events.  The 
conceptive  consciousness  reveals  more  than  thoughts  —  it 
discloses  among  its  successive  ideas  relations.  By  observa- 
tion of  the  changes  among  material   phenomena,  we   arrive 

7  That  is,  strictly  speaking,  "  knowledge  about  things,"  forms  the  "  ideas  of  sen- 
sation "  of  Locke,  and  "  knowledge  about  ideas,"  his  "  ideas  of  reflection." 
s  Lehrbuch,  §  43.  9  Lehrbuch,  §  43. 


c;g  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [324 

at  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  Matter  (Body)  ;  by  observation 
of  the  order  of  succession  and  coexistence  among  our 
thoughts,  we  arrive  at  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  Mind  (Soul). 
Both  kinds  of  knowledge  tell  us  of  processes ;  on  the  one 
hand  of  the  process  of  corporeal  evolution,  on  the  other  of  the 
process  of  psychical  development;  and  just  as  we  so  sharply 
distinguish  the  perceptive  from  the  conceptive  consciousness, 
likewise  we  regard  the  utmost  opposition  as  existing  between 
these  two  processes.  Thus  again,  for  our  apprehension, 
Motion,  the  form  of  activity  of  Matter,  becomes  so  utterly 
opposed  to  Thinking,  the  form  of  activity  of  Spirit,  that 
philosophy  has  even  gone  to  the  length  of  regarding  these 
two  forms  of  activity  so  independent  and  diverse  as  to  be 
conceivable  per  se. 

§  18.  Real  Relation  between  Soul  and  Body — It  is  not  the 
intention  at  this  point  to  attempt  a  complete  answer  to 
the  question  of  the  real  relation  between  body  and  soul,  or 
more  strictly  of  the  real  real  relation  of  consciousness  to  an 
external  world.  That  is  the  problem  for  metaphysics,  and 
a  problem  which,  as  Beneke  conceived  it,  can  be  solved  only 
after  the  preliminary  work  of  empirical  psychology  is  com- 
pleted. But  we  may  now  at  least  clear  the  way  in  part  for 
the  metaphysical  solution  by  a  juster  appreciation  of  the  op- 
positions just  set  forth.  Philosophers,  says  Beneke,  in  criti- 
cism of  the  attempt  of  the  earlier  Metaphysics,  in  their  zeal 
for  a  deep  philosophical  knowledge,  have  carried  over  what 
is  merely  "  an  opposition  in  knowledge"  to  the  Real,  with 
the  result  that  they  have  represented  the  Soul  and  Body  in 
opposition  to  each  other  "  in  their  inmost  being \"1  The  con- 
sequence of  this  has  been  that  since  the  experience  of  every 
moment  reveals  body  and  soul  in  immediate  coherence  in 
one  and  the  same  being,  and  their  immediate  interaction  one 
upon  the  other,  there  have  arisen  most  wonderful  hypothe- 

10  Cf .  Lehrbuch,  §  44. 


325]  FRIEDRICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  r  g 

ses,  such  as  the  "Conscious  Automatism"  of  Descartes,  the 
"Occasionalism"  of  Geulinx,  and  the  "  Preestablished  Har- 
mony" of  Leibnitz.  But  the  attempts  of  Cartesianism  (or 
of  modern  Physiological  Psychology"),  to  set  up  the  bodily 
organism  as  a  mechanical  automaton,  with  its  fleeting 
accompaniment  of  psychical  phenomena  in  mysterious 
parallelism,  or  the  attempt  of  Materialism  to  reduce  mental 
phenomena  to  vibrations  of  molecules  of  the  brain,  Beneke 
contends,  must  remain  for  ever  impossible,  just  because  not 
only  the  bodily  organisms  of  other  men  exist  for  us  merely 
as  phenomena  in  our  perceptive  consciousness,  but  "  even 
our  own  body,  as  every  other  corporeal  thing,  we  apprehend 
only  through  the  impress  on  our  senses,  and  consequently 
*      *      *     not  immediately  as  it  is  in  itself."  1J 

This  argument  holds  good,  also,  when  we  apply  it  to  the 
opposition  between  corporeal  and  psychical  processes.  Not 
only  is  this  opposition,  as  was  pointed  out,  one  which  exists 
for  our  apprehension,  but  it  is  also  to  be  observed  that 
"  there  is  710  kind  of  corporeal  process  wJiicJi  cannot  under  cer- 
tain circumstances  become  conscious,  and  as  a  tiling  in  con- 
sciousness (als  Bewustes)  be  directly  perceived  by  us."1''  But 
in  doing  this  it  becomes  something  psychical.  "  Such  a  rev- 
olutionary change  of  a  thing  usually  not  a  psychical  apprehen- 
sion to  a  psychical  apprehension,  should  be  unthinkable  in 
case  of  a  fundamental  opposition  in  their  being ;  only  the 
more  by  this  are  we  brought  to  the  conclusion  that  both 
kinds  of  powers  in  their  innermost  nature  must  stand  very 
close  to  each  other,  and  that  for  the  explanation  of  their  inner 
coherence  and  interaction  no  artificial  hypotheses  are  neces- 
sary.    What  we  apprehend  of  the  human  body  through  the 

"  Beneke  in  the  Lehrbuch,  §  47,  note  3,  expressly  raises  the  question  whether 
Anatomy  or  Physiology  will  ever  succeed  in  demonstrating  the  parallelism  of  a 
thought,  or  a  thought  process,  with  certain  molecular  conditions  of  the  brain. 

12  Lehrbuch,  §  48.  13Ibid.,  §  4S. 


60  FRIEDRICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  [326 

senses,  or  what  we  usually  call  "the  body,"  we  have  to  look 
on  only  as  the  outward  signs  or  representations  of  the  inner 
{in  itself)  being  of  the  body,  which  just  as  in  the  case  of  the 
soul,  consists  of  certain  powers  and  their  processes,  which, 
while  they  are  different  from  those  of  the  soul,  still  in  reality 
are  like  unto  them."14 

Ill  THE  ORIGIN  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS 
§  19.  Meaning  of  "the  Origin'  of  Consciousness — The 
analysis  just  completed  gives  a  new  turn  to  the  question  of 
the  origin  of  consciousness.  What  now,  we  may  ask,  is  the 
real  meaning  of  this  question?  The  history  of  philosophy,  if 
it  has  shown  anything,  has  shown  all  experience  to  be  a 
form  of  consciousness,  that  is,  both  outer  and  inner  experi- 
ence have  as  their  necessary  and  essential  characteristics  the 
grasping  of  multiplicity  as  unity.  The  manifold  of  sense,  the 
successive  series  of  seemingly  discrete  elements  of  the  stream 
of  thought,  if  really  manifold,  if  really  discrete,  could  never 
constitute  experience,  as  we  know  it,  much  less  yield  con- 
sciousness of  themselves  as  manifold  or  successive.  If  then 
we  inquire  as  to  the  origin  of  consciousness,  this  must  mean 
either  of  two  things.  First,  the  question  must  be  as  to  the 
conditions  and  possibility  of  any  experience  whatsoever,  i.  e. 
it  must  touch  the  grounds  and  possibility  of  both  the  per- 
ceptive and  the  conceptive  consciousness  as  a  whole  ;  or  sec- 
ond, it  must  refer  to  the  conditions  and  possibility  of  certain 
particular  facts  within  either  the  perceptive  or  the  conceptive 
consciousness.  The  former  is  the  truly  philosophical,  or 
metaphysical  question ;  the  latter  may  be  regarded  as  a 
purely  scientific  one. 

§  20.  Metaphysical  Method  of  Solution — In  attempting  to 
account  for  experience  as  a  whole,  Beneke  shows  himself  in 
the  widest  opposition  not  only  to  the  method  of  Materialism, 

14  Ibid.,  §  48. 


22  7]  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  6r 

but  also  to  the  a  priori  method  of  procedure  as  employed  in 
the  metaphysics  of  Kant. 

His  opposition  to  the  materialistic  method  has  already 
been  shown  in  his  criticism  of  the  automaton  theory.  In 
spite  of  the  great  achievements  of  modern  science,  and  of 
the  value  of  the  atomic  theory  as  a  working  hypothesis,  in 
spite  of  the  valuable  results  achieved  by  physiological 
psychology, — the  criticism  of  Berkeleian  idealism,  and  the  de- 
monstration by  Theory  of  Knowledge  of  the  conscious  char- 
acter of  all  experience,  must  ever  prove  valid  against  crude 
Materialism.  To  begin  with  a  universe  of  Matter  existing  in 
a  real  Space  and  thus  attempt  to  account  for  all  experience, 
is  not  only  to  fail  on  such  a  basis  to  render  an  intelligible 
account,  but  is  also  to  ignore  the  very  data  of  experience. 
That  which  is  fundamentally  given  in  experience  is  not  a 
material  universe  in  itself,  existing  in  space,  but  the  two 
forms  of  consciousness  so  often  alluded  to.  This  is  why 
Beneke  urges  that,  if  we  attempt  to  ask  concerning  the  Real, 
"  we  must  recognize  that  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  beyond 
all  comparison  we  know  better  what  a  Soul  than  what  a  Body 
is."  15  Simply  because  body,  so  far  as  it  is  known,  or  enters 
into  our  experience,  is  already  in  the  realm  of  the  Soul,  as 
forming  part  of  our  conscious  experience.  This  too  is  why 
he  points  out  that,  as  against  Materialism,  "the  history  of 
psychology  shows  one  is  not  in  a  position  ever  to  explain  or 
to  construct  even  the  slightest  thing  in  the  development  of 
the  soul  out  of  that  which  is  material.  And  not  only  this, 
but  there  can  also  be  no  doubt  that  this  will  be  just  as  little 
possible  for  all  future  time."  16 

Beneke's  opposition  to  the  a  priori  method  of  Kant  touches 
the  very  heart  of  his  conception  of  psychology  as  a  natural 
science.  According  to  Kant,  empirical  psychology  was  to 
have  its  principles  predetermined  and  handed  over  to  it  by 

^Lehrbuch,  §  47,  note  I.  16  Lehrbuch,  §  45. 


62  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BEXEKE  [328 

metaphysics.  The  new  philosophy,  on  the  other  hand,  con- 
tends for  the  reverse  process.  The  starting  point  for  all 
scientific  investigation  is  experience,  and  experience  in  the 
sense  of  the  immediate  consciousness  of  the  individual.  The 
a  priori  forms  of  Kant,  the  intuitions  of  space  and  time,  and 
the  categories  of  the  understanding,  are  philosophical  con- 
cepts which,  as  concepts,  may  or  may  not  at  a  given  time  be 
present  in  the  immediate  inner  conscious  experience  of  an 
individual.  But  "  all  philosophical  concepts  are  truly  pro- 
ducts of  the  human  soul;  and  only  by  a  knowledge  of  the 
manner  and  way  they  originate  in  it  can  they  gain  their 
greatest  clearness."17  Only  when  we  first  on  the  basis  of 
scientific  observation  and  experiment  have  examined  into 
the  nature  of  the  origin  of  our  ideas,  shall  we  be  able  to  pass 
on  their  validity  or  ascertain  clearly  their  presuppositions. 
And  if  this  be  so,  not  only  is  psychology  the  science  of  inner 
experience,  but  "  the  rest  of  the  philosophical  sciences  con- 
sequently are  all  nothing  more  than  an  applied  psychology."™ 
§  21.  Psychological  Method  of  Solution — Turning  now  to 
the  second  sense  in  which  the  question  of  the  origin  of  con- 
sciousness may  be  understood,  we  find  Beneke  proposing 
this  problem  with  an  insight  which,  if  it  had  been  open  to 
English  thinkers,  would,  we  must  believe,  have  given  an 
entirely  different  character  to  British  traditional  philosophy. 
The  attempt  to  explain  any  given  idea  or  consciousness  as  a 
whole  as  the  mere  product  of  the  material,  or,  as  Beneke 
puts  it,  the  attempt  "to  carry  the  psychical  development 
back  to  the  corporeal,"  has  already  been  shown  to  be  in- 
valid, so  far  as  we  mean  by  the  material  or  the  corporeal, 
the  "  extra-mentem"  or  that  which  lies  beyond  all  conscious 
experience,  the  so-called  "  real."  But  now  there  is  an  en- 
tirely new  sense  in  which  we  may  regard  the  psychical  as  a 
product  of  the  corporeal.     Any  particular  fact  of  the  con- 

17  Kant  und  die philosophische  Aufgabe,  pp.  89-90.  18  Ibid.,  p.  91. 


329]  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  63 

ceptive  consciousness,  i.  e.,  any  given  memory,  concept,  etc., 
may  depend  for  its  existence  on  certain  material  conditions. 
In  other  words,  the  condition  of  the  existence  of  a  given 
subjective  fact  may  be  some  given  material  thing.  For  ex- 
ample, I  should  never  gain  the  concept  book,  nor  the  memory 
of  any  particular  book,  unless  certain  objects  had  once  pre- 
figured in  my  individual  experience  as  a  distinct  part  of  my 
perceptive  consciousness.  But  then  a  material  thing,  in  this 
sense,  is  already  a  part  of  my  eonseious  experience,  and  as 
existing  within  the  conscious  realm,  already  exists  in  the 
realm  of  the  soul.  The  origin  of  ideas,  then,  in  the  sense  of 
the  material  conditions  of  their  existence,  is  to  be  under- 
stood, not  as  a  question  as  to  the  direct  dependence  on,  or  a 
certain  correspondence  to  molecular  brain  structure,  of  which 
we  know  absolutely  nothing,  but  as  a  question  concerning 
the  dependence  of  one  form  of  consciousness  on  another,  both 
of  which  being  directly  present  to  clear  conscious  experience, 
and  both  of  which,  leaving  their  distinct  traces  in  memory, 
lay  themselves  open  to  subsequent  analysis,  by  virtue  of 
which  the  whole  psychical  process  of  development  or  evolu- 
tion of  the  soul  may  be  traced.  It  is  at  this  point  that 
Beneke's  thought  shows  itself  in  most  striking  contrast  with 
the  philosophy  of  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  to  which  his  philoso- 
phy offers  surprising  points  of  agreement.  His  grasp  of  the 
conception  of  consciousness  as  an  evolutionary  development 
is  most  complete,  but  his  great  difference  from  Spencer  is 
that  the  evolutionary  process  is  regarded  not  as  one  of  a 
mysterious  unknowable,  nor  as  one  of  a  real  physical  process 
in   a  real  physical  universe,19  but  as  a  soul  process,  taking 

Ul  Mr.  Spencer's  well-known  contention  that  his  philosophy  justifies  neither 
idealism  nor  materialism  falls  to  the  ground  in  a  remarkable  admission  made  by 
Mr.  Spencer  himself  in  a  reply  to  certain  criticisms  of  Prof.  Watson ;  "  Our  Space 
Consciousness:  A  Reply"  (Mind,  July,  1S90).  After  arguing  at  considerable 
length  that  the  great  body  of  our  space  knowledge  lies  latent  in  our  inherited  ner- 
vous structures,  Mr.  Spencer  says  (p.  323)  :  "  Of  course  the  interpretation  takes 


g4  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [330 

place  entirely  within   the   perfectly  knovvable   realm   of  the 
soul. 

§  22.  Source  of  the  Notion  that  Self-Consciousness  is  Mate- 
rially Conditioned — The  origin  of  the  notion  that  ideas  are 
materially  conditioned  is  not  far  to  seek.  The  history  of 
philosophy  has  shown  how  the  French  sensationalists  in  fol- 
lowing Locke  carried  back  all  ideas  to  sensations  ;  how  Con- 
dillac  expressly  says:'20  "Our  ideas  are  nothing  more  than 
transformed  sensations;"  how  Diderot  implied  the  same  in 
his  dictum20  that  "every  impression  which  cannot  find  an  ex- 
ternal and  sensible  object  to  which  it  can  establish  its  affinity 
is  destitute  of  signification."  We  have  seen  how  for  Hume, 
too,  ideas  were  but  faint  copies  of  original  impressions. 
What  now  is  the  ground  of  this  procedure?  What  has  given 
occasion  to  this  view,  Beneke  declares,  is  "  only  the  greater 
Clearness  and  Definitcness  which  the  presentations  of  the 
physical  have,  for  a  person  unused  to  self-apprehension,  over 
the  presentations  of  the  psychical.'"1  But  this  superior  clear- 
ness and  definiteness  of  sense-perception,  as  we  shall  later 
find  Beneke  demonstrating,  and  as  modern  psychology  has 
clearly  made  out,  is  not  explicable  as  the  unaided  result  of 
the  exciting  stimulus.  The  content  of  our  perceptive  con- 
sciousness owes  its  distinct,  definite  character  in  no  small 
degree  to  the  representative  element  present  in  it,  that  is,  to 
the  reinforcing  effect  of  sub-conscious  elements  excited  from 

for  granted  the  existence  of  objective  space,  or  rather  of  some- matrix  of  phenomena 
to  which  our  consciousness  of  space  corresponds.  Manifestly  the  hypothesis  that  a 
form  of  intuition  is  generated  by  converse  with  a  form  of  things,  necessarily  pos- 
tulates the  existence  of  a  form  of  things:'  And  Mr.  Spencer  attempts  to  justify  this 
wholesale  admission  by  a  mere  tu  quoque  !  For  he  adds :  "  With  this  admission, 
however,  may  be  joined  the  assertion  that  the  Kantian  hypothesis  tacitly,  though 
unavowedly,  inconsistently  makes  the  same  assumption." 

20  Quoted  by  Sir  William  Hamilton  :  Metaphysics  (Bowen's  Edition,  Cambridge, 
1 861),  p.  402. 

11  Lehrbuch,  §  46. 


231  ]  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  B  F.N  EKE  65 

memory.  Beneke  consequently  urges  as  to  the  vividness  and 
clearness  of  the  contents  of  the  perceptive  consciousness  that 
"  this  superiority  still  is  grounded  purely  subjectively  (i.e., 
in  the  nature  of  our  power  of  intuition),  and  its  being  turned 
over  to  the  'rear  or  objective,  can  be  justified  by  nothing."" 
Beneke  goes  even  further.  He  claims  that  the  apparent 
superiority  in  vividness  of  the  facts  of  the  perceptive  con- 
sciousness is  only  an  accidental  circumstance,  and  that  "  by 
long-continued  and  judiciously  conducted  practice  in.  the 
apprehension  of  the  psychical  product  and  its  effect,  an  equally 
great,  yea,  even  a  still  greater  clearness  and  definiteness  can 
be  obtained."23 

IV    THE  UNITY  OF  MIND  OR  CONSCIOUSNESS 

§  23.  Beneke  compared  with  English  and  with  German 
Thinkers — In  psychological  method  and  in  metaphysical 
conclusion  Beneke  occupies  a  position  somewhat  midway 
between  the  English  psychologists  and  the  abstract  German 
thinkers  typified  by  Fichte,  Schelling  and  Herbart.  With 
the  English  psychologists  his  point  of  contact  is  his  thorough- 
going reliance  on  introspection,  with  the  difference  that  he 
carries  introspection  farther,  and  supplements  it  by  hypoth- 
esis and  experimentation.  From  the  Germans  his  point  of 
departure  is  his  thoroughgoing  attempt  to  deny  not  the  ab- 

22  Ibid.,  §  46. 

2:iNot  to  mention  the  superiority  acquired  by  mathematical  concepts  and  judg- 
ments, compare  for  an  interesting  experimental  confirmation  of  a  like  superiority 
in  the  case  of  mental  images,  Meyer's  account  of  his  visual  imaginations  (Quoted 
by  James,  Psychology,  Vol.  II,  p.  66).  Meyer  says :  "  With  much  practice  I  have 
succeded  in  making  it  possible  for  me  to  call  up  subjective  visual  sensations  at 
will.  ...  I  can  now  call  before  my  eyes  almost  any  object  which  I  please,  as  a 
subjective  appearance,  and  this  in  its  own  natural  color  and  illumination;  I  can 
see  them  almost  always  on  a  more  or  less  light  or  dark,  mostly  dimly  changeable 
ground.  Even  known  faces  I  can  see  quite  sharp,  with  the  true  color  of  hair  and 
cheeks."  Most  of  these  subjective  appearances  even  left  after  images.  See  the 
page  mentioned  for  further  valuable  details. 


66  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [332 

solute  necessity  of  unity  to  experience,  for  to  this  he  agrees, 
but  that  this  unity  may  be  conceived  otherwise  than  as  a 
concrete  organic  unity, — a  complete  concrete  psychical 
organism.  In  this  connection  it  is  to  be  remembered  that, 
while  there  are  certain  points  of  substantial  agreement  be- 
tween Beneke  and  Herbart,  and  while  the  latter  was  not 
without  influence  in  moulding  some  of  Beneke's  views,  still 
only  by  the  most  utter  disregard  of  his  concept  of  the  soul 
as  a  "  Simple,"  as  maintained  in  his  Metaphysics,  was  Her- 
bart able  to  set  it  forth  in  his  psychology,  as  he  practically 
did,  as  a  single  concrete  psychological  mechanism. 

§  24.  The  Soul  as  a  Hierarchy  of  Faculties — Beneke's 
view  is  in  striking  contrast  to  the  Lockian  concept  of  mind, 
which  had  resulted  among  English  thinkers  in  the  extremest 
form  of  "  faculty  psychology,"  with  its  hierarchy  of  relatively 
independent  agencies,  through  the  activity  of  which  all  men- 
tal phenomena  were  to  be  explained.  Beneke  shares24  with 
Herbart  the  merit  of  freeing  psychology  from  the  evil  con- 
sequences of  this  misconception.  He  himself  regarded  this 
improvement  as  the  first  and  chief  point  in  the  thoroughgoing 
reform  in  psychological  method  which  largely  through  his 
own  and  Herbart's  efforts  was  beginning  to  be  instituted  in 
his  day.  The  basis  for  this  improvement,  Beneke  recognized, 
was  laid  by  Locke  in  dealing  a  death-blow  to  "innate  ideas," 
and  in  showing  that  all  concepts  arise  by  abstraction,  and  in 
last  analysis  grow  out  of  presentations  which  have  reached 
the  intuitive  stage,  whether  these  presentations  be  in  either 
outer  or  inner  experience.  But  the  advantage  so  gained  was 
nullified  by  the  retention  of  innate  "  faculties."  The  pheno- 
mena of  the  developed  soul,  or  adult  consciousness,  it  is 
true,  allow  themselves  to  be  discriminated  into  certain  psy- 
chical forms, — presentations,   memories,  imaginations,   con- 

24  In  the  lehrbuch,  §  12,  note,  Beneke  expressly  gives  Herbart  credit  for  his 
part  in  the  new  reform. 


333]  FRIEDRICH  ED  UARD  BENEKE  6  7 

cepts,  judgments,  reasonings,  volitions,  etc.  But  because 
these  various  forms  of  consciousness  can  be  brought  under 
a  single  class  concept,  is  no  justification  for  referring  them  to 
a  single  "  faculty"  or  power  of  the  soul.  Such  faculties  are 
naught  but  hypostasized  class  concepts,  important  enough 
purely  as  descriptions,  but  valueless  so  far  as  pretending  to 
be  a  profound  account  of  the  nature  of  the  soul.  The  true 
method  of  procedure,  insists  Beneke,  is  first  to  ask  how 
these  psychical  forms  arose  in  experience.  Though  we  find 
them  in  the  fully  developed  soul,  "  it  by  no  means  follows 
that  faculties,  or  powers,  must  belong  to  the  as  yet  unde- 
veloped soul,  and  be  contained  preformed  in  these  psychical 
forms.""5  Beneke  thus  is  one  of  the  very  first  to  insist  that 
psychology  must  take  more  account  of  the  evolutionary  pro- 
cess involved  in  the  development  of  all  psychical  forms. 
For  as  he  says,  with  the  emphasis  of  italics,  "  Of  all  these 
forms  which  we  perceive  in  the  developed  soul,  it  is  admitted 
that  they  are  produced  through  a  very  long  series  of  interven- 
ing processes .""6 

§  25.  The  Soul  as  a  Simple,  or  Abstract  Unity — Beneke's 
view,  again,  is  in  striking  contrast  with  that  concept  of  the 
soul  which  reduces  it  to  a  mere  undifferentiated  abstract 
principle.  We  have  seen  how  Kant  analyzed  all  experience 
into  a  form  of  consciousness,  and  how  Beneke  attached  the 
utmost  importance  to  the  distinctions  of  outer  and  inner  con- 
scious experience.  If  now  we  inquire  as  to  the  justification 
for  applying  the  term  consciousness  to  the  twofold  forms  of 
experience,  we  shall  find  the  essence  of  consciousness  in- 
dicated even  in  the  etymology  of  the  word  which  stands  for 
it.  It  is  knowing  together.  Only  so  far  as  the  manifold 
of  sense  is  apprehended  as  one,  only  so  far  as  successive 
feelings  are  apprehended  in  a  thought  which  grasps  their  re- 

,5  Lehrbuch,  §  10.  26  Ibid.,  §  10. 


68  FRIEDRICH  ED  UARD  BENEKE  [334 

lations,  can  experience,  such  as  we  know  it,  be  possible. 27 
Both  in  the  perceptive  and  in  the  conceptive  form  of  con- 
sciousness then  are  we  able  to  analyze  out  a  "something" 
over  and  above  the  diverse  constituents  of  the  given  exper- 
ience; a  "transcendental  unity,"  without  which,  as  constitut- 
ing its  absolutely  necessary  condition,  experience  of  any 
kind  is  utterly  inexplicable.  But  there  is  great  danger  of  go- 
ing wrong  in  the  way  in  which  we  may  understand  this 
"  something."  How  unrelated  sensations,  discrete,  isolated 
impressions,  could  ever  constitute  experience,  it  is  true,  is 
perfectly  unintelligible,  But,  on  the  other  hand,  an  "  empty 
Unity,"  a  common  being  into  which  single  things  disappear 

27  Compare  an  interesting  foot-note  by  Professor  James,  Psychology,  Vol.  i. 
(New  York,  1893),  p.  162,  recognizing  this  "essential  character"  of  experience, 
and  confirmatory  of  the  unintelligibility  of  regarding  experience,  or  knowledge,  as 
a  series  of  truly  distinct  and  separate  elements :  "  It  may  seem  strange  to  sup- 
pose," the  note  concludes,  "  that  any  one  should  mistake  criticism  of  a  certain 
theory  about  a  fact  for  doubt  of  that  fact  itself.  And  yet  the  confusion  is  made 
in  high  quarters  enough  to  justify  our  remarks.  Mr.  J.  Ward,  in  his  article  Psy- 
chology in  the  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  speaking  of  the  hypothesis  that  '  a  series 
of  feelings  can  be  aware  of  itself  as  a  series,'  says  (p.  39)  :  '  Paradox  is  too  mild 
a  word  for  it,  even  contradiction  will  hardly  suffice.'  Whereupon,  Professor  Bain 
takes  him  thus  to  task  :  '  As  to  "  a  series  of  states  being  aware  of  itself,"  I  confess 
I  see  no  insurmountable  difficulty.  It  may  be  a  fact,  or  not  a  fact;  it  may  be  a 
very  clumsy  expression  for  what  it  is  applied  to;  but  it  is  neither  paradox  nor 
contradiction.  A  series  merely  contradicts  an  individual,  or  it  may  be  two  or 
more  individuals  as  coexisting;  but  that  is  too  general  to  exclude  the  possibility 
of  self-knowledge.  It  certainly  does  not  bring  the  property  of  self-knowledge 
into  the  foreground,  which,  however,  is  not  the  same  as  denying  it.  An  algebraic 
series  might  know  itself,  without  any  contradiction.  The  only  thing  against  it  is 
the  want  of  evidence  of  the  fact'  (Mind,  in.,  459).  Prof.  Bain  thinks,  then,  that 
all  the  bother  is  about  the  difficulty  of  seeing  how  a  series  of  feeling  can  have  the 
knowledge  of  itself  added  to  it !  !  !  As  if  anybody  was  ever  troubled  about  that. 
That,  notoriously  enough,  is  a  fact:  our  consciousness  is  a  series  of  feelings  to 
which  every  now  and  then  is  added  a  retrospective  consicousness  that  they  have 
come  and  gone.  What  Mr.  Ward  and  I  are  troubled  about  is  merely  the  silliness 
of  the  mind-stuffists  and  associationists  continuing  to  say  that  the  '  series  of  states' 
is  the  '  awareness  of  itself; '  that  if  the  states  be  posited  severally,  their  collective 
consciousness  is  eo  ipso  given;  and  that  we  need  no  further  explanation,  or  '  evi- 
dence of  the  fact.' " 


3  3  5  ]  FRIEDRICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  fig 

by  "  fusing,"  can  be,  as  a  later  writer  has  put  it,  "  nothing 
but  a  blank  featureless  identity."28  Such  a  featureless  iden- 
tity, Schelling,  on  the  basis  of  the  Fichtean  Ego,  attempted 
to  establish  as  the  groundwork  of  all  that  is, — an  absolute 
identity  or  indifference.  Such  a  featureless  identity  Herbart, 
inconsistently  with  his  psychology,  makes  the  soul,  when  he 
says:  "The  soul  is  a  simple  essence  (Wesen),  not  merely 
without  parts,  but  also  without  any  kind  of  diversity  or  mul- 
tiplicity in  its  quality."  ^J  But  Beneke  protests  again  and 
again  against  the  attempt  to  regard  "  the  whole  rich  mani- 
foldness  given  in  consciousness  and  in  nature"  as  having 
"  their  being  and  their  truth  only  in  and  through  this  poor  or 
perfectly  empty  Unity."30  As  against  Fichte  and  Schelling 
he  exclaims :  "  All  deduction  of  plenum  from  a  vacuum,  of 
the  particular  from  an  abstract  that  is  indifferent  to  the  par- 
ticular, is  a  work  of  the  imagination,  and  a  smuggling  in  by 
stealth  of  what  has  been  reproduced  from  previous  ex- 
perience. Human  thinking,  of  any  sort,  can  only  clear  up, 
can  only  make  prominent  for  clearer  apprehension,  what  is 
already  in  part  included  in  the  material  given  to  it  for  its  con- 
sumption from  elsewhere.  It  cannot  create  out  of  itself  the 
content  of  a  presentation.  Only  within  the  manifold  can  unity 
be  found.  Not  the  manifold  within  unity."  31  Or,  as  Beneke 
sums  it  up  in  another  place  and  connection,33  philosophy 

wGreen:  Prolegomena  to  Ethics  (Oxford,  1890),  p.  31,  §  28:  "It  is  true,  as 
we  have  said,  that  the  single  things  are  nothing  except  as  determined  by  relations 
which  are  the  negation  of  their  singleness,  but  they  do  not  therefore  cease  to  be 
single  things.  Their  common  being  is  not  something  into  which  their  several 
existences  disappear.  On  the  contrary,  if  they  did  not  survive  in  their  singleness, 
there  could  be  no  relation  between  them — nothing  but  a  blank,  featureless  ident- 
ity. There  must,  then,  be  something  other  than  the  manifold  things  themselves, 
which  combines  them  without  effacing  their  severalty. 

29  Text-book  in  Psychology  (Jr.  by  M.  K.  Smith,  International  Education  Series, 
New  York,  i89i),p.  119. 

30 Kant  und  die philosophische  Aufgabe,  p.  45. 

31  Ibid.,  p.  62.  S2  Ibid.,  p.  85. 


JO  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [336 

"  dares  not   wish  to    be  more  simple  than  nature  and    the 
human  spirit  are  themselves." 

§  26.  The  Soul  as  a  Concrete  Psychical  Organism — Ben- 
eke's  own  view  of  the  original  nature  and  being  of  the  soul 
will  be  better  understood  after  the  detailed  statement  of  his 
psychology.  Here,  however,  we  may  indicate  the  nature  of 
the  substitute  which  he  proposes  for  this  "  abstract  unity," 
for  this  "  undifferentiated  oneness,"  in  which  the  manifold  of 
experience,  as  manifold,  becomes  lost  and  fused — that  indif- 
ferentism  of  Schelling  which  Hegel  characterized  as  "the 
night  in  which  all  cows  are  black."13  Beneke  clearly  recog- 
nizes that  "  unity,"  in  the  sense  of  the  apprehension  of  the 
manifold  as  one,  is  the  form  of  all  conscious  experience. 
But  then  such  unity,  so  far  as  known,  is  an  existence  for 
consciousness.  It  is  merely  the  logical  form  of  the  presented 
contents  of  experience,  and  it  does  not  therefore  follow  that 
we  must  because  of  it  accept  a  fundamental  faculty  which  is 
individual  or  one,  or  a  power  which  is  at  once  all  in  one 
{Gesammt  Kraft).  "The  mistake  has  been  made,"  he  says, 
"  that  for  all  soul  processes  which  agree  with  one  another  in 
form  (for  all  concepts,  desires,  volitions,  reasoning,  etc.),  a 
single  fundamental  faculty  or  unifying  activity  has  been  sup- 
posed, through  which  they  become  produced.  But  because 
they  are  one  logically,  ox  for  our  perceiving,  it  does  not  at  all 
follow  that  they  must  also  in  reality,  or  in  their  psychical  foun- 
dation,^ one  (an  identical  oneness)."  A  "The  (developed) 
soul,"  he  continues,'3  "has  not  one  understanding,  one  power 
of  judgment,  one  will,  etc.,  but  thousands  of  powers  of  under- 
standing, of  powers  of  judgment,  of  powers  of  will."  Thus 
every  cognition,  every  judgment,  every  emotion,  every  voli- 
tion, is  a  distinct  and  separate  process  in  itself.  There  is  no 
w/^ same  'faculty,'  'form,'  or  'category,'  which  presides  over 

83  Cf.  Schwegler,  History  of  Philosophy,  p.  318. 

34  Lehrbuch,  §11.  »  Ibid.,  Note  2. 


237]  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  y  r 

each  and  every  particular  experience  of  the  varied  kinds 
named,  and  into  which  all  such  particular  experiences  coalesce 
or  become  submerged  in  an  indifferent  identity.  Nor  is  to 
say  this  to  take  away  unity  from  the  soul,  but  only  to  under- 
stand that  unity,  not  as  an  abstract  logical  form,  but  as  a 
concrete  interconnection  of  parts  constituting  a  system.  For 
"of  course  everything  in  the  soul  is  intimately  united  in  a 
single  whole  or  one.  But  not  of  this  universal  oneness  is  it 
treated  here,  but  of  the  immediate  oneness  of  truly  particular 
forms  one  with  another."1" 

The  unity  of  the  soul,  then,  as  conceived  by  Beneke,  takes 
on  a  new  form  as  compared  with  the  prevailing  way  in  which 
it  tended  to  be  regarded  by  the  German  successors  of  Kant. 
The  soul  for  him  is  "  a  throughout  immaterial  being,  consist- 
ing in  certain  fundamental  systems,  which  not  only  in  them- 
selves, but  also  with  one  another,  are  in  their  trice  inwardness 
one,  or  form  just  one  being."31  Thus,  for  the  "  simple  soul" 
of  the  Herbartian,  for  the  "abstract  unity"  of  the  Fichtean 
or  Schellingian,  Beneke  substitutes  the  conception  of  the 
mind  or  soul  as  a  concrete  psychological  organism.  And 
this  organism,  as  being  an  interrelated  system,  is  in  the  truest 
and  most  intelligible  sense  of  the  word  one. 

36  Ibid.,  Note  3.  "Lehrbuch,  §  38. 


CHAPTER  III 
Beneke's  Empirical  Psychology — Introduction 

i    psychology  as  a  natural  science 

§  27.  Introduction — The  empirical  psychology  of  Beneke, 
we  have  already  seen,  starts  with  a  very  advanced  conception 
of  the  nature  of  man  and  of  knowledge.  It  accepts  the  naive 
attitude  of  phenomenalism  and  looks  upon  the  individual  as 
distinguishing  himself  into  a  two-fold  form  of  experience,  and 
regards  both  these  kinds  of  experience  as  consciousness.  By 
outer  experience  it  means  that  panoramic  series  of  pictures 
which  in  the  individual's  waking  moments  is  incessantly 
passing  before  him ;  or,  not  to  give  undue  prominence  to 
visual  phenomena,  outer  experience  includes,  as  Hume  would 
put  it,  also  all  lively  and  violent  "  sensations,  passions  and 
emotions,  as  they  make  their  first  appearance  in  the  soul." 
Visual,  tangible,  and  audible  things,  then,  and  in  fact  all  sen- 
sations, as  they  make  their  first  appearance  in  conscious  ex- 
perience, are  regarded  as  "outer  experience."  By  inner 
experience,  on  the  other  hand,  is  meant  that  stream  of  sub- 
jective remembering,  imagining,  reasoning  or  thinking, 
which  we  are  ever  conscious  of  as  going  on  simultaneously 
with  the  passing  show  of  the  panorama  before  us. 

§  28.  Inner  Experience  the  Immediate  Object  of  Psychology 
— With  this  insight  clearly  in  mind,  we  are  in  a  position  to 
appreciate  the  significance  of  Beneke's  efforts  to  establish 
psychology  as  a  natural  science.1    If  it  was  the  merit  of  Kant 

1  For  a  full  discussion  of  this  point  see  Die  neue  Psychologic,  Erster  Aufsatz  : 
"  Ueber  die  Behandlung  der  Psychologie  ah  Naturwissensckaft"  pp.  1-50. 
72  [338 


339]  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  73 

that  he  brought  philosophy  back  to  outer  experience,  it  is 
Beneke's  great  merit  that  he  brought  psychology  back  to 
inner  experience.  The  great  success  of  the  method  of  ex- 
ternal sciences  had  already  become  demonstrated  in  Be- 
neke's day.  All  psychology  needed,  thought  Beneke,  for  a 
like  success,  was,  beside  a  clear  concept  of  its  field  and  scope, 
the  scrupulous  use  of  those  very  methods  which  had  so 
greatly  aided  natural  science.  This  field  was  inner  experi- 
ence, self-consciousness ;  but  the  method  of  investigation  was 
to  be,  as  against  the  old  metaphysical  attempt  to  construct 
knowledge  "out  of  mere  reason,"  "out  of  mere  concepts," 
or  through  "pure  speculation,"  thoroughly  scientific,  that  is, 
empirical.  Psychology,  as  well  as  the  outer  sciences,  was  to 
depend  directly  and  entirely  on  experience,  but  the  experi- 
ence which  was  to  be  the  distinct  subject  matter  of  psychol- 
ogy was  inner  experience. 

§  29.  The  Objective  Method  Dealing  with  the  Inner  Ex- 
perience of  Others — In  making  inner  experience  the  direct 
subject  matter  of  psychology,  Beneke  clearly  recognized  the 
possibility  of  two  distinct  methods  of  study,  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  experience  with  which  psychology  has  to  deal  may 
be  either  the  inner  experience  of  ourselves  or  that  of  other 
men.  Against  the  objective  or  comparative  method,  which 
deals  with  the  experience  of  other  men,  certain  obvious  dis- 
advantages, it  is  true,  may  be  urged.  We  as  individuals  are 
not  in  a  position  to  perceive  immediately  and  inwardly  that 
which  passes  before  the  minds  of  others.  We  are  limited  to 
the  outward  signs  of  their  inner  thoughts,  so  that  psychol- 
ogical knowledge  attained  in  this  way  must,  it  would  seem, 
be  and  always  remain  in  the  highest  degree  incomplete.  At 
any  rate,  the  knowledge  so  gained  must  at  the  best  be  a 
knowledge  grounded  on  the  analogy  of  our  own  individual 
experience.  And  since,  "  in  every  other  man,  every  man 
sees  only  himself,"  it  is  all  the  more  important,  to  avoid  the 


74  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  [340 

misinterpretation  due  to  the  limitation  of  our  own  individual- 
ity, that  our  own  individual  experience  should  be  properly 
and  fully  interpreted  by  us.  While  therefore  the  psychologi- 
cal knowledge  gained  through  others  must  always  be  more 
or  less  uncertain  because  of  its  indirectness,  nevertheless 
this  knowledge,  urges  Beneke,  is  not  so  uncertain  as  at  first 
appears.  The  intense  interest  which  mankind  have  shown  in 
one  another,  coupled  with  the  desire  to  learn  with  exactness 
what  another  thinks,  feels  and  wills,  has  resulted  in  the  for- 
mation of  a  language  of  signs,  which  through  the  cooperation 
of  millions  has  gained  an  extraordinary  richness.  This  lan- 
guage, too,  through  scientific  labor,  is  capable  of  immeasur- 
able perfection,  and  indeed,  says  Beneke,  the  perfecting  of  it 
has  already  been  undertaken  with  such  success  and  zeal  that 
on  the  whole,  so  far  as  the  expression  of  human  language  is 
concerned,  very  little  has  been  left  to  be  desired. 

§  30.  The  Subjective  Method  Dealing  with  the  Inner  Ex- 
perience of  Ones  Own  Self- — While  fully  appreciating  the 
necessity  of  putting  our  purely  subjective  interpretations  to 
the  test  of  "  general  assent,"  Beneke  nevertheless  believed 
in  the  essential  superiority  of  the  subjective  or  introspective 
method.  This  superiority  lies  in  the  fact  that  what  passes 
before  us  in  our  own  experience  is  not  only  capable  of  more 
exact  examination,  but  indeed  is  open  to  direct  inspection  or 
observation.  For  this  reason,  particularly  in  self-appre- 
hension, or  inner  experience,  we  have  the  chief  source  of 
psychological  knowledge  {die  Hanptquelle  der psychologischen 
Erkenntniss)  .2 

§31.  Possibility  of  Applying  the  Method  of  the  External 
Sciences  to  Inner  Experience — I  shall  not  attempt  here  to 
follow  Beneke  through  his  whole  able  discussion  of  psychol- 
ogy as  a  natural  science,  mainly  because  most  of  his  con- 
clusions   and    arguments   have    become  scientific  common- 

-  Cf.,  Die  neite  Psychologie,  p.  14. 


34I 1  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  -5 

places  at  the  present  day.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say,  how- 
ever, that  he  is  the  father  of  modern  experimental  psychology, 
although  in  the  development  of  this  method,  his  original 
standpoint  and  insight,  as  to  the  real  starting-point  of 
empirical  psychology,  has  unfortunately  in  too  many  in- 
stances been  entirely  lost  sight  of.  This  starting-point  was 
the  phenomenalistic  view  of  individual  experience,  with  the 
explanation  of  both  the  inner  and  outer  forms  of  which 
psychology  has  to  do.  Against  the  objection  that  inner 
conscious  experience  is  not  open  to  observation  and  experi- 
mentation in  the  same  manner  as  outer  conscious  experience, 
Beneke  argued  with  profound  insight.  We  are  apt  to  over- 
look the  fact  that  a  scientific  observer  is  a  trained  observer. 
Mere  observation  of  things  will  not  yield  full  knowledge  of 
them,  but  only  acquired  perceptive  powers.  The  botanist  in 
looking  at  the  flower  receives  perhaps  no  more  stimulation 
from  it  than  the  uneducated  man.  But  how  much  more  in  a 
glance  he  sees  !  This  is  only  to  show  that  in  outer  percep- 
tion there  are  varying  grades  of  clearness,  definiteness  and 
exactness.  But  this,  too,  is  true  in  the  case  of  internal  per- 
ception. By  unnumbered  repetition,  not  only  the  vaguest, 
faintest  sensation,  but  all  the  facts  of  inner  sense  can  be 
brought  to  like  grades  of  clearness,  definiteness  and  exact- 
ness.    And  this  is  true  even  of  the  most  fleeting  ideas. 

The  experimental  method  has  become  so  firmly  intrenched 
in  psychology  in  these  days  that  there  is  no  need  to  repeat 
the  arguments  by  which  it  was  first  established.  It  is  ex- 
ceedingly interesting,  however,  to  note  some  of  the  various 
ways  in  which  Beneke,  as  one  of  the  earliest  advocates  of  the 
method,  thought  it  could  be  employed.  "  We  are  able,  for 
example,"  he  says,  "to  think  upon  a  circumstance  after  pre- 
viously we  have  thought  upon  a  like  one,  or  of  something 
differing  from  it  in  this  or  that  degree,  and  with  this  or  that 
degree  of    attention,  during  this  or  that  length  of   time."3 

3  Die  netie  Psychologie,  p.  20. 


y  6  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  [342 

Continuing  in  this  strain,  he  suggests  other  varied  experi- 
ments with  memories,  percepts  and  feelings,  so  common- 
place at  the  present  day  as  to  need  no  further  mention. 

II   GENERAL  NATURE  OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  PROBLEM 

§  32.  The  Problem  Stated — The  first  point  in  attempting  to 
solve  the  fundamental  psychological  problem,  the  alterations 
in  consciousnoss,  is  clearly  to  conceive  the  nature  of  the 
problem  and  the  data  with  which  we  may  begin.  Beneke, 
familiar  as  we  have  seen  with  the  results  of  Locke,  Berkeley, 
and  Hume,  accepted  as  data  that  description  of  individual 
experience  which  regarded  it  as  distinguished  into  two  great 
orders  or  series  of  phenomena,  the  so-called  lively  or  vivid 
impressions  of  Hume — outer  experience,  and  the  so-called 
fainter  internal  ideas — inner  experience.  Impressions  distin- 
guish themselves  into  a  multiplicity  of  objects  or  things,  the 
investigation  of  the  coherency  and  relations  of  which  consti- 
tutes the  natural  sciences  ;  while  ideas  distinguish  themselves 
into  memories,  imaginations  and  cogitations  (meaning  by  this 
latter,  concepts,  judgments  and  reasonings),  the  discrimina- 
tion and  description  of  which  constitutes  the  work  of  descrip- 
tive psychology,  and  the  origination  of  which  in  any  given 
individual  constitutes  the  work  of  education  in  the  broadest 
sense  of  that  term.  On  this  basis,  then,  of  a  clear  circle  of 
changing  impressions  and  a  concomitant  stream  of  fleeting 
ideas,  theory  of  knowledge  continues  its  work.  Its  task  is  not 
to  describe  the  contents  and  coherences  either  of  the  circle 
of  impressions  or  the  stream  of  ideas,  but  taking  in  hand  some 
individual  experience,  to  interpret  the  exact  manner  in  which 
the  alterations  in  that  conscious  experience  take  place,  and 
just  how  a  given  individual  experience  grows  to  be  what  it  is. 

§  33.  Previous  Attempts  at  Solution  of  the  Problem — The 
failure  of  previous  philosophers  either  to  conceive  clearly  the 
nature  of  the  psychological  problem  as  involved  in  the  phil- 


343]  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  j  j 

osophical  interpretation  of  experience  in  its  twofold  aspect, 
or  to  furnish  an  adequate  solution  of  it,  was  fully  appreciated 
by  Beneke.  If  the  individual  experience  is  to  be  distin- 
guished into  two  forms  or  aspects,  a  perceptive  conscious- 
ness and  a  conceptive  consciousness, — a  realm  of  things, 
and  a  realm  of  thought, — then  an  adequate  psychology  will 
account  for  the  nature  growth,  and  implications  of  both 
these  forms  of  experience. 

But,  as  to  a  psychology  of  the  perceptive  consciousness, 
the  shortcomings  of  the  earlier  English  philosophers  have 
already  been  pointed  out.  Locke  never  got  beyond  a  purely 
descriptive  faculty  psychology  of  the  most  pronounced  type, 
and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  never  seemed  to  grasp  vividly 
enough  the  distinction  of  inner  and  outer  experience  so 
often  contended  for  in  these  pages.  For  the  "  Ideas  of  Sen- 
sation "  and  "  Ideas  of  Reflection  "  of  Locke,  while  ap- 
parently distinguishing  experience  into  external  and  internal 
perception,  seem  only  too  frequently  in  his  pages  to  be  ideas 
in  Hume's  restricted  sense  of  the  term,  and  so  fall  entirely 
within  the  conceptive  consciousness  or  inner  experience ; 
while  the  differentiated  picture  or  aggregate  of  things  which 
at  any  moment  constitutes  a  given  individual's  percept  of  the 
outer  world,  seems  again  and  again  to  be  entirely  passed 
over  or  lost  sight  of  by  him.  Berkeley,  again,  while  showing 
a  distinct  recognition  of  the  perceptive  consciousness,  and 
referring  to  it  as  consisting  of  "  real  things"  in  spite  of  his 
recognition  that  in  all  developed  visual  perception  we  go  be- 
yond present  sense,  not  only  fails  to  show  how  the  alleged 
"  aggregations  "  of  sensations  could  ever  constitute  "  things," 
but  avoids  the  necessity  by  supposing  them  to  be  directly 
"imprinted  on  the  senses  by  the  Author  of  Nature." 
Finally  Hume,  in  his  account  of  the  nature  and  origin  of  im- 
pressions, also  fails  to  render  a  satisfactory  account  of  the 
perceptive  consciousness.     Instead  of  starting  with  the  com- 


78  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  \'hA\ 

plex  consciousness  given  in  immediate  experience,  Hume 
almost  at  the  outset  assumes  that  it  is  made  up  of  certain 
"  simple  perceptions  or  impressions  "  such  as  admit  of  no 
distinction  or  separation.  These  simple  impressions,  it  is 
true,  are  regarded  as  somehow  combined  into  "  complex  im- 
pressions," which  may  be  distinguished  into  parts.  But  why 
a  given  individual's  perceptive  consciousness  at  a  given 
moment  is  such  a  complex  as  it  is,  why  it  is  made  up  of  lesser 
groups  or  complexes  of  simple  impressions,  are  questions 
which  Hume,  in  respect  to  the  perceptive  consciousness, 
does  not  pretend  to  answer.  As  to  the  origin,  too,  of  im- 
pressions, Hume  is  equally  silent.  "  As  to  those  impressions, 
which  are  from  the  senses,"  he  says, 4  "  their  ultimate  cause 
is  in  my  opinion  perfectly  inexplicable  by  human  reason, 
and  'twill  always  be  impossible  to  decide  with  certainty, 
whether  they  arise  immediately  from  the  object,  or  are  pro- 
duced by  the  creative  power  of  the  mind,  or  are  derived  from 
the  Author  of  our  being." 

It  was  the  defects  of  these  English  doctrines  of  impressions 
as  a  theory  of  perception,  or  as  even  a  description  of  the 
perceptive  consciousness,  that  awoke  Kant  from  his  dog- 
matic slumber.  The  attempt  of  Hume  to  describe  the  per- 
ceptive consciousness  as  a  mosaic  of  disconnected  sense 
impressions  continuously  undergoing  lightning-like  kaleido- 
scopic changes,  only  served  to  force  into  clearer  relief  as  the 
essential  nature  of  such  consciousness  its  characteristic  of  mul- 
tiplicity in  unity.  A  psychological  atomism  of  the  Humean 
type  not  only  fails  as  a  true  description,  but  could  never 
serve  as  an  intelligible  fundamental  foundation  for  experience 
in  the  form  which  the  perceptive  consciousness  reveals  it  to 
be.  Momentary  experience,  as  we  know  it,  is  manifestly 
and    obviously    the   apprehension  of    the  manifold    as  one. 

*  Hume,  Treatise  of  Human  ATature,  p.  84. 


24 c ]  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  79 

The  absolute  condition  of  the  very  existence  of  the  percep- 
tive consciousness,  Kant  therefore  urged,  is  the  "  trans- 
scendental  unity,"  or  synthetic  activity,  which  stands  over 
and  above  the  multiplicity  given  in  sense  perception  and 
gives  unity  to  it. 

Further,  as  to  a  psychology  of  the  conceptive  conscious- 
ness, the  shortcomings  of  the  earlier  English  psychologists 
are  likewise  manifest.  We  need  not  review  here  the  views  of 
Locke  and  Berkeley,  but  may  proceed  at  once  to  their  out- 
come in  the  psychology  of  Hume.  However  willing  Hume 
was  to  regard  the  coexistences  and  successions  of  simple  im- 
pressions as  entirely  fortuitous,  he  readily  allowed  that,  in 
inner  experience,  simple  ideas  (supposed  to  be  fainter  copies 
of  original  simple  impressions)  are  not  entirely  loose  and 
disconnected  subjective  facts  which  somehow  fall  into  groups 
by  chance.  The  imagination  in  its  workings  seems,  he  says, 
to  be  "  guided  by  some  universal  principles,  which  render  it 
in  some  measure  uniform  with  itself  in  all  times  and 
places."5  The  same  simple  ideas,  experience  frequently 
shows,  fall  regularly  into  complex  ones.  How  could  they 
do  this  unless  there  were  some  kind  of  union  among  them, 
some  associating  quality,  by  which  one  idea  naturally  intro- 
duces another?  But  this  "  uniting  principle  among  ideas," 
in  Hume's  hands,  finally  resolves  itself  into  a  mere  tendency 
of  the  imagination  to  feign,  becomes  a  "  fiction  of  the  mind," 
and  as  the  mind  or  soul  itself  is  ultimately  explained  away 
by  Hume,  the  relations  among  ideas  are  ultimately  made  to 
depend  on  those  relations  of  contiguity  and  succession  in 
the  perceptive  consciousness,  which  were  left  over  by  Hume 
unaccounted  for,  and  as  "perfectly  inexplicable." 

It  was  likewise  the  defects  of  this  earlier  English  doctrine 
of  the  interconnections  of  ideas  which  Kant  attempted  to 

5  Treatise  of  Human  ATature,  p.  10. 


80  FKIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [346 

remedy.  "Whatever  may  be  the  origin  of  our  ideas, 
*  *  *,"  he  urges,  "they  must  all  belong  to  inner  sense. 
All  knowledge  is,  therefore,  at  bottom  subject  to  time  as  the 
formal  condition  of  inner  sense,  and  in  time  every  part  of  it 
without  exception  must  be  ordered,  connected  and  brought 
into  relation  with  every  other  part."  *  *  *  "Now  if  I 
draw  a  line  in  thought,  or  think  of  the  time  from  one  day  to 
another,  or  even  think  of  a  certain  number,  it  is  plain  I  must 
be  conscious  of  the  various  determinations,  one  after  the 
other.  But  if  the  earlier  determinations — the  prior  parts  of 
the  line,  the  antecedent  moments  of  time,  the  units  as  they 
arise  one  after  the  other — were  to  drop  out  of  my  conscious- 
ness, and  could  not  be  reproduced  when  I  passed  on  to  later 
determinations,  I  should  never  be  conscious  of  a  whole ; 
and  hence  not  even  the  simplest  and  most  elementary  idea 
of  Space  and  Time  could  arise  in  my  consciousness."6  That 
is  to  say,  Kant  here  again  would  emphasize  the  unifying  ac- 
tivity as  the  peculiar  function  of  mind,  and  this  unified  char- 
acter— multiplicity  in  unity — as  the  peculiar  characteristic  of 
all  experience,  outer  or  inner. 

The  whole  point  of  the  criticism,  so  far  advanced  as  to 
previous  theories  regarding  both  perceptive  and  conceptive 
consciousness,  and  the  point  which  marks  in  particular  the 
advance  on  Hume,  centres  about  the  synthetic  activity  which 
reveals  itself  as  the  dominating  characteristic  of  experience. 
This  much,  at  least,  is  clear  gain  from  Kant,  that  the  ele- 
ments of  experience  are  more  than  absolutely  independent, 
disconnected  psychological  atoms  or  sense  impressions.  So 
far  as  a  manifold  of  sense  has  conscious  existence  at  all,  it 
appears  to  a  percipient  Ego  or  Self,  the  essential  character- 
istics of  which  are,  on  the  one  hand,  the  ability  to  synthe- 
size the  manifold  given  it  in  experience,  and  so  apprehend  it 

6  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  (Watson's  Selections),  p.  57. 


347]  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  8  I 

as  one,  on  the  other  hand,  the  ability  to  preserve  and  repro- 
duce its  separate  experiences  in  time.  And  only  on  the 
basis  of  such  a  hypothesis  is  explicable  the  simultaneous 
presentation  of  the  multiplicity  of  coexistence  and  the  multi- 
plicity of  succession  as  wholes. 

§  34.  The  Problem  as  Conceived  by  Beneke — Beneke's  con- 
ception of  the  true  nature  of  the  fundamental  psychological 
problem  takes  him  back  to  this  point  in  the  Kantian  criti- 
cism. The  whole  effort  of  German  philosophy  subsequent 
to  Kant  had  turned  upon  the  definition  or  understanding  of 
the  transcendental  unity  or  Ego,  which  Kant  had  implied  as 
the  fundamental  condition  of  any  experience  whatever. 
And  in  the  hands  of  Fichte,  Schelling,  and,  as  Beneke 
thought,  Hegel,  this  Ego  had  been  made  out  to  be  little 
better  than  a  "  a  poor,  empty  unity,"  a  logical  abstraction 
spun  out  by  the  old  reprehensible  metaphysical  method  of 
explicating  concepts.  But  the  starting  point  of  psychologi- 
cal investigation  is  not  the  preconception  handed  over  to  it 
by  metaphysics  of  the  Soul,  either  as  a  "  Simple,"  or  as  a 
"Transcendental  Ego,"  innately  furnished  with  forms  of  in- 
tuition and  with  categories.  The  real  starting  point  is  Ex- 
perience, inner  and  outer,  and  ultimately  the  immediate 
object  of  psychological  inquiry  must  always  be  the  investi- 
gator's own  conscious  experience  in  its  twofold  aspect. 
Experience,  so  conceived,  reveals  itself  as  a  series  of  kalei- 
doscopic changes ;  and  only  when  we  have  first  investigated 
how  the  alterations  in  the  consciousness  constituting  an  in- 
dividual experience  are  to  be  conceived,  shall  we  be  able  to 
reach  any  conclusions  regarding  the  original  nature  and 
being  of  the  Soul. 

There  are  two  points,  therefore,  in  the  investigation  of  the 
psychological  problem,  upon  which  Beneke,  in  his  criticism 
of  previous  theories,  strenuously  insists ;  first,  the  individual 
character  of  the  problem,  and  second,  the  necessity  of  an 


82  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  T^g 

exacter  insight  into  the  meaning  of  changes  in  conscious- 
ness. As  to  the  first  point,  Beneke  insists  that  preceding 
theories  have  been  "entirely  too  general"  in  character,  "  and 
therefore  incapable  of  being  applied  to  the  explanation  of 
individual  experiences."7  As  to  the  second  point,  the  pre- 
ceding prevailing  doctrine,  in  its  explanation  of  changes  in 
consciousness,  had  never  gotten  beyond  "what  was  figura- 
tive." "It  has  spoken,"  he  says,8  "of  a  'slumbering,'  of  an 
'awakening,'  of  a  'being  awakened,'  of  ideas,  of  an  'associa- 
tion '  among  them,  etc.  But  it  tells  us  nothing  of  the  precise 
tiling  which  happens  in  these  processes." 

What  now  is  "the  precise  thing  which  happens"  when 
changes  in  the  content  of  immediate  conscious  experience 
take  place?  There  are  three  things,  says  Beneke,  which 
psychology  wants  to  know  about  the  alterations  of  con- 
sciousness :  ( i )  Exactly  what  is  changed  in  a  presentation 
when  from  being  a  conscious  state  it  becomes  an  uncon- 
scious trace,  or  that  which  is  capable  of  later  re-entering 
consciousness  as  a  memory;  (2)  Exactly  what  change  takes 
place  in  this  trace  or  tendency,  when  it  is  restored  to  con- 
sciousness;  (3)  Exactly  what  is  imparted  to  it  on  its  being 
combined  with  others.9 

Ill  beneke's  doctrine  of  traces 
§  35.  Transition — Before  entering  directly  upon  discussion 
of  the  fundamental  psychological  problem  as  outlined  by 
Beneke,  it  is  first  necessary  to  explain  what  is  perhaps  the 
most  important  part  of  his  whole  psychology,  his  general 
doctrine  of  the  persistence  of  psychical  forms. 

§  36.  The  Fact  of  Persistence  and  How  Known — No  facts 
of  consciousness,  it  is  generally  conceded,  are  more  in  evi- 
dence or  are  more  obvious  than  the  constant  reproductions 
of  original  experiences  which,  in  their  phenomenal  aspect  at 

iLehrbuch,  §  86.  8  Ibid.,  Note.  9Cf.  Lehrbuch,  §  86,  note. 


349]  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  g3 

least,  have  gone  by  forever.  No  facts  of  consciousness, 
nevertheless,  have  more  failed  of  proper  interpretation  than 
these.  It  is  the  custom  of  modern  psychologists  of  a  cer- 
tain type,  in  their  almost  ludicrous  efforts  to  conform  to  a 
so-called  rigorous  "  scientific  method,"  to  begin  their  work 
with  elaborate  descriptions  of  the  human  nervous  organism. 
Then,  on  the  basis  of  this  preliminary  preconception,  they 
endeavor  to  interpret  not  only  the  facts  of  memory,  but  those 
of  all  conscious  life.  Not  so  with  Beneke.  He  as  a  psycho- 
logist who  has  risen  to  the  conception  of  experience  as  a. 
form  of  consciousness,  and  who,  having  completed  his  de- 
scription of  the  facts,  is  ready  to  interpret  theva,  founds  his  data 
on  the  twofold  form  of  conscious  experience  so  frequently 
insisted  on.  Beginning  with  this  as  a  basis,  so  obvious  when 
attention  is  properly  called  to  it,  as  to  become  a  postulate, 
the  true  psychologist  next  looks  whether  there  are  any  other 
facts  which  come  home  to  consciousness  with  like  coercive 
or  axiomatic  force.  Such  a  fact  is  the  unconscious  persist- 
ence of  psychical  forms.  All  memories,  considered  as  psy- 
chical existences,  and  at  the  moment  of  their  forming  part 
of  an  individual  experience,  are  facts  of  inner  experience. 
Any  memory,  considered  as  to  content,  reproduces  either  an 
original  fact  of  outer  experience,  or  an  original  fact  of  inner 
experience.  The  reproduction  of  previous  experiences,  in- 
ner or  outer,  as  memories,  is  so  obvious  and  constant  a  fact 
of  every  day  life  that,  as  Beneke  says,  it  is  only  too  surpris- 
ing that  preceding  speculation  had  never  supplied  an  ade- 
quate theory  of  its  nature  and  significance.  "  Reproduc- 
tions of  presentations,  and  other  psychical  forms  repeat 
themselves  in  every  moment  of  our  waking  lives,  so  that  in 
consequence,  there  lies  before  every  man  immeasurable  riches 
of  facts  of  this  sort ;  and  one  therefore  would  think  that  the 
theory  on  this  point  must  long  ago  have  raised  itself  to  the 
highest  clearness  and  exactness."10 

10  Lehrbiuh,  §  86. 


FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE 


[350 


How  now  do  we  know  of  the  unconscious  persistence  of 
psychical  forms  ?  Simply  through  the  fact  of  reproduction. 
Conscious  experience  shows  itself  to  us  as  an  almost  con- 
tinuous process  of  change.  But  we  soon  find  that  this 
change  is  not  so  far-reaching  a  matter  as  at  first  appears. 
It  is  not  so  much  a  change  in  things  or  being ;  it  is  only 
change  in  conscious  activity.  And  we  soon  find  that  "every- 
thing which  has  once  been  formed  in  the  human  soul  with 
any  completeness,  preserves  itself,  even  after  it  has  vanished 
from  consciousness,  or  from  an  active  psycliical  form  into  un- 
consciousness or  the  imier  being  of  the  soul,  from  which  it 
thereupon  caii  later  emerge  into  a  conscious  psycliical  form  or 
be  reproduced.""  Thus  then  in  view  of  these  most  obvious 
and  universal  facts  of  experience,  we  are  led  to  believe  in 
the  unconscious  persistence  of  psychical  forms,  and  the  basis 
of  our  knowledge  of  such  persistence  is  the  obvious  fact  of 
reproduction. 

§  37.  Nature  of  Unconscious  Persistence — Beneke,  how- 
ever, thinks  that  we  may  do  more  than  merely  affirm  that 
persistence  of  some  sort  is  a  fact  of  conscious  experience ; 
we  may  say  something  as  to  the  nature  of  this  persistence. 
A  psychical  form,  or  conscious  phenomenon,  which  is  not 
now  present  to  consciousness,  which  in  other  words  has  sunk 
into  a  subconscious  or  latent  state,  may  be  regarded  from 
two  points  of  view — in  reference  to  the  original  conscious 
experience,  inner  or  outer,  of  which  it  is  the  vestige,  and  in 
reference  to  the  reproduced  conscious  experience,  of  which 
it  is  the  foundation.  This  "  unconscious  persistent,"  in  rela- 
tion to  the  psychical  product  which  continues  in  this  manner 
to  exist  inwardly,  Beneke  calls  "  a  trace"  {cine  Spur)  ;  and 
in  relation  to  the  psychical  product  which  is  formed  upon  it 
as  a  foundation,  or  which  can  proceed  from  it,  a  "  rudiment," 
or  "  tendency  "  (eine  Angel e gtheii)  .Vl 

1 » Lehrbuch,  §  27.  12  Cf .  Ibid.,  §  27. 


3  5  I  ]  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  8  5 

As  to  the  nature  of  "  traces,"  so  far  as  they  are  uncon- 
sciously persisting  things,  Beneke  boldly  asserts  that  they 
are  psychical  existences.  Traces,  of  course,  in  that  they  are 
unconscious,  cannot,  he  grants,  be  represented  or  known 
immediately  as  they  are  in  themselves.  But  "  the  trace  is 
what  lies  between  the  product  of  a  soul  activity  (e.  g.  a  sense- 
perception)  and  its  reproduction  (e.  g.  as  a  memory)  ;  and 
since  both  these  acts  are  psychical  acts,  we  have  a  right  to 
represent  also  the  trace  only  in  psychical™  form.14 

§  38.  The  PJiilosophical  Significance  of  Memory — Beneke' s 
doctrine  of  the  persistence  of  psychical  forms  becomes  of  the 
greatest  importance  because  of  the  profound  psychological 
significance  which  it  assigns  to  the  facts  of  memory.  Facts 
of  the  individual's  outer  experience  (Things),  and  facts  of 
the  individual's  inner  experience  (Ideas),  are  apprehended 
in  consciousness  not  only  as  single  objects,  but  possess 
varying  grades  of  vivacity,  clearness,  intensity,  activity  and 
rapidity  of  development.  Undoubtedly  a  scientific  man 
when  he  perceives  a  given  flower  actually  sees  more  at 
a  glance  than  would  an  uneducated  individual  looking  at  the 
same  object.  Undoubtedly,  too,  the  idea,  which  the  scien- 
tific man  has  of  this  flower,  is  livelier,  clearer,  more  active 
(when  actually  present)  in  determining  the  complexion  of 
the  succeeding  states  of  inner  thought,  and  characterized  by 
more  ramifications  or  interconnections,  than  that  of  the  un- 
educated man.     How,  then,  a  given  perception,  or  a  given 

18  To  the  contention  that  retention  is  a  purely  physiological  fact,  Beneke  would 
reply  as  follows :  If  we  ask  concerning  the  "  where  "  of  a  given  trace  the  answer 
is  that  it  is  "  nowhere."  For  as  with  the  soul  in  general,  so  with  all  its  parts, 
they  are  "  nowhere."  If  again  we  ask  whether  "  traces  "  are  not  somehow  at- 
tached to  the  bodily  organs,  the  answer  is  plain.  Bodily  organs  exist  too  as  facts 
for  the  perceiving  consciousness,  as  part  of  the  content  of  outer  experience,  and 
at  most  can  only  be  said  to  be  parallel  to  subjective  facts.  In  no  intelligible  sense 
of  the  word  can  traces  be  said  to  be  "  attached"  to  bodily  organs. 

14  Lehrbuch,  §  29. 


85  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  [352 

idea,  or  even  the  perceptive  consciousness  of  the  individual 
as  a  whole,  has  attained  to  its  present  vivacity,  clearness,  in- 
tensity, etc.,  are  questions  towards  the  solution  of  which,  in- 
sight into  the  nature  and  significance  of  memory  affords  inval- 
uable aid.  Beneke  therefore  maintained  that  his  theory  was 
important  for  two  reasons.  In  the  first  place,  a  direct  con- 
sequence of  the  doctrine  that  "  traces  are  not  cast  out  of  the 
soul  by  their  becoming  unconscious "  is  to  emphasize  that 
any  given  fact,  either  of  outer  or  of  inner  conscious  exper- 
ience, is  not  to  be  explained  as  a  ready-made  product 
stamped  clearly  and  immediately  in  all  its  completeness  on 
the  blank  passivity  of  the  soul ;  but  rather  that  such  in- 
dividual facts,  as  well  as  the  momentary  perceptive  con- 
sciousness as  a  whole,  has  its  origin  and  its  definite  character 
determined  in  no  small  measure  by  the  mass  of  memories 
which  form  the  subjective  possession  of  the  soul.  In  the 
second  place,  the  doctrine  is  important  in  forcing  to  a  clear 
issue  the  real  problem  which  presses  psychology  for  solution. 
It  is  not  the  persistence  of  psychical  forms  that  needs  ex- 
planation, since  we  may  explain  this  on  the  ground  that 
"  What  has  once  happened  continues  to  exist  until  it  is  de- 
stroyed again  in  consequence  of  some  special  cause."  !  What 
then  must  yield  to  explanation,  urges  Beneke,  "  is  not  the 
retention  but  the  becoming  imconscious  of  what  previously  was 
conscious."  l5 

Beneke's  doctrine  of  traces  thus  brings  us  back  to  that 
conception  of  the  fundamental  psychological  problem  with 
which  we  started,  and  especially  to  the  discussion  of  those 
specific  questions  which  must  be  answered  if  the  alterations 
of  consciousness  are  to  be  explained  in  any  profound  sense 
of  the  term. 

15  Lehrbuch,  §  28. 


CHAPTER  IV 

The  Psychology  of  Inner  Experience 

i  general  introduction 

§  39.  Transition — We  are  now  ready  for  the  scientific  in- 
vestigation of  experience — inner  and  outer.  These  two 
forms  of  experience,  we  have  seen,  are  the  real  data  for 
scientific  inquiry ;  both  are  to  be  regarded  as  forms  of  con- 
sciousness ;  and  for  the  understanding  of  both  the  doctrine 
of  the  persistence  of  psychical  forms  is  of  vast  significance. 

§  40.  Knowledge  both  a  Product  and  a  Process — We  must 
notice,  however,  at  the  outset,  a  distinction  which  has  proved 
revolutionary  in  modern  psychology — that  between  knowl- 
edge as  a  product,  and  knowledge  as  a  process.  Beneke,  it 
would  seem,  was  one  of  the  first  psychologists  to  appreciate 
the  full  significance  of  this  distinction.  "All  psychological 
observation,"  he  says,  "is  confined  to  consciousness,  and  the 
process  of  awakening  to  consciousness,  consequently,  as  that 
in  which  consciousness  first  takes  place  (which  therefore  pre- 
cedes in  ?//j-consciousness),  is  necessarily  withdrawn  from 
our  observation."1  Thus,  so  far  as  we  treat  a  "thing"  of 
the  perceptive  consciousness,  or  a  "  thought"  of  the  concep- 
tive  consciousness,  merely  as  a  product,  that  is  in  respect 
to  its  presented  content,  we  never  get  beyond  the  realm  of  a 
purely  descriptive  psychology.  Only  when  we  attempt  to 
get  at  the  presentative  activity  back  of  the  given  thing  or 
thought — at  the  process  back  of  the  product,  do  we  get  on 

1  Lehrbuch,  §  87. 
353]  87 


8  8  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BENEKE  [354 

the  track  of  what  really  will  throw  light  on  our  fundamental 
problem — the  changes  and  alterations  of  consciousness. 
But  inasmuch  as  the  process  of  knowledge  is  apparently 
shut  off  entirely  from  direct  observation,  it  would  seem  as 
though  psychology  had  here  struck  a  chasm  which  it  could 
never  bridge. 

§  41 .  Changes  TO  Consciousness,  and  Changes  IN  Conscious- 
ness — While  it  is  true  that  if  the  psychologist  can  never  get 
beyond  immediate  consciousness,  the  task  of  psychology 
must  prove  hopeless,  it  is  also  true  that  there  is  a  real  way 
out  of  this  difficulty.  At  no  point  in  his  whole  philosophy 
does  Beneke  show  himself  profounder  than  in  this  distinc- 
tion :  If  the  process  of  awaking  to  consciousness  is  not  open 
to  direct  observation,  the  process  of  arising  in  consciousness 
is.  And,  since  every  conscious  change,  once  clearly  ex- 
perienced, remains  as  a  trace  in  the  inner  being  of  the  soul, 
we  may  by  recollective  reflection  on  previous  experience  see 
exactly  how  changes  in  consciousness  have  taken  place,  and 
thus,  if  there  be  any,  discover  the  laws  which  govern  these 
changes.  Consequently,  may  we  not  further,  on  the  basis 
of  the  facts  so  ascertained,  argues  Beneke,  "  make  the  in- 
quiry whether  we  are  not  in  a  position  to  explain  also  the 
mounting  from  an  unconscious  to  a  conscious  state  in  accord- 
ance with  like  laws?"2  In  consequence  of  this  distinction, 
the  investigation  of  inner  experience  naturally  comes  first. 
For  the  facts  of  outer  experience,  as  Beneke  alleges,  are  in 
part  the  product  of  stimulants  taken  up  from  the  outer 
world,  but  the  facts  of  inner  experience  are  forms  of  con- 
sciousness directly  depending  on  other  immediate  forms  of 
consciousness  (those  of  immediate  outer  experience). 

*Lehrbuch,  §  87. 


3  c  c  ]  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  89 

II      INNER  EXPERIENCE  :   ORIGIN  OF  INDIVIDUAL  FACTS 

§  42.  The  Facts  of  Inner  Experience — Inner  experience 
reveals  itself  as  a  series  of  ever-shifting  states  or  pulses,  each 
of  which  has  a  definite  individual  character.  To  these  indi- 
vidual states  or  pulses,  in  order  to  distinguish  them  from 
things  or  external  impressions,  we  may  apply  the  generic 
term  thoughts,  or  ideas.  Ideas  then,  further,  differentiate 
themselves  into  certain  specific  kinds :  imaginations — repro- 
ductive (i.  e.  memories  proper)  and  productive,  concepts, 
judgments,  and  reasonings.  Beneke  distinctly  recognizes 
each  of  these  kinds.  Memory'in  general,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  is  merely  the  persistence  in  the  inner  being  of  the  soul 
of  what  has  once  formed  part  of  the  clear  conscious  experi- 
ence of  the  individual.  Properly  speaking,  however,  Beneke 
contends,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  memory  in  general. 
There  are  only  specific  memories,  for  "  every  individual 
presentation  has  its  own  particular  memory."7.  Memories 
proper  then  are  imaginations  of  the  individual  reproductive 
type.  But  so-called  productive  imaginations,  Beneke  holds, 
are  also  reproductive.  That  is,  "  in  respect  to  content  (the 
material)  of  their  representation,  they  are  merely  reproduct- 
ive ;  productive,  entirely  in  respect  of  their  form'"'  These 
two  types  are,  in  the  wide  sense  of  the  term,  reproductive 
imaginations  {Einbildungsvorstellungen) .  The  existence, 
moreover,  of  concepts  (Begriffe)  judgments  (Urtheilen) , 
and  inferences  (Schliisse),  are  all  fully  and  specifically  re- 
cognized by  Beneke  as  facts  of  inner  conscious  experience. 

§  43.  The  Origin  and  Growth  of  Ideas — Whatever  we  may 
say  ultimately  and  finally  as  to  the  nature  and  meaning  of 
conscious  experience  as  a  whole,  the  scope  of  the  method  of 
investigating  the  origin  and  growth  of  the  facts  of  inner  ex- 
perience, as  was  shown  in  the  discussion  upon  the  origin  of 

3  Lehrbuchy  §  103.  *  Ibid.,  §  109,  note  2. 


g0  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [356 

consciousness,5  has  for  psychology  been  clearly  made  out. 
We  saw  then  that  the  question  of  the  origin  of  ideas  is  one 
"  concerning  the  dependence  of  one  form  of  consciousness  upon 
another,  both  of  which  being  directly  present  to  clear  con- 
scious experience,  and  both  of  which  leaving  their  distinct 
traces  in  memory,  lay  themselves  open  to  subsequent  analy- 
sis, by  virtue  of  which  the  whole  psychical  process  of  develop- 
ment or  evolution  of  the  soul  may  be  traced."  It  is  just  in 
virtue  of  this  fundamental  fact, — viz.,  that  everything  that 
has  once  taken  place  in  experience  with  any  measure  of 
clearness  persists  in  the  soul  as  a  memory,  that  we  are  able 
to  trace  out  the  exact  process  by  which  the  given  occurrence 
has  come  to  pass.  With  this  method  in  mind,  we  proceed, 
therefore,  to  the  examination  of  those  changes  which  take 
place  entirely  within  the  conscious  realm. 

( 1 )  Memories — If  we  inquire  first  as  to  the  origin  of  the 
simplest  facts  of  inner  experience — memories  of  particular 
objects — we  must  note  first  what,  in  Beneke's  psychology, 
becomes  demonstrated  of  all  the  facts  of  inner  experience, 
that  they  all  depend  on  certain  original  experiences  in  the 
perceptive  consciousness.  The  person  who  has  never  seen 
an  alligator  can  have  no  memory  of  an  alligator.  The  per- 
son who  has  never  heard  the  music  of  the  hautboy  can  have 
no  memory  of  those  particular  sounds.  Beneke  thus  agrees 
with  Hume  "  that  any  impression  either  of  the  mind  or  body 
is  constantly  followed  by  an  idea,  which  resembles  it,  and  is 
only  different  in  the  degrees  of  force  and  liveliness."  But 
while  with  Hume,  "  the  chief  exercise  of  the  memory  is  not 
to  preserve  the  simple  ideas,  but  their  order  or  position,"6 
with  Beneke  memory,  in  the  sense  of  persistence,  assumes  a 
clearer  function,  and  is  indicative  of  an  important  psycho- 
logical  process.     My   memory  of  the   face  of  my  intimate 

5  Chap.  II,  §  21.  G  Treatise  of  Human  Arature,  p.  9. 


3  c  7 1  FRIED  RICH  ED  UA  RD  BEN  EKE  g  r 

friend,  whose  photograph  I  see  every  day,  is  a  more  vivid, 
clearer  inner  experience,  than  my  memory  of  the  face  of 
some  casual  accuaintance,  whom  I  have  beheld  but  once  or 
twice.  Why  ?  Because  I  have  seen  my  friend's  face  as 
pictured  in  the  photograph  a  thousand  times,  my  acquaint- 
ance's once.  Each  time  I  have  seen  the  former,  that  con- 
scious experience  in  becoming  unconscious  has  become  a 
trace.  These  unconscious  traces  in  my  soul,  being  precisely 
similar,  or  almost  so,  all  tend  to  fuse,  and  represent  them- 
selves in  consciousness  as  a  single  distinct  act.  If  then 
memories  gain  in  clearness  and  definiteness  through  unnum- 
bered repetitions  of  the  original  experience  which  they  repre- 
sent, it  is  only  because  of  the  fusion  which  has  taken  place 
among  these  separate  traces  in  consequence  of  the  mutual 
attraction  due  to  their  similarity. 

(2)  Concepts — We  may  inquire  now  as  to  the  manner  in 
which  and  the  materials  out  of  which  concepts  arise.  Sup- 
pose there  were  presented  to  my  visual  consciousness  either 
simultaneously  or  in  immediate  succession  the  following  ob- 
jects :  A  piece  of  coal,  a  clump  of  soot,  a  lot  of  pitch,  some 
ink,  a  raven,  and  mourning  clothes7.  There  would  irresistibly 
arise  in  inner  consciousness  the  concept  "  blackness."  Now 
in  each  of  these  things,  so  dissimilar  as  a  whole,  there  were 
certain  constituent  parts   common  to  all.     As  each  of  these 

7  In  this  whole  section  I  have  availed  myself  of  illustrative  material  and  pre- 
cisely formulated  statements  given  in  a  most  valuable  little  exposition  of  Beneke's 
system  by  Dr.  G.  Raue :  Die  neue  Seele?ilehre  Dr.  Beneke's  nach  methodischen 
Grundsatzen  in  einfach  entwickelnder  IVeise  fiir  Lehrer  bearbeitet.  This  book 
was  afterwards  enlarged  and  improved  by  J.  G.  Dressier,  Director  of  the  Normal 
School  at  Bautzen,  Beneke's  leading  follower.  It  is  the  book  that  has  done  most 
to  make  Beneke  known  to  German  teachers. 

An  English  translation  of  this  work  was  made  by  some  unknown  person  in 
1 87 1.  Morris  in  one  of  the  supplementary  notes  to  his  translation  of  Ueber- 
weg's  History,  cites  (Vol.  II.,  p.  285)  this  work  as  a  translation  made  by  Raue  of 
Beneke's  lehrbuch  der  Psychologie.  Raue's  work  was  really  written  in  German, 
and  is  an  original  exposition  of  Beneke's  system.' 


g2  FRIEDRICH  ED  UARD  BENEKE  [353 

things  was  passed  before  me,  the  dissimilar  elements  occurred 
but  once,  whereas  that  which  was  similar  was  repeated  six 
times.  As  the  coal  passed  before  me  it  left  its  trace  in  the 
soul ;  then  the  soot,  the  pitch,  and  the  remaining  things 
likewise.  These  traces,  because  of  their  similarity,  instantly 
attracted  each  other,  or  fused  as  one  object.  And  in  pro- 
portion to  their  greater  frequency,  the  common  elements 
were  reproduced  or  represented  more  strongly  and  clearly 
than  those  peculiar  to  each  of  the  stated  objects.  In  this 
manner,  then,  experience  shows  concepts  first  arise.8 

A  like  process  is  at  work  in  the  formation  of  higher  con- 
cepts. Suppose  by  the  method  above  explained,  I  had 
already  acquired  in  separate  ways  the  concepts,  blackness, 
redness,  blueness,  greenness.  Let  some  one  now,  by  means 
of  symbols  or  otherwise,  simultaneously  or  successively 
arouse  in  my  consciousness  these  several  concepts.  In- 
stantly there  arises  a  new  concept,  a  higher  one,  which  I 
learn  afterwards  to  designate  as  "  color."  Hence  we  reach 
this  general  conclusion :  "  CONCEPTS  arise  in  the  human  soul 
becatise  the  similarities  in  different  notions  of  individual 
objects  (Intuitions)  mutually  attract  each  other  and  fuse 
together  into  one  whole ;  and  as  concepts  so  formed  have  also 
points  in  common,  they  in  turn  coalesce,  and  hence  arise  NEW 
and  continually  HIGHER  CONCEPTS."  9 

(3)  Judgments — When  once  a  concept  has  been  produced, 
in  consequence  of  the  law  of  persistence  of  psychical  forms, 
it  continues  to  exist  in  the  inner  being  of  the  soul.     Suppose 

8 "When,  therefore,  there  are  no  intuitions,  there  can  be  no  concepts  answering 
to  them.  Hence  a  man  born  blind  has  no  concept  of  •  Color,'  although  he  knows 
the  name;  the  man  born  deaf  has  no  concept  of  '  Sound,'  nor  can  such  persons 
erer  obtain  these  concepts.  Similarly  those  who  live  in  equatorial  regions  are 
destitute  of  the  concept  '  Ice,'  nor  had  Luther  any  concepts  of  coffee,  tobacco, 
steam-engine,  etc." — G.  Raue,  in  his  "  Elements  of  Psychology,  on  the  Principles 
of  Beneke'"  (English  translation,  Oxford  1871),  p.  35. 

9Raue's  Elements  {op.  cit.),  p.  37. 


359]  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  g  3 

now,  having  acquired  the  concept  "  blackness,"  I  am  again 
shown  the  objects  mentioned  above.  Instantly  I  say : 
"  These  things  are  black."  It  would  be  possible  to  show  by 
thousands  of  instances  that  "  when  we  perceive  anything,  as  a 
ntle  a  concept  rises  into  consciousness  in  addition  to  that  per- 
ception." Again,  if  the  word  red  or  black  is  mentioned,  I 
instantly  think,  "  This  is  a  color."  In  other  words,  instances 
are  equally  numerous,  in  which  a  higher  concept  is  summoned 
into  the  mind  along  with  another.  We  mean  by  judgments, 
then,  cases  where  either  a  like  concept  is  called  into  con- 
sciousness along  with  a  (simple)  perception,  or  a  higher  con- 
cept of  like  kind  along  with  another  concept.  And  here 
again  the  essential  thing  to  notice  is  the  attraction  of  like 
for  like  and  their  fusion. 

(4)  Inferences — The  psychological  process  involved  in 
*'  drawing  a  conclusion"  is  thus  stated  by  Dr.  Raue,  one  of 
Beneke's  earliest  and  most  enthusiastic  followers  : 

"  In  the  human  soul  there  are  very  often  several  judg- 
ments conscious  at  the  same  time.     Take  the  judgments : 

All  men  are  mortal 
A  Moor  is  a  man 

Here  we  have  three  concepts  side  by  side,  man,  mortal,  Moor. 
While  the  first  judgment  affirms  '  mortality'  of  all  men,  i.  e., 
of  the  whole  compass  of  that  concept,  the  second  declares 
that  the  Moor  is  included  in  that  compass. 

"What  takes  place?  'Man'  and  'Moor'  are  similar  con- 
cepts, for  Moor  is  but  another  name  for  man — it  only  signi- 
fies a  particular  kind  of  human  being.  Hence  these  two 
concepts  will  coalesce,  but  in  such  a  way  that  Moor  will  re- 
main present  to  consciousness.  In  fact  this  concept  is  forced 
with  special  strength  upon  the  consciousness,  the  conse- 
quence of  which  is  that  not  it,  but  '  all  men'  is  obscured,  and 
almost  vanishes  from  consciousness.     The  movable  elements 


94  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  ll^O 

which  kept  it  consciously  present  are  withdrawn  from  the 
latter,  and  are  attracted  to  the  more  strongly  emphasized 
term  '  Moor.'  Hence  the  only  thing  the  dissimilar  concept 
'being  mortal'  can  do,  is  to  attach  itself  to  the  term  Moor, 
now  vividly  conscious:  and  so  the  inference  (the  inferring 
judgment)  is  drawn — (Therefore)  the  Moor  is  mortal  also. 

"  If  in  two  judgments  there  is  a  total  want  of  similar  con- 
cepts, though  they  may  coexist  in  consciousness,  yet  they  can 
give  rise  to  no  new  judgment,  no  conclusion,  no  inference. 
Suppose  for  instance, 

The  bird  flies 
The  fish  is  aquatic 

Here  each  is  outside  the  other,  and  no  inference  is  possible 
in  such.  As  the  concepts  in  the  judgments,  iron  is  hard, 
and  honey  is  sweet,  can  never  coalesce,  so  neither  can  the 
former. 

"  When  therefore  two  judgments  are  rendered  SIMULTAN- 
EOUSLY conscious,  and  in  them  are  contained  similar  concepts 
together  with  one  DISSIMILAR  one,  the  similar  concepts  fuse 
together  and  a  new  judgment  is  produced ;  because  the  DIS- 
SIMILAR concept  must  attach  itself  to  that  one  of  the  similar 
concepts  which  in  one  of  the  judgments  has  been  brought  defi- 
nitely and  prominently  into  consciousness."™ 

§  44.  First  Fundamental  Psychological  Process" — The  ex- 
amination of  the  facts  of  inner  experience,  as  above  set  forth, 
therefore,  seems  to  yield  a  fundamental  law  governing  the 
formation  of  the  psychical  forms  found  in  inner  experience. 
This  law,  however,  Beneke  contends,  is  more  than  a  mere 
descriptive  "  law."  It  is  in  fact  a  real  fundamental  psycho- 
logical process  unceasingly  at  work  in  the  life  of  the  human 

10  Raue's  Elements,  pp.  43-44. 

11  For  Beneke's  statement  of  the  four  fundamental  psychological  processes,  see 
the  Lehrbuck,  Chap.  1,  I:  Grundprocesse  der  psychischen  Enhvickelung. 


j6l]  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  g  5 

soul.     It   is  given  by  him  as  the  fourth  of  his  "fundamental 
processes,"  and  is  stated  as  follows: 

"  Like  products  of  the  human  soul,  or  similar  products,  ac- 
cording to  the  measure  of  their  similarity,  attract  each  other  or 
strive  to  enter  into  closer  union  with  each  other."1' 

Ill      INNER   EXPERIENCE:    A   CONTINUOUS    PROCESS    OF 
REDISTRIBUTION 

§45.  Introduction — Having  completed  now  this  review  of 
the  individual  facts  of  inner  experience,  resulting  in  the  dis- 
covery of  a  fundamental  psychological  process  underlying 
their  formation,  we  must  turn  attention  next  to  two  other 
important  aspects  of  this  form  of  consciousness.  Inner  ex- 
perience reveals  itself  at  once  as  a  continuous  process  of 
change,  and  also  as  a  series  or  chain  of  associated  ideas. 
Hence  arise  two  fundamental  psychological  questions.  The 
first  is  twofold :  a)  when  once  either  a  perception  or  an  idea 
has  sunk  into  an  unconscious  state  and  so  become  a  trace, 
exactly  what  change  takes  place  in  it  by  virtue  of  which  it  is 
restored  to  consciousness?;  b)  why  should  an  idea  that  is 
immediately  present  in  conscious  experience  ever  become 
unconscious  at  all?  The  second  fundamental  psychological 
question  asks  concerning  the  connection  between  ideas : 
since  a  given  perception  or  idea  shows  itself  in  experience 
to  be  connected  with  a  thousand  different  associates,  why  is 
it  that  in  the  succssion  of  ideas,  a  given  psychical  form  at 
certain  times  summons  in  its  wake  one  particular  associate 
rather  than  another? 

§  46.  Alteration  in  Inner  Experience  a  Change  in  Activity 
— Inner  consciousness  is  never  continuously  one  individual 

12  Lehrbuch,  §  35.  Raue  called  this  formula  the  "  Law  of  the  Mutual  Attrac- 
tion of  Similars."  Beneke  regarded  the  process  as  requiring  almost  no  elucida- 
tion, because  there  lie  open  to  immediate  observation  such  abundant  instances  of 
the  process,  not  only  in  its  result  but  also  in  its  happening. 


9<5  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [362 

substantive  state,  whether  memory,  concept,  judgment,  etc., 
in  the  unchanging  contemplation  of  which  it  has  become 
utterly  absorbed.  Inner  consciousness,  to  be  sure,  can  be- 
come submerged,  as  it  were,  in  a  long  train  of  thinking  on 
one  distinct  topic ;  but,  generally  speaking,  it  is  always  a 
fleeting  series  of  subjective  facts  in  which  memories  (proper), 
concepts,  judgments,  etc.,  each  follow  close  upon  the  heels 
of  the  other  with  unceasing  rapidity.  If  now  we  accept  the 
contention  so  far  made,  that  "in  general  what  has  once  been 
formed  in  our  soul  with  a  certain  degree  of  completeness  can 
not  become  lost  again,"13  and  that  "the  source  or  origin  of  the 
powers  and  faculties  of  the  developed  soul  is  to  be  found  in 
the  traces  of  the  earlier  aroused  psychical  developments"^  this 
continuous  alteration  which  our  self  consciousness  shows, 
becomes  understood  in  a  new  light.  Since  the  soul  is  stored 
with  the  records  or  memories  of  its  previous  experiences, 
change  in  inner  consciousness  then  is  a  change  "  only  in  ac- 
tivity" {jiur  die  Erregtheii)  .15  The  absolute  condition  of  re- 
tention or  unconscious  persistence  is  certain  original  clearly 
conscious  experiences,  perceptive  or  conceptive.  The  con- 
dition of  recall  is  that  these  unconscious  forms  be  actively 
excited  or  aroused. 

§  47.  Beneke's  Doctrine  of  "Movable  Elements" — If  now 
we  inquire  why  any  particular  subjective  fact  occupies  at 
the  immediate  moment  the  theatre  of  inner  consciousness, 
the  question  is  one  as  to  how  this  given  fact  became  actively 
aroused.  When  I  look  at  the  photograph  of  my  friend 
there  instantly  flashes  into  my  mind,  i.  e.,  there  engages  my 
immediate  inner  consciousness,  either  a  memory  of  my 
friend's  face,  or  some  fact  or  circumstances  which  in  my  past 
experience  have  been  associated  with  him.  When,  as  stated 
a  moment  ago,  I  looked  at  pitch,  ink,  soot,  a  raven,  etc.,  in- 

13  Lehrbuch,  §  28.  "  Ibid.,  §  31.  15  Ibid.,  §  27. 


3  6  3 1  FRIED  RICH  ED  UA  RD  BEN  EKE  g  y 

stantly  there  arose  in  my  inner  consciousness  the  concept 
*l  blackness  ;"  and  this  was  followed  by  the  judgment,  "  these 
things  are  black."  When,  too,  my  mind,  i.  e.,  inner  con- 
sciousness, momentarily  becomes  centered  on  the  memory  of 
my  friend's  face,  instantly  there  is  suggested  or  arises  into 
active  consciousness,  a  number  of  successive  subjective 
facts,  which  may  happen  to  come  in  the  form  of  memories, 
judgments,  or  inferences,  relating  to  my  friend.  These  in- 
stances, which  of  course  might  be  multipled  indefinitely,  all 
go  to  show  that  all  conscious  appearances  forming  part  of 
the  content  of  the  total  momentary  percept  called  outer  ex- 
perience, as  well  as  all  facts  of  immediate  inner  experience, 
have  effective  power  to  bring  trailing  into  immediate  clear 
conscious  activity,  certain  psychical  forms  which,  the  instant 
before,  were  utterly  outside  clear  conscious  experience,  or, 
in  other  words,  were  existing  as  unconscious  or  inactive 
traces.  What  then  is  the  meaning  of  this  power  of  conscious 
forms,  already  present  in  immediate  experience,  to  call  up 
and  make  active  other  forms?  It  can  only  mean,  contends 
Beneke,  that  the  stimulating  forms  actually  yield  up  or  trans- 
fer certain  "  movable  elements,"  or  stimulants,  which  prove 
effective  in  making  consciously  active  those  forms  to  which 
they  become  transferred.  "Traces  or  unconscious  psychical 
forms  consequently,"  he  says,  "  become  conscious  or  active 
psychical  forms,  because  there  jiozv  over  to  them  from  those 
forms  already  active,  elements  suitable  to  effect  this  mount- 
ing to  active  consciousness."  l6  This  is  Beneke's  doctrine  of 
movable  elements,  which,  as  will  be  shown  later,  plays  so  im- 
portant a  part  in  his  system.  These  elements,  besides 
"  movable"  or  "  balancing  elements  "  {beweglichcr  odcr  aus- 
gleichuugselemente)  are  also  called  by  him,  because  of  their 
function,  "elements  of  consciousness"  (Bewusstscimic- 
jnente). " 

16  Lehrbuch,  §  89.  "  Lehrbuch,  §  89,  note  2. 


g  8  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BENEKE  [364 

§  48.  Immediately  active  inner  Consciousness  the  Resultant 
of  a  Dynamic  Process — That  limited  span  of  ideas  or 
thoughts  which  constitutes  the  immediate  inner  conscious- 
ness of  the  moment,  Beneke  therefore  regards  as  a  sort  of 
momentary  state  of  equilibrium  brought  about  by  the  distri- 
bution or  diffusion  over  a  certain  area  of  the  soul,  as  it  were, 
of  certain  movable  or  balancing  elements,  toward  stimulation 
by  which  the  unconscious,  that  is,  inactive  traces  in  the  inner 
being  of  the  soul  are  ever  striving.  Or  to  put  it  in  his  own 
words,  "Traces  or  rudiments  are  not  indeed  cast  out  of  the 
soul  by  their  becoming  unconscious,  and  must  therefore  also 
take  part  in  the  universal  balancijig  of  the  movable  elements 
for  which  all  the  psychical  forms  of  our  being  are  striving."18 
We  see  then  why  certain  memories,  concepts,  judgments,  etc., 
are  continually  re-arising  in  consciousness.  Immediately  act- 
ive inner  consciousness,  as  Beneke  interprets  the  facts  of  the 
case,  is  a  continuous  readjustment  or  balancing  process — a 
perpetual  alternation  of  disturbances  of  equilibrium  and  com- 
pensating balancings  or  adjustments.  Consciousness  thus,  in 
the  sense  of  knowledge,  is  both  product  and  process — static 
and  dynamic.  So  far  as  we  regard  active  consciousness  as 
a  substantive  state,  i.  e.,  as  unity  embracing  multiplicity,  we 
are  emphasizing  its  static  condition  or  phenomenalistic  as- 
pect, which  is  confined  entirely  to  the  side  of  presented  con- 
tents. But  the  static  condition,  or  knowledge  as  a  product, 
is  the  resultant  of  two  factors — on  the  one  hand,  the  psychi- 
cal form,  or  trace,  which  is  aroused  from  the  inner  being  of 
the  soul,  on  the  other,  the  movable  elements  or  stimulants 
which  are  transferred  to  it  from  some  actively  aroused  form 
of  consciousness.  Thus  so  far  as  we  regard  active  conscious 
forms  as  such  resultants,  we  gain  an  insight  into  the  dynamic 
aspect  of  consciousness,  or  knowledge  as  a  process.     When 

18  lehrbuch,  §  89. 


365]  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  gg 

therefore  we  regard  some  conceptive  form  of  consciousness 
as  directly  depending  for  its  activity  on  some  other  form  of 
consciousness,  perceptive  or  conceptive,  we  must  not  fall 
into  the  error  of  supposing  that  Beneke  in  claiming  that 
something  real,  from  the  percept  or  concept  that  sinks  into 
obscurer  consciousness,  is  actually  transferred  to  the  form  of 
consciousness  that  gains  in  clearness,  means  to  say  that  any 
part  or  portion  of  the  presented  contents  of  the  form  or 
presentation,  becomes  transferred  in  its  qualitative  aspect  as 
presented  contents  to  the  latter.19     Not  only  the  forms  of  inner 

19  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  in  the  only  serious  critical,  though  brief,  estimate  we 
have  in  English  of  Beneke's  psychological  views  (G.  F.  Stout :  "  Herbart  com- 
pared with  English  psychologists  and  with  Beneke,"  Mind,  January  1889),  mis- 
apprehension on  this  point  should  have  led  to  severe  criticism  of  Beneke.  Mr. 
Stout  says,  (p.  23)  :  "  Many  of  Beneke's  hypotheses  are  no  doubt  wild  and  un- 
tenable. But  the  general  conception  of  the  working  of  the  psychological  me- 
chanism through  which  presentations  disappear  and  reappear,  or  wane  and  wax 
in  distinctness,  seems  to  have  a  firm  basis  in  fact.  I  do  not  mean  that  the  theory 
of  transferable  elements  can  be  in  any  way  justified.  What  I  refer  to  is  the  gen- 
eral principle  that  the  rising  of  one  presentation  is  so  correlated  with  the  sinking 
of  others,  and  vice  versa,  that  the  whole  process  can  best  be  formulated  for 
psychological  purposes  as  a  transference  of  something  from  the  presentation  which 
wanes  in  distinctness  to  that  which  waxes  in  distinctness.  This  something  we  may 
regard  either  as  a  reality  or  as  a  fiction,  and  we  may  call  it  attention  or  psychi- 
cal energy,  or  by  any  other  convenient  name.  But  we  must  not,  like  Beneke,  re- 
gard it  as  a  constituent  element  of  the  presented  content.  Nothing  is  ever  trans- 
ferred from  one  presented  content  to  another.  A  presentation  becomes  more  or 
less  distinct  as  more  or  fewer  qualitative  details  become  distinguishable  in  it. 
Now  it  is  obviously  untrue  that  the  qualitative  details  of  one  presentation  ever  be- 
come transferred  to  another  when  the  latter  become  clearer  in  consequence  of 
the  former  becoming  obscured."  Certainly  it  is  a  grievous  mistake  to  regard  Be- 
neke as  contending  for  any  such  view  as  that  just  stated.  Every  conscious  appear- 
ance or  presentation,  Beneke  continually  contends,  is  a  product  whose  factors  are 
always,  on  the  one  hand  a  primary  power  or  group  of  primary  powers  (the  essen- 
tially psychical  elements),  on  the  other,  certain  stimulants,  which  so  far  as  their 
being  is  concerned  in  respect  to  the  soul,  may  be  external  or  internal.  It  is  either 
these  primary  powers  themselves,  or  the  stimulants  which  have  been  appropriated 
from  without  and  made  a  permanent  possession  of  the  soul,  that  form  the  trans- 
ferable elements.  This  indeed  is  the  basis  for  the  profound  distinction  between 
Beneke  and  the  English  associationists.     With  the  latter  it  is  sensations  that  are 


IOO  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  \_l^6 

experience  (ideas),  but  also  those  of  outer  experiance  (per- 
cepts) are  to  be  regarded  in  one  aspect  as  phenomenalistic 
products ;  and  so  what  actually  becomes  transferred  from  the 
exciting  form  of  consciousness  is  some  part  of  its  factors, 
which  to  be  sure,  on  the  representative  side  of  conscious- 
ness, may  qualitatively  re-present  precisely  what  it  was  on 
the  representative  side  of  the  original  stimulating  percept; 
but  then  this  only  becomes  known  to  a  third  conscious  ex- 
perience, which  analyzes  out  the  common  elements  of  the 
two  preceding  experiences. 

§  49.  Why  Forms  Immediately  Present  in  Inner  Conscious- 
ness become  Inactive — The  second  form  of  the  main  question 
so  far  discussed,  touching  the  reason  why  an  idea  immedi- 
ately present  to  inner  experience  ever  sinks  out  of  active 
consciousness,  is  easily  answered.  If  a  given  idea  (whether 
image,  concept,  judgment  or  inference),  has  risen  into  active 
consciousness  by  virtue  of  a  certain  gain  or  stimulation  of 
movable  elements,  it  becomes  inactive  again,  or  a  mere  trace, 
by  suffering  a  corresponding  loss  of  those  elements.  If,  in 
the  case  already  cited,  the  judgment — "  These  things  are 
black,"   is  instantly  followed  by  the  judgment — "  Black  is  a 

aggregated  and  segregated  so  as  to  give  rise  to  all  the  higher  and  varied  cemplex 
forms  of  experience.  With  Beneke  it  is  what  lie  back  of  sensations,  and  make 
them  possible,  that  become  associated.  Beneke  recognized  that  even  could  we 
penetrate  in  consciousness  to  the  most  elementary  ground  of  all  things,  the  atom, 
we  should  only  reach  "  elementary  appearance,"  and  we  must  still  look  back  of 
this  for  its  producing  factors  (compare  Metaphysik,  p.  122).  With  this  conception 
of  factors  there  is  of  course  a  way  out  out  of  the  difficulty  as  to  the  doctrine  of 
transferable  elements.  Mr.  Stout  fully  recognizes  this  himself  when  he  con- 
tinues: "Only  when  we  disregard  presented  content,  and  merely  formulate  the 
mechanical  connection  of  mental  processes  in  its  quantitative  aspect,  do  we  find 
a  legitimate  scope  and  meaning  for  the  conception  of  a  transferable  somewhat 
continually  redistributed  within  the  mental  system.  From  this  point  of  view, 
however,  the  conception  is  certainly  of  value,  and  it  is  to  be  preferred  to  Her- 
bart's  theory  of  conflict."  Certainly  this  is  the  point  of  view  which  Beneke 
both  in  spirit  and  expressly  held.     Compare  infra,  §  66. 


367]  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  IOl 

color,"  this  is  because  the  movable  elements  which  had  been 
at  work  rendering  the  concept  "blackness"  active,  have 
again  become  transferred  with  the  effect  of  arousing  or  excit- 
ing into  active  or  immediate  clear  consciousness  the  concept 
"color." 

§  50.  Second  Fundamental  Psychological  Process — The 
obvious  conclusion  from  these  facts  of  inner  experience  is 
that  the  alteration  in  activity  revealed  in  inner  experience, 
is  best  conceived  to  be  in  the  nature  of  a  balancing  process 
— in  one  case,  "  a  partial  discontinuance  of  stimuli,"20  in  con- 
sequence of  which  a  psychical  form  becomes  a  memory  or 
trace ;  in  the  other  case,  a  compensatory  restoring  of  stimuli, 
in  consequence  of  which  it  again  enters  active  consciousness. 
The  second  fundamental  process  of  conscious  experience, 
then,  may  be  stated  as  follows : 

"In  all  psychical  combinations,  at  every  moment  in  our 
lives,  there  is  an  active  striving  towards  a  balancing  or  equal- 
izing of  the  movable  elements  contained  in  these  combina- 
tions:'m 

IV      INNER   EXERIENCE:     AN   ASSOCIATION   OF   IDEAS 

§  51.  Introduction — Having  seen  that  in  general  an  idea  is 
roused  into  active  consciousness  because  of  the  transference 
to  its  unconscious  trace  of  certain  movable  elements,  we 
must  turn  now  to  consider  the  specific  question  why  in  a 
given  case  a  particular  idea  actually  aroused  in  conscious- 
ness becomes  supplanted  by  one  particular  idea  rather  than 
any  other  with  which  it  has  been  frequently  associated.  As 
this  question  of  the  direction  of  changing  consciousness  in- 
volves the  nature  of  the  connections  between  ideas,  the  latter 
problem  is  considered  first. 

20  Lehrbuch,  §  88 :  "A  partial  disappearance  of  this  stimulant  changes  the  con- 
scious sensations  and  perceptions  again  into  unconscious  traces  or  rudiments." 

21  Beneke's  "  third  "  fundamental  process.     Cf.  Lehrbuch,  §  26. 


I02  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [368 

A — THE    CONNECTIONS    BETWEEN    IDEAS 

§  52.  Nature  of  the  Problem — The  real  problem  involved 
in  the  "association  of  ideas"  was  very  sharply  distinguished 
by  Beneke.  The  inability  of  the  general  laws  of  association 
as  set  forth  in  purely  descriptive  psychology,  to  explain  the 
conscious  experiences  of  an  individual,  has  already  been 
pointed  out.  "It  is  claimed,"  says  Beneke,  "that  presenta- 
tions become  associated  and  awaken  one  another  after  the 
relations  of  Similarity,  Coexistence  and  Succession,  Con- 
tiguity in  Space,  Causal  Connexion,  Contrast,  etc.  But 
almost  every  presentation  has  at  some  previous  time  arisen 
with  numerous  different  presentations  in  all  of  these  rela- 
tions. Why  therefore  does  the  awakening  follow,  at  one 
time  this,  at  another  time  that  relation,  and  why  does  some 
special  one  of  the  many  associated  presentations  become 
awakened?"5  To  answer  this  question  psychology  must 
know  precisely  "  what  is  imparted  to  an  idea  on  its  being 
combined  with  others." 

§53.  Essential  Nature  of  the  Union  between  Like  Psychical 
Forms — Since  common  experience  shows  us  that  the  union 
between  ideas  is  of  two  distinct  kinds,  that  between  psychical 
forms  perfectly  alike,  and  that  between  unlike  forms,  we 
must  look  first  to  discover  the  nature  of  the  union  between 
the  former.  It  has  been  postulated,  it  will  be  remembered, 
that  experience  is  a  twofold  form  of  consciousness,  outer 
and  inner,  and  that,  as  a  matter  of  daily  experience,  original 
experiences,  whether  facts  of  outer  or  of  inner  experience, 
become  reproduced  as  memories.  These  memories,  so  far 
as  memories,  are  facts  of  inner  experience.  Assuming  for 
the  moment  outer  or  perceptive  consciousness,  it  is  these 
facts  of  inner  experience  that  we  are  trying  to  account  for. 
Suppose  now  there  is  presented  to  my  perceptive  conscious- 

'nIehrbnch,  §  86,  Chapter  III.,  on  "  The  Reproduction  of  Traces,"  §  86,  note  2. 


369]  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  I03 

ness  for  the  first  time  the  photograph  of  a  person ;  or  sup- 
pose that  I  hear  for  the  first  time  some  shrill  note.  The 
moment  the  photograph  is  withdrawn  from  my  field  of  view, 
and  the  moment  the  note  dies  away — likeness  and  note, 
ceasing  from  active  consciousness,  become  memories  or 
traces  in  the  inner  being  of  the  soul.  If  now,  on  a  later 
occasion,  I  see  again  the  identical  photograph,  or  hear  again 
the  same  shrill  note,  again  there  will  be  left  in  the  soul  traces 
of  these  experiences,  and  these  traces  will  become  more 
numerous  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  times  the  original 
experience  is  repeated  in  exactly  the  same  way.  To  each 
of  the  traces  of  the  photograph  above  mentioned,  no  matter 
if  seen  a  thousand  times,  Beneke  would  assign  a  distinct 
numerical  existence  in  the  inner  being  of  the  soul.  Upon 
those  numerous  traces  the  psychological  process  of  the 
mutual  attraction  of  the  similar  of  course  tends  to  operate ; 
but  unless  this  process  was  supplemented  by  that  of  the 
actual  transference  of  balancing  elements,  there  could  arise 
no  real  bond  or  connection  between  these  similar  traces. 
They  would  remain  but  a  "mere  aggregation"  of  discrete 
individuals.  But  these  similar  traces,  Beneke  claims,  do 
enter  into  an  organic  or  vital  relation,  and  this  relation  or 
connection  is  also  something  numerically  real  and  distinct  in 
the  soul.  We  know  this  because  "  even  of  this  transference 
of  movable  elements  from  one  psychical  form  to  another, 
traces  remain  in  the  inner  being  of  the  soul."23  And  it  is 
this  transference  that  becomes  the  ground  of  "  all  enduring 
relation!'  That  a  "permanent  linking  or  union"  between 
these  similar  forms,  then  takes  place,  is  due,  Beneke  con- 
cludes, to  the  ''balancing  process "  by  virtue  of  which  the 
movable  elements  are  transferred  from  one  form  to  another. 
§  54.  Effect  of  Conscious  Activity  on  the  Inner  Character 

23  Lehrbuch,  §  34. 


io4  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  [370 

of  the  Trace1* — A  first  characteristic,  then,  of  the  inner 
nature  of  a  trace,  is  this  strengthening  ( Verst'drkung)  or 
close  bond  of  intimacy  which  has  resulted  in  consequence 
of  similar  psychical  forms  being  aroused  to  active  conscious- 
ness. The  second  time  my  friend's  photograph  occupied  a 
part  of  my  perceptive  consciousness,  it,  in  consequence  of 
the  law  of  the  mutual  attraction  of  similars,  was  immediately 
attracted  towards  the  trace  of  the  original  sense  perception, 
the  original  perception  having  became  a  trace  by  losing  part 
of  its  stimulation.  But  not  only  were  the  two  conscious 
forms,  percept  and  trace,  attracted,  but  the  actively  conscious 
percept,  in  consequence  of  the  universal  balancing  process* 
transferred  some  of  its  stimulants  to  the  unaroused  trace,  and 
thus  tended  to  make  the  latter  consciously  active.  When 
now  this  virgin  trace  lapses  again  into  an  inactive  state,  it 
does  not  do  so  unchanged.  It  has  entered  into  organic  re- 
lation with  the  second  trace.  There  has  been  formed 
between  the  two  traces  a  connecting  path,  as  it  were,  which 
Beneke  regards  not  as  "  an  ideal  relation,  but  as  something 
real  continuously  existing  in  the  inner  being  of  the  soul." ' 
This  path  or  connection,  too,  has  resulted  from  the  actual 
transference  of  movable  elements.  And  every  time  a  new 
similar  memory  has  been  formed,  this  process  has  repeated 
itself  until  the  thousand  traces  of  the  given  photograph  form 
a  complete  organic  tissue  in  the  soul's  inner  being. 

Besides  this  organic  union  resulting  from  conscious 
activity,  the  trace  in  its  inner  nature  possesses  two  other  im- 
portant characteristics,  dependent  on  the  quantity  or  number 
of  exactly  similar  traces.  Sense  perceptions,  as  well  as 
other  immediately  active  sense  forms,  become  traces,  we 
have  seen,  because  of  &  partial  disappearance  of  the  balancing 

24  Cf.   Lehrbuch,  Chapter   3,    IV :    Wirkung  der   Erregung  auf  der   innere 
Beschaffenheit  des  Erregten. 

25  Lehrbuch,  §  34. 


3  7 1  ]  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BENEKE  1 0  5 

elements,  by  the  appropriation  of  which  they  have  become 
active.  This  means  then  that  every  time  an  actively  con- 
scious form  lapses  into  unconsciousness,  "  a  part  of  the  bal- 
ancing elements  remains  behind  with  the  inner  trace,  or 
united  with  it.""6  Thus  the  greater  the  number  of  separate 
traces  forming  the  given  organic  aggregate,  the  greater  will 
be  the  quantity  of  balancing  elements  remaining.  The 
direct  and  important  result  of  this  then  is  that,  since  this 
organism  of  traces  "  will  afterwards  require  fewer  balancing 
elements  in  order  to  become  genuinely  conscious,"  such  an 
organism  is  brought  nearer  the  tJiresliold  of  consciousness. 
While  a  second  important  effect  of  the  quantity  of  traces  on 
the  connection  between  conscious  forms,  is  that  the  union 
will  be  most  intimate  where  the  greatest  number  of  traces 
completely  alike  have  fused,  or  better,  become  interconnected 
in  one  organic  aggregate. 

§  5  5.  Effect  of  the  Inner  Character  of  the  Trace  on  Active 
Consciousness  '" — The  inner  being  of  the  developed  soul,  thus, 
according  to  Beneke,  is  a  mass  of  organized  memories  or 
traces.  But,  if  now  I  have  seen  the  same  photograph  a 
thousand  different  times  in  precisely  the  same  way,  when  I 
recall  this  object,  the  separate  traces  left  by  the  original  per- 
ceptions do  not  come  trooping  into  consciousness  one  after 
the  other.  "  In  consciousness  this  aggregate  of  similars 
presents  itself  as  a  single  act  (Bin  Akt),  which,  according  as 
the  number  of  these  elements  is  less  or  greater,  gives  itself, 
so  far  as  known,  a  fainter  or  stronger  character."28  When 
therefore  the  final  memory  arises  in  consciousness,  although 
really  a  manifold,  it  appears  as  a  unity.  But  its  manifold- 
ness,  in  which  consists  its  quality,  is  perceived  not  immedi- 

16  Lehrbuch,  §  97. 

27Cf.  Lehrbuch,  Chap.  3,  III :   Einfluss  cier  inneren  Bcschaffenheit  des  Zuerre- 
genden. 

"^Lehrbuch,  §  95. 


106  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  T^y2 

ately,  or  qualitatively,  but  only  by  means  of  its  strength  or 
vivacity,  i.  e.,  quantitatively. 

§  56.  Laws  of  Quantitative  Differences  of  Presentations — 
Two  very  important  laws  are  to  be  observed  in  respect  to 
this  quantitative  difference  of  presentations,  and  to  its  bear- 
ing on  the  balancing  process  at  work  in  effecting  active  con- 
sciousness. Although  a  part  of  the  stimulation  remains  in 
connection  with  a  conscious  form  even  when  it  sinks  to  a 
trace,  and  in  consequence,  the  quantity  of  traces  in  a  given 
aggregate  requires  less  stimulation  to  restore  it  to  active 
consciousness,  nevertheless  it  is  not  the  total  trace  (  Gesammt- 
angelegtheiten),  as  an  aggregate,  but  the  simple  traces  indi- 
vidually, that  form  the  true  basis  for  the  balancing  or  equal- 
izing of  the  movable  elements.  Hence  results  the  first  law : 
that  "  every  aggregate  or  psychical  form  contains  the  more 
balancing  elements*9  the  more  simple  traces  it  arises  from.30 
But  it  also  results  that  the  greater  the  number  of  simple 
similar  traces  united  in  a  given  aggregate,  the  greater  will  be 
the  capacity,  so  to  speak,  of  this  aggregate  for  the  balancing 
elements.  Such  an  aggregate  then  tends  to  draw  from  the 
immediately  active  and  stimulating  conscious  form  all  its  ac- 
tivity, without  giving  back  any  in  return.  Hence  the  second 
law:  "  The  greater  the  number  of  simple  traces  from  which 
a  given  presentation  arises,  the  more  fitted  it  is  to  appropriate 
and  hold  fast  for  itself  those  elements  tending  to  bring  about 
active  consciousness."    ( Erregungseleme?ite)'Al 

§  57.  Nature  of  the  Union  BeHveen  Unlike  Psychical  Forms 
— So  far  the  discussion  has  turned  on  forms  supposed  to  be 
perfectly  alike.  But  daily  experience  reveals  cases  of  imme- 
diate connection  of  percept  with  percept,  percept  with  idea, 
and  idea  with  idea,  where  the  connected  elements,  in  pres- 

29  That  is,  plays  a  more  effective  part  in  determining  the  character  of  immediate 
active  consciousness. 

30  Lehrbuch,  §  95.  31  Ibid<i  §  g6 


373]  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  I07 

ented  contents,  vary  from  the  closest  resemblance  to  almost 
total  unlikeness.  Taking  for  granted,  for  the  time  being, 
separate  percepts  or  individual  intuitions,  as  well  as  the  in- 
terconnected group  of  things  that  constitutes  the  immediate 
momentary  percept  of  the  individual,  we  may  note,  as  to 
inner  experience,  that  not  all  ideas  are  reproductive  imagina- 
tions, in  the  sense  of  exact  "copies"  or  images  of  original 
sense-perceptions  or  impressions.  Inner  experience  has 
been  distinguished  into  other  psychical  forms  also — fancies, 
concepts,  judgments,  inferences.  The  idea,  therefore,  which 
appears  to  be  immediately  associated  with  any  given  percept 
or  other  idea,  may  show  itself  to  subsequent  reflective 
thought  to  have  been  of  any  one  of  these  psychical  forms. 
A  raven,  forming  part  of  the  pictured  content  of  my  field  of 
view,  might  instantly  suggest  to  (i.  e.,  make  active  in)  my 
conceptive  consciousness,  the  memory  of  another  resembling 
bird ;  while  the  judgment,  "  This  raven  is  black,"  might 
arouse  the  inference,  "  This  raven  has  as  one  of  its  qualities 
color."  Now  the  connection  between  all  so-called  unlike 
forms  is  to  be  explained  on  this  basis  of  a  partial  similarity 
of  the  constituent  elements  of  each.  The  memory  of  the 
piece  of  coal  instantly  "suggests"  the  memory  of  the  raven, 
because,  when  these  two  percepts  were  originally  immedi- 
ately present  in  consciousness,  elements  similar  in  each  were 
immediately  attracted  to  each  other.  A  like  process  takes 
place  when  any  two  partially  similar  ideas  of  any  kind  are 
immediately  present  in  active  consciousness.  But,  in  any 
case,  this  process  of  attraction  is  immediately  followed  by  an 
actual  transfer  of  "  movable  elements  "  between  the  two  like 
portions.  And  it  is  this  trace  or  track,  left  in  the  being  of 
the  soul  by  the  actual  transference  of  balancing  elements 
from  one  similar  form  to  another,  that  is  the  ground  of  con- 
nection between  the  forms,  and  this  "  connection,"  as  we 
have  seen,  is  to  be  regarded  not  as  ideal,  but  as  something 


I0g  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [374 

real.  The  connection  between  unlike  forms  thus  has  as  its 
deepest  ground  the  connection  between  like  forms,  the  like 
forms  being,  in  this  case,  like  parts  or  portions  of  the  con- 
nected unlike  forms. 

§  58.  Relations  Between  Separate  Percepts  and  Between 
Percepts  and  Ideas  Strengthened  by  Repetition — Where  the 
process  of  transference  is  not  too  rapid,  not  only  traces  of 
the  original  coexisting  percepts  or  concepts  remain,  but 
there  also  continues  to  exist  in  the  inner  being  of  the  soul, 
traces  of  that  immediate  flowing  over  of  movable  elements.31 
Thus  these  connections  or  relations  between  individual  per- 
cepts, between  individual  ideas,  and  between  percepts  and 
ideas,  come  also  to  be  represented  in  inner  conscious  ex- 
perience. And  just  as  memories  of  individual  percepts  are 
at  first  less  lively  than  their  correspondent  percepts,  so  at 
first  these  relations,  on  the  presented  side  of  inner  experi- 
ence, "are  of  course  in  and  for  themselves  rather  faint;  but 
by  virtue  of  frequent  repetition  they  too  are  able  to  attain  to 
every  grade  of  strength  or  clearness  (Verstarkung) ,  so  that 
they  are  able  to  surpass  even  [the  first]  "  (J.  e.)  those  or- 
iginally given  in  outer  conscious  experience.33  In  conse- 
quence, then,  of  these  connections  formed  between  forms 
perfectly  alike,  and  between  heterogeneous  individual  forms 
of  conscious  experience,  the  inner  being  of  the  soul  becomes 
one  organic  tissue  of  more  or  less  intimately  connected 
psychical  forms,  which  on  the  presented  side  of  active  con- 
sciousness appear  sometimes  as  groups  of  coexisting,  and 
sometimes  as  trains  of  successive,  elements. 

sl"Auch  das  Zugleichjliessen  der  beweglichcn  Elemente  im  inneren  Seelensein 
fortexistirt." — Lehrbuch,  §  34. 
^Lehrbuch,  §  308. 


375]  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  l0g 

B      DIRECTION  FOLLOWED  IN  THE  TRANSFERENCE  OF  CONSCIOUS  ACTIVI'l  Y  " 

§  59.  Law  of  the  Direction  of  Consciousness — Having 
clearly  in  mind  the  nature  of  the  connection  between  various 
psychical  forms,  we  are  now  in  a  position  to  understand  why 
a  given  psychical  form,  which  happens  to  be  present  in 
active  consciousness,  summons  in  its  wake  one  particular 
associate  rather  than  another.  Change  in  consciousness 
means  only  change  in  activity,  and  change  in  activity  means 
a  redistribution  of  the  balancing  elements.  But  the  balanc- 
ing processes,  which  give  rise  to  the  momentary  forms  of 
consciousness,  have  already  set  up  repeated  immediate  con- 
nections between  that  form  which  does  the  transferring  and 
that  which  receives  the  transference.  These  connections  be- 
tween various  forms  are  more  or  less  numerous  and  com- 
plete. Hence,  while  the  reason  in  general  why  an  idea  is 
roused  into  active  consciousness  is  because  of  the  transfer- 
ence to  it  of  certain  movable  elements,  the  reason  in  par- 
ticular why  a  specific  idea  arises  is  because :  "  The  movable 
elements  are  always  passed  on  from  every  active  psychical 
form  to  that  whicli  is  most  strongly  connected  or  is  one  with 
it."3" 

§  60.  The  Law  Applied  to  the  Old  Laws  of  Association — 
The  law  just  stated,  taken  in  connection  with  what  has  been 
said  as  to  the  nature  of  the  bond  of  union  among  ideas, 
throws  new  light  upon,  and  puts  some  real  meaning  into,  the 
old  laws  of  the  association  of  ideas.  In  general  we  may  say 
that  "the  connection  arising  through  coexistence  is  stronger 
than  that  through  succession  :  for  the  latter  arises  indeed  only 
through  a  partial  and  one-sided  coexistence,  namely,  in  that 
between  the  end  of  one  psychical  process  and  the  beginning 
of  the  following.     The  connection  between  the  properties  of 

34  Cf.  Lehrbuch,  Chap.  3,  II :  "  Richtung,  in  welcher  die  Uebertraguns;  der  Er- 
regtheit  geschieht." 
3i>  Le/irbuc/i,  §  91. 


1 1  o  FRIEDRICH  ED  UARD  BENEKE  [376 

a  thing  shapes  it  for  our  perceiving  consciousness,  for  the 
most  part,  as  an  observed  manifold  coexistence ;  the  connec- 
tion of  cause  and  effect,  for  the  most  part,  as  an  observed 
manifold  succession.  The  connection  of  what  is  given  as 
joined  spatially,  if  it  is  in  general  to  have  place  for  us,  re- 
quires likewise  a  coexistence  or  succession  for  our  perceiv- 
ing consciousness ;  and  as  to  the  strength  of  this  connection, 
therefore,  this  will  depend  on  how  often  such  conscious 
presentations  have  been  produced  by  us  coexistently  or  suc- 
ceeding one  another.  Similarity  becomes  analyzed  into  re- 
semblance and  difference,  whereby  that  which  is  different  is 
given  coexistent  with  the  resembling  parts ;  and  even  the 
fundamental  basis  of  permanent  connections  between  like 
forms  is  in  a  certain  measure  to  be  referred  to  a  coexistence. 
Contrast  finally  shows  itself  only  by  virtue  of  the  similarity 
which  lies  at  its  basis  as  awakening  principle."36 

3*  Lehrbtuh,  §  92. 


CHAPTER  V 
The  Psychology  of  Outer  Experience 

§  61.  Introduction — Beneke's  doctrine  of  the  perceptive 
consciousness  brings  out  most  sharply  and  clearly  his  psy- 
chological method,  serving  to  distinguish  it  at  once  from  the 
intuitive  empiricism  of  his  English  predecessors  and  the 
metaphysical  abstractness  of  the  Germans.  He  does  not 
attempt  like  some  of  the  English  to  begin  with  simple  sensa- 
tions and  by  the  separation  and  combining  of  these  try  to 
build  up  the  whole  complex  mental  structure  of  the  soul. 
Nor  does  he,  on  the  hand,  like  some  of  the  Germans,  begin 
with  the  soul  as  an  abstract  unity  or  simple,  and,  from  this 
metaphysical  presupposition,  endeavor  to  deduce  or  spin 
out  to  the  minutest  detail  its  complex  inner  organization. 
Experience, — outer  experience,  just  as  it  presents  itself  to 
the  developed  soul — is  his  starting  point.  Analysis  of  imme- 
diate experience,  just  as  the  adult  consciousness  knows  it, 
may  lead  to  the  hypothesis  of  simple  sensations  or  impres- 
sions, some  such  as  contended  for  by  Locke,  and  by  Hume ; 
and  it  may  lead  to  the  conception  of  the  soul  as  some  sort 
of  a  unity.  But  this  much  at  least  we  may  say,  that  psy- 
chology must  not  begin  with  these  presuppositions. 

I    OUTER  EXPERIENCE  :    ORIGIN  AND  GROWTH  OF  PERCEPTS 

§  62.  Fundamental  Characteristics  of  the  Perceptive  Con- 
sciousness— Outer  experience,  in  the  sense  of  the  individual's 
perceptive  consciousness,  shows  itself  momentarily  as  a  cer- 
tain complex,  more  or  less  clearly  differentiated  into  lesser 
groups  or  individuals  called  things.  These  things,  so  far  as 
377]  IIX 


I  1 2  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  [378 

they  are  perceived  with  some  degree  of  clearness,  whether 
they  be  visual,  tactual,  auditory,  olfactory,  or  gustatory,  may 
conveniently  be  called  sense-perceptions,  or  simply  percepts. 
The  fundamental  characteristics  then  of  the  perceptive  con- 
sciousness are,  first,  that  perceptions  are  always  knowledge 
of  individual  or  particular  things  that  are  actually  and  im- 
mediately present,  and,  second,  that  these  particular  things 
are  always  perceived  as  existing  in  space,  and,  while  re- 
garded as  being  something  appearing  to  us,  are  yet  regarded 
as  having  their  stimulating  cause  without  us.  It  is  these  indi- 
vidual facts  of  the  perceptive  consciousness,  as  well  as  the 
perceptive  consciousness  as  a  whole  (2.  e.  regarded  as  that 
total  immediate  intuition  which  constitutes  the  individual's 
immediate  momentary  percept  called  outer  experience) 
which  psychology  must  investigate. 

§63.  The  Origin  of  Sense-Perceptions — We  have  already 
seen  enough  of  Beneke's  general  standpoint  to  know  that  he 
does  not  attempt  to  trace  back  sense-perceptions  to  the 
organs  of  sense.  Of  these  the  adult  consciousness  knows 
immediately  nothing,  except  so  far  as  they  are  appearances  in 
outer  experience;  and,  as  appearances,  or  sense  perceptions, 
they  are  the  very  things  which  are  under  investigation.  But 
even  when  one  has  attained  the  phenomenalistic  point  of 
view,  it  is  easy  for  the  unreflective  consciousness  to  persuade 
itself  that  its  intuitions  are  ready-made  products  stamped 
upon  it  immediately  in  all  their  completeness  from  without. 
But  careful  reflection  upon  outer  experience  shows  that  sense 
perceptions  are  really  very  complex  affairs.  Perceptions,  as 
well  as  concepts  and  the  other  individual  facts  of  inner  ex- 
perience, are  a  growth;  so  that  percepts  may  exhibit  all 
grades  of  liveliness  (Starke),  fixedness  (Statigkeit) ,  clear- 
ness (Klarheit),  and  precision  (Bestimmtheit).  "Attentive 
reflection  upon  experience  as  it  lies  directly  before  us,"  says 
Beneke,  "  shows  beyond  doubt  that   sensuous    impressions 


279]  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  H3 

and  perceptions  of  the  developed  soul  are  by  no  means  of  so 
simple  a  nature.  The  sense  experiences  of  children  in  the 
first  weeks  of  their  lives  are  manifestly  different  from  the 
feelings  and  perceptions  of  the  developed  soul ;  and  people 
born  blind  who  have  regained  sight  are  as  little  able  at  first 
to  form  perceptions  similar  to  ours."1  We  must  therefore 
look  for  some  further  explanation  of  the  clear  intuitions  of 
the  perceptive  consciousness. 

§  64.  Sense-Perceptions  as  Products  of  Subjective  and  Ob- 
jective Factors — In  accounting  for  the  growth  of  perceptive 
knowledge  Beneke  turns  to  great  advantage  his  fundamental 
postulate  as  to  the  persistence  of  psychical  forms.  There 
can  be  no  sense  experience  without  a  corresponding  trace 
having  been  left  in  the  inner  being  of  the  soul.  When 
therefore  similar  sense  experiences  repeat  themselves,  they 
in  consequence  of  the  law  of  the  mutual  attraction  of  the 
similar,  and  the  direct  transference  of  movable  elements, 
instantaneously  call  up  into  active  consciousness  all  traces 
of  elements  similar  to  those  which  they  contain.  This  ap- 
perceptive mass  of  traces  fuses  with  the  immediately  excited 
sensuous  feeling,  and  to  this  is  due  the  clearness  which  the 
sensation  on  the  presented  side  of  consciousness  possesses, 
while  the  apperceptive  mass  itself  becomes  refreshened  or 
strengthened  by  the  additional  trace  of  the  immediate  per- 
ceptive experience.  Thus  then  Beneke  contends  that  "  in 
order  to  the  production  of  clearly  conscious  sense  impres- 
sions, to  the  feeling  freshly  formed  through  immediate  sen- 
suous excitation,  there  must  come  from  the  inner  being  of 
the  soul  something  which  corresponds  individually  and  en- 
tirely to  this  feeling!''1  And  what  this  something  is,  the  pre- 
ceding analysis  of  the  facts  of  inner  experience  has  prepared 
us  to  understand.     As  to  the    growth  of  sense-perceptions, 

1  Lehrbuch,  §  53.  2  Lehrbuch,  §  54. 


H4  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  [380 

therefore,  we  may  observe  that  "  (in  the  case  of  the  child 
first  awakening  to  conscious  life)  the  original  sense  impres- 
sions, though  they  maybe  like,  are  still  immeasurably  fainter 
than  those  of  the  developed  soul.  But  since  like  sensuous 
feelings  (e.  g.  of  a  color,  of  a  sound)  are  repeatedly  formed, 
and  since  from  all  these  forms  traces  are  left  in  the  inner  be- 
ing of  the  soul,  which  then  flow  over  to  the  like  feelings 
aroused  later;  as  a  consequence,  these  must  continually  grow 
in  strength,  and  thereby  must  sense  impressions  and  percep- 
tions of  the  developed  soul  contain  in  themselves  hundreds, 
yea  thousands  of  just  these  psychical  acts  which  in  that 
original  feeling  were  given  only  once."3  "  For  every  sense 
activity  of  the  developed  soul  therefore,"  Beneke  concludes, 
"  there  must  properly  speaking  be  two  chief  constituents 
working  together :  (1)  A  freshly  formed  sense  impression, 
and  (2)  the  similar  traces  contained  in  the  inner  being  of 
the  soul.  Every  sense-perception,  consequently,  however 
simple  it  may  be  in  appearance,  is  in  fact  already  an  infinite 
complex."* 

§65.  Nature  and  Meaning  of ' '  Original  Sense- Impressions ' ' 
— It  is  obvious,  however,  that  any  adequate  accounting  for 
the  perceptive  consciousness  must  say  a  good  deal  more 
about  these  "freshly  formed  sense  impressions," — these  so- 
called  "original  sensuous  feelings"  to  the  hypothesis  of 
which  analysis  of  outer  experience  seems  to  force  us.  While 
percepts,  so  far  as  involving  numerous  similar  traces,  may 
be  regarded  as  a  complex,  which  reveals  this  qualitative 
difference  on  the  side  of  presented  contents  only  quantita- 
tively, that  is,  by  its  strength  or  clearness,  there  is  another 
kind  of  qualitative  difference  directly  revealed  in  immediate 
consciousness.  Even  the  simplest  thing  we  can  imagine  is, 
as  to  content,  a  manifold,  while  the  manifoldness  of  the  in- 

3  Lehrbuch,  §  55.  *  Lehrbuch,  §  55,  note  2. 


2  8  i  ]  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  \  |  - 

dividual  things  of  outer  experience  as  immediately  present 
in  the  momentary  perceptive  consciousness,  as  well  as  the 
manifoldness  of  the  momentary  perceptive  consciousness  as 
a  whole,  is  constantly  a  matter  of  direct  observation.  This 
differentiated  content  or  manifoldness  of  outer  experience, 
therefore,  demands  some  deeper  explanation,  and  especially 
is  this  true  of  space  perception,  so  far  as  involved  in  that 
clear  circle  of  visual  phenomena  constituting  the  immediate 
kaleidoscopic  field  of  view.  So  far  as  Hume  attempted  to 
supply  this  deeper  explanation,  he  was  led  to  the  hypothesis 
of  certain  minima  visibilia,  minima  tangibilia,  and  other 
"simple  impressions,"  to  which  he  assigned  both  qualitative 
and  quantitative  differences.  Are  the  "  freshly  formed  sense 
impressions"  of  Beneke  to  be  regarded  in  the  same  way? 
Certainly  there  seems  to  be  good  ground  for  this  assump- 
tion, Beneke  would  maintain,  inasmuch  as  we  can  actually 
perceive  most  minute  portions  of  space,  actually  feel  most 
minute  points,  and  simultaneously  hear  faint  sounds,  one  of 
which  obviously  is  of  less  volume  than  the  others.  The  ob- 
vious facts  of  visual,  tangible  and  other  forms  of  sense  per- 
ception, thus  seem  all  to  point  to  certain  minimal  forms  of 
sensation  or  sensuous  feeling. 

§  66.  Significance  of  Original  Minimal  Sensation  as  In- 
evitable Hypotheses — But  Beneke  differs  from  Locke,  Berkeley 
and  Hume,  both  in  the  character  which  he  assigns  to  these 
original  simple  sense  impressions  as  hypotheses,  and  also  in 
his  conception  of  the  method  by  which  we  arrive  at  the 
knowledge  of  them.  Simple  sensations,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
are  pure  abstractions  which  are  never  realized  in  their  iso- 
lated oneness  in  immediate  experience.  In  their  individu- 
ality they  are  not  even  psychological  appearances,  or  pro- 
ducts for  our  outer  consciousness.  And  yet  outer  experience 
is  obviously  a  spatial  manifold  that  is  irresistibly  perceived, 
as  well    as    conceived,  as    made    up    of   small    portions    or 


!  !  g  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BENEKE  [382 

spaces.  But  this  is  only  to  say  that  the  soul  itself,  con- 
cretely considered,  is  a  manifold ;  and  we  have  yet  to  under- 
stand how  outer  consciousness  arises  at  all.  If  simple 
sensations,  or  outer  sense  experience  as  a  whole,  are  the 
product  of  impress  from  without  the  soul,  it  is  obvious  that 
since  observation  is  confined  entirely  to  consciousness,  it  is 
not  open  to  immediate  inspection  how  this  change  to  con- 
sciousness has  taken  place.5  It  is  at  this  point  that  Beneke, 
with  great  effect,  avails  himself  of  the  distinction  already  set 
forth  regarding  changes  to  consciousness  and  changes  in 
consciousness.6  We  have  already  seen  the  laws  governing 
changes  in  consciousness.  May  we  not  explain  changes  to 
consciousness  by  analogy  to  these?  If  so,  we  may  note  that 
so  far  we  have  seen  all  psychical  forms  to  be  the  product  of 
factors.  All  the  facts  of  inner  experience,  and  even  the 
clear  percepts  of  the  developed  soul,  have  shown  themselves 
to  result  from  a  conjunction  between  a  trace,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  certain  stimulating  elements  on  the  other.  Are 
we  not  justified  then  in  regarding  a  freshly  formed  minimal 
impression  likewise  as  such  a  product? 

§  67.  Beneke 's  Doctrine  of  Primary  Powers  (Urvermogeii) 

5  Mr.  Stout,  in  the  critical  article  already  referred  to  (Cf.  p.  99,  note),  cer- 
tainly does  Beneke  an  injustice  when  he  says  (p.  26)  :  "  Now,  Beneke  was  any- 
thing rather  than  judicious.  He  claimed  with  reason  the  right  of  framing 
hypotheses  to  explain  observed  facts.  But  he  pushed  his  hypotheses  far  beyond 
what  the  exigencies  of  psychological  explanation  required.  Worse  than  this,  he 
regarded  some  of  his  most  arbitrary  theories,  e.g.,  the  appropriation  of  stimulants 
by  faculties,  as  directly  based  on  the  evidence  of  introspection."  If  this  means 
to  say  that  Beneke  regarded  the  appropriation  of  external  stimulants  a  matter  of 
direct  introspection,  this  is  in  error,  for  Beneke  expressly  and  emphatically  says  it 
is  impossible  to  have  immediate  knowledge  of  the  process  of  awaking  to  con- 
sciousness (Cf.  Lehrbuch,  §  87  and  20,  also  supra,  §  41).  If  it  means  to  say  that 
we  have  a  deduced  or  mediate  knowledge  of  this  process,  reached  on  the  basis  of 
certain  immediate  knowledge  of  processes  directly  observed  to  take  place  in  con- 
sciousness, then  the  "  arbitrariness  "  of  the  hypothesis  is  not  altogether  apparent. 

6Cf.  supra,  §  41. 


3  8  3 1  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  T  j  y 

— It  is  this  conception  of  minimal  sense  impressions  as  psy- 
chical products  or  phenomena  that  leads  Beneke  to  the  most 
fundamental  hypothesis  of  his  whole  theory.  In  the  case  of 
these  original  sense  impressions,  Beneke  calls  that  factor 
which  comes  from  the  soul  a  "primary  power"  (Urver- 
mogen)  or  faculty ;  that  which  comes  from  without  the  soul, 
a  "stimulant"  (Reiz).  Since  now  the  soul  is  continuously 
being  stimulated  from  without,  and  since  the  sense  impres- 
sions so  produced  are,  in  consequence  of  a  partial  with- 
drawal of  the  stimulation,  continually  lapsing  into  traces,  the 
primary  powers  are,  as  it  were,  ever  being  used  up,  so  that, 
for  the  production  of  every  fresh  sensuous  impression,  a 
fresh  primary  power  is  needed.  Consequently,  argues  Be- 
neke, "  for  the  complete  explanation  of  the  life  of  our  souls, 
we  must  take  as  a  basis  just  as  many  sensuous  primary  pow- 
ers (sinnliche  Urvermogen)  as  in  the  course  of  life  there  have 
been  formed  elementary  sensuous  feelings  {sinnliche  Empfin- 
dungeri)'" 

§  68.  Third  Fundamental  Psychological  Process — We  are 
now  in  a  position  to  understand  what  Beneke  states  as  really 
the  most  fundamental  of  all  the  psychological  processes : 

"  Sensuous  impressions  and  perceptions  are  formed  by  the 
human  soul  in  consequence  of  impressions  or  stimulants  which 
affect  it  from  without." 8 

II   OUTER  EXPERIENCE  :    OBJECTIVE  RELATIONS  OF  PERCEPTS 

§  69.  Introduction — The  most  important  phases  of  the 
psychological  problem  involved  in  the  explanation  of  outer 
experience  yet  remain  to  be  considered.  In  the  first  place, 
the  immediate  perceptive  consciousness  presents  itself  as  a 
manifold  of  spatially  related  elements,  and  we  must,  there- 
fore, attempt  to  determine  the  nature  of  the  objective  rela- 

7  Lehrbuch,  §  56.  8  Ibid.,  §  22.     Beneke's  "  first"  fundamental  process. 


1 1 8  FRIEDKICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  [384 

tions  among  such  inter-connected  phenomena.  In  the 
second  place,  the  mosaic  of  immediate  sense-perception  is 
continuously  undergoing  kaleidoscopic  changes,  and  we 
must,  therefore,  attempt  to  account  for  these  panoramic 
transformations.  The  latter  question  will  be  considered  in 
the  following  chapter. 

§  70.  Nature  of  the  Problem — Preceding  psychological 
doctrines,  we  have  seen,  left  entirely  without  answer  the 
question  why  external  consciousness  at  any  given  moment 
is  a  certain  complex,  more  or  less  immediately  differentiated 
into  lesser  groups  or  complexes.  So  far  as  Hume  con- 
sidered this  problem,  we  have  seen  that  he  regarded  the 
immediate  manifold  of  sense-perception  as  made  up  of  cer- 
tain mimima  visibilia,  minima  tangibilia,  etc.,  but  with  the 
result  of  reducing  outer  experience  to  an  empirical  chaos. 
"  Simple  impressions  "  were  regarded  by  Hume  not  merely 
as  distinguishable,  but,  consequently,  as  separable ;  and  so 
wide  was  their  separation,  and  so  utter  their  isolation,  as  to 
lead  him  to  say,  "  I  do  not  think  there  are  any  two  distinct 
impressions  which  are  inseparably  conjoined." 9  But  the 
inconceivability  of  how  minimal  colored  points,  sounds, 
touches,  etc.,  if  actually  entirely  separated  and  discrete, 
could  yield  experience  or  consciousness,  such  as  we  know 
it,  only  forces  to  the  sharpest  issue  the  question  how  we  are 
to  conceive  the  connections  which  we  actually  perceive  to 
subsist  among  the  manifold  elements  of  sense. 

§71.  Objective  Relations  Depend  on  Original  Organic  Re- 
lations of  the  Primary  Powers — Beneke's  conception  of  the 
nature  of  the  objective  relations  of  the  perceptive  conscious- 
ness marks  his  most  characteristic  difference  from,  and  great 
point  of  advance  on,  the  whole  advanced  psychology  of  his 
day,  English   and    German.     Similarly  to    Hume,  we  have 

9  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  p.  66. 


385]  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BENEKE  1 1  g 

found  Beneke  postulating  certain  original  or  freshly  formed 
sense  impressions.  But  even  these  simple  impressions,  as 
hypotheses,  are  hypotheses  of  phenomenal  existences.  As 
phenomenal  then  they  must  be  regarded  as  the  product  of 
factors,  or  the  result  of  a  process,  of  which,  they  if  they  were 
actually  to  enter  clear  conscious  experience,  would  be  the 
mere  elementary  appearance.  When  therefore  we  speak  of 
the  perceptive  consciousness  of  the  adult  individual  as  hav- 
ing resulted  from  a  long  series  of  infinitely  repeated  original 
sense  impressions,  we  must  be  careful  to  remember  that  the 
real  existence  or  being  is,  on  the  one  hand,  the  primary 
powers  of  the  soul,  on  the  other,  the  stimulants  external  to 
these  powers,  to  the  conjunction  of  which  simple  sense  im- 
pressions correspond.  It  is  the  inevitableness  of  these 
hypotheses  that  leads  Beneke's  concrete  mind  boldly  to  con- 
clude that  the  soul,  before  it  awoke  to  consciousness,  already 
possessed  an  organic  structural  unity  in  the  shape  of  these 
interrelated,  numerically  distinct,  primary  powers.  For  he 
contends,  "  these  primary  powers  certainly  not  only  in  the 
organic  whole  of  the  soul's  being  (im  Ganzen  des  See/enseins), 
but  also  in  the  collective  activity  of  each  sense,  are  bound 
together  in  the  most  intimate  union ;  nevertheless  they  must 
be  regarded  as  sundered  or  separated  from  one  another,  in  so 
far  as  they  are  able,  on  the  one  hand,  to  enter  the  field  of 
sensation,  in  consequence  of  special  connection  with  the 
stimulant  appropriated  by  each,  on  the  other,  to  persist  in 
this  connection  in  the  inner  being  of  the  soul."10  It  is,  there- 
fore, in  virtue  of  this  original  organic  connection  between  the 
primary  powers  of  the  different  senses,  and  between  the  in- 
dividual's sense  system  as  a  whole,  that  a  certain  objectivity 
and  reality  attaches  to  the  interconnections  of  the  manifold 
which  is  immediately  and  successively  presented  in  our  per- 
ceptive consciousness. 

10  Lehrbuch,  §  56. 


120  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  Ijg6 

§  72.  Objective  and  Subjective  Connections  Distinguished — 
These  original  objective  connections  involved  in  immediate 
outer  conscious  experience  are  of  course  to  be  distinguished 
from  those  so-called  purely  subjective  connections  which 
later  in  and  through  experience  arise  between  groups  and 
series  of  presentations.  While  Beneke  regarded  both  as 
"something  real  in  the  inner  being  of  the  soul,"  he  neverthe- 
less distinguishes  them  by  the  supposition  that  the  former 
are  originally  given,  whereas  the  latter  arise  through  that 
balancing  process  or  transference  which  takes  place  entirely 
within  the  realm  of  the  individual  soul.  Thus  he  says : 
"  The  transference  of  conscious  activity  is  governed  by  the 
connections  between  psychical  forms,  or  their  degree  of  one- 
ness. But  these  connections  are  either  already  given  origi- 
nally (in  the  soul  only  between  the  primary  powers  of  one 
and  the  same  system,  in  the  body  variously  and  between 
several  systems),  or  are  first  formed  later  (through  the  im- 
mediate transference  of  balancing  elements)."11 

11  Lehrbuch,  §  308. 


CHAPTER  VI 

Conclusions  Relating  to  both  Inner  and  Outer 
Conscious  Experience 

i  the  character  and  kinds  of  active  consciousness 

§  73.  Character  of  Consciousness  as  Determined  by  Meth- 
ods of  Excitation — The  most  fundamental  distinction  of  im- 
mediate conscious  experience  so  far  recognized  has  been 
that  between  outer  and  inner.  The  basis  for  this  distinction 
we  now  see  lies  in  the  method  of  excitation  to  active  con- 
sciousness. In  general,  however,  as  Beneke  points  out,1  we 
are  able  to  distinguish  three  modes  by  which  psychical  forms 
are  aroused  into  active  consciousness:  \}  purely  inner;  2) 
purely  outer ;  3)  that  through  the  process  of  transference  or 
balancing.  In  the  case  of  this  last  method,  the  direction 
which  conscious  activity  will  take  becomes  determined  by 
the  connections  of  that  group  of  percepts  or  ideas  which  on 
each  occasion  is  actually  present  in  immediate  active  con- 
sciousness. The  second  method,  depending  on  an  outer  im- 
press or  stimulant,  is  the  only  one  that  in  and  for  itself  is 
without  any  colierency  with  the  previous  being  of  the  soul 
(conscious  or  unconscious),  and  consequently  the  only  one 
through  which  the  direction  of  the  soul's  activity  can  be  di- 
rectly and  arbitrarily  changed.  The  first  method,  depend- 
ing on  the  presence  in  the  soul  of  still  tinappropriated  prim- 
ary powers,  which  exert  an  attractive  influence  on  the  similar 
traces  of  which  the  inner  being  of  the  soul  consists,  is  the 

1  Lehrbuch,  §  306. 
387]  121 


122  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [388 

basis  of  voluntary  action,  and  so  calls  for  more  detailed 
statement. 

§  74.  The  Nature  of  Voluntary  Action — So  far  we  have 
learned  of  two  kinds  of  psychical  elements,  the  original 
primary  powers  of  the  soul,  and  the  stimulants  taken  up 
from  without.  The  function  of  this  latter  has  been,  through 
partial  separation  from  the  original  primary  powers  by 
which  they  have  been  appropriated,  to  serve  as  "  transferable 
elements,"  by  which,  in  the  ensuing  balancing  process,  other 
similar  psychical  forms  or  powers  become  aroused.  Beneke 
assigns  a  like  function  to  some  of  the  still  unfilled  primary 
powers.  They  too  can  be  transferred  to  similar  forms,  al- 
ready existing  as  unconscious  possessions  of  the  soul,  and 
can  arouse  these  to  active  consciousness.  They,  thus,  are 
the  foundation  of  voluntary  action.  "  The  difference  be- 
tween the  two  species  of  elements  just  mentioned,"  says 
Beneke,  "  shows  itself  moreover  also  in  the  reproductions 
which  manifestly  are  grounded  on  them.  The  enhancing 
which  becomes  effected  through  stimulants  (Reize)  alone,  is 
the  ground  of  that  fresher,  thoroughly  involuntary  arising  of 
perceptions  and  other  psychical  forms ;  that  through  free 
primary  powers  alone,  the  ground  of  the  intense  voluntary 
arising;  that  resulting  from  the  mixture  of  both,  the  ground 
of  the  usual  intermediate  arising."2 

The  essential  nature  of  voluntary  action  thus  consists  in 
being  the  direct  cause  either  of  introducing  into  active  con- 
sciousness a  form  not  actually  and  actively  present,  or  of 
retaining  in  active  consciousness  a  form  already  aroused. 
The  most  important  function  of  volition  then  is  in  deciding 
the  direction  which  active  consciousness  shall  take.  The  will 
is  of  course  determined,  in  the  sense  that,  since  the  primary 
powers  in  general  draw  to  them  those  similar  forms  which 
are   most  strongly  connected,  it  is  dependent  on  the  inner 

2  Lehrbuch,  §  90. 


3 89 J  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  i2$ 

organization  of  the  soul  as  previously  formed.3  But  its  ac- 
tion differs  radically  from  the  involuntary  stimulation  of  the 
balancing  elements,  in  that  the  direction  of  consciousness, 
when  the  change  taking  place  results  from  the  transference 
of  balancing  elements,  is  already  predetermined  by  the  con- 
nections of  those  conscious  forms  which  at  the  given  mo- 
ment are  actually  and  actively  present  in  immediate  con- 
scious experience  (outer  or  inner). 

§  75.  Character  of  Consciousness  as  Determined  by  the 
Kinds  of  Primary  Powers  Active — Actually  aroused  sensa- 
tions, as  distinguished  for  consciousness,  that  is,  on  the  side 
of  their  presented  contents,  may  also  be  classified  with  refer- 
ence to  those  various  sub-systems  of  primary  powers  of 
which  the  soul  is  supposed  originally  to  consist.  Beneke 
thus  divides  sensations  into  three  great  classes : 4  1)  Organ- 
empfindungen,  which  arise  from  those  specific  kinds  of  primary 
powers  that  constitute  the  five  special  senses,  the  character- 
istics of  which  are  that  they  "  stand  immediately  open  to  the 
outer  world,"  and  have  corporeal  representatives  called 
"organs;"  2)  Vital- empfindnngen  (including  sensations  of 
heat  and  cold,  pressure,  and  other  partially  unknown  pleas- 
urable moods,  etc.),  which  for  all  sensuous  primary  powers 
are  alike,  or  at  least  only  quantitatively  different ;  3 ) 
Empfindungen  in  the  digestive  organs  and  in  the  rest  of  the 
inner  bodily  systems,  including  sensations  which  accompany 
the  movements  of  muscles.  Sensations  of  the  third  class, 
Beneke  observes,  are  somewhat  intermediate  between  those 
of  the  first  and  second.  Indeed  sensations  of  the  second 
and  third  classes  are  not  only  so  much  alike  for  the  most 
part  that  the  same  word  does  service  for  both,  but  in  gen- 
eral the  fundamental  basis  of  their  production  is  the  same. 
"  For  the  stimulants  from  which  sensations  of  the  third  class 
arise,  although  given  immediately  in  the  body,  are  in  like 

3  Cf.  Lehrbiuh,  §  306.  *  Lehrbuch,  §  67. 


124  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [390 

manner  outer  to  the  power  (  Vermogen)   which  experiences 
the  sensation."5 

§  76.  Immediate  Consciousness  as  Determined  by  the  Rela- 
tion of  Power  and  Stimulant — Actually  present  sensations, 
or,  more  exactly,  any  fact  of  immediate  conscious  experi- 
ence, outer  or  inner,  may  further  be  classified  for  conscious- 
ness, as  dependent  on  the  quantitative  relation  between  the 
two  factors,  power  and  stimulant,  of  which  it  is  the  product. 
This  relation  has  no  unimportant  influence  on  conscious 
products,  and  especially  upon  what  Beneke  would  term  their 
"  form."  If  we  were  carefully  to  examine  those  changes  to 
active  consciousness  which  take  place  in  consciousness,  that 
is  those  changes  which  are  open  to  immediate  observation, 
we  should  find  that  we  might  distinguish  five  different  forms 
of  consciousness,  attributable  to  five  varying  quantitative 
degrees  in  which  the  exciting  stimulus  and  appropriating 
power  may  combine.6 

1.  The  stimulation  may  be  partial — In  this  case  the  ex- 
citing stimulant,  or  movable  elements,  are  too  weak  to  fill 
completely  the  appropriating  trace  or  psychical  form.  On 
the  side  of  consciousness  we  have  the  phenomenon  of  a  feel- 
ing of  dissatisfaction  or  dislike,  accompanied  by  a  longing 
for  completer  stimulation. 

2.  The  stimulation  may  be  exactly  commensurate  with  the 
appropriating  capacity  of  the  trace.  In  this  case  neither 
factor  exceeds  the  other.  This  is  the  fundamental  form  for 
clear  representation. 

3.  The  stimulant  is  of  marked  fulness,  or  overflowing 
without  being  immediately  excessive.  This  results  in  an 
immediate  feeling  of  pleasure. 

4.  The  stimulation  may  gradually  become  excessive.  The 
result  in  consciousness  is  a  feeling  of  satiety,  or  blunted 
appetite. 

5  Lehrbuch,  §  67.  6  Cf.  lehrbuch,  §  58. 


2  o  i  ]  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  !  2  5 

5.  An  excessive  stimulation  may  combine  with  an  appro- 
priating power  too  suddenly.  This  sudden  overstimulation 
is  the  basis  of  the  phenomena  of  paiti. 

In  consequence,  then,  of  this  varying  relation  between 
stimulant  and  appropriating  trace,  Beneke  recognizes  five 
fundamental  constructive  forms,  and  on  the  basis  of  analogy, 
concludes  that  these  forms  prove  operative  also  in  the  case 
of  the  external  stimulant  (der  Rets)  and  the  appropriating 
primary  power  (Urvermogen) .  All  these  conscious  phe- 
nomena, excepting  the  second,  it  will  be  noticed,  are  emo- 
tional products,  although  the  first,  in  its  aspect  of  a  striving 
after  full  stimulation,  reveals  what  Beneke  regarded  as  an 
essential  characteristic  of  volitional  action. 

§  77.  The  Threefold  Nature  of  Consciousness — Notwith- 
standing his  recognition  of  five  fundamental  constructive 
forms,  Beneke  fully  and  clearly  recognized  the  essentially 
similar  emotional  character  of  certain  of  these,  and  so  ex- 
pressly accepted  the  threefold  classification  of  Consciousness 
into  cognitions  (Vorstellungcn) ,  feelings,  {Gefuhlen)?  and 
volitions  {Strebungen) .'  With  Beneke,  however,  these  dis- 
tinctions are  not  the  most  fundamental.  The  deepest  dis- 
tinction is  that  between  primary  power  {Urvermogcn')  and 
stimulant  (Reise).  The  primary  power,  it  is  true,  already 
implies  these  distinctions.  For  originally  it  is  a  striving  or 
impulse  {Strebung)  after  stimulation.  In  the  appropriating 
of  the  stimulant  consciousness  arises,  which,  on  the  side  of 
presented  contents,  will  be  either  a  feeling  {Gefuhl)  or  a 
clear  presentation  {Vorstellung),  as  dependent  on  the  in- 
tensity of  relation  between  the  two  original  elements. 

7  Beneke's  analysis  of  feeling  and  volition  is  really  perhaps  the  most  important 
of  his  whole  special  psychology.  The  general  plan  of  the  present  work,  however, 
has  prevented  adequate  treatment  of  these  subjects,  which  must  be  left  to  other 
investigators.     Cf.  Lehrbuch,  Chapters  6  and  7;  also  Psychologische  Skizzen. 


1 2  6  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  r  g  q  2 

II  THE  SPAN  OF  IMMEDIATE  CONSCIOUSNESS 
§  78.  Introduction — Conscious  experience,  outer  and  inner, 
as  it  reveals  itself  to  the  immediate  observation  of  the  indi- 
vidual, is  exceedingly  limited  and  finite  in  character.  So 
far  as  attention  is  concentrated  on  visual  phenomena,  outer 
experience  is  never  more  than  that  pictorial  circle  of  clear 
consciousness  which  constitutes  our  immediate  field  of  view; 
while  in  such  a  case,  inner  experience  is  those  immediate 
images,  concepts,  or  judgments  directly  aroused  by  the 
picture  before  us.  The  question  here  to  be  considered  is 
not  that  raised  by  later  psychologists  as  to  how  many  things 
can  be  attended  to  at  once,  but  rather  why  in  general  the 
limited  circle  of  clear  consciousness,  outer  and  inner,  does 
not  immediately  and  clearly  represent  the  whole  rich  mani- 
fold of  the  soul's  being. 

§  79.  The  Span  of  Inner  Consciousness — If,  as  Beneke 
maintains,  even  the  poorest  equipped  human  soul  contains 
within  it  an  endless  multitude  of  inner  traces,  why  do  not 
these  traces  all  become  conscious  at  once?  In  Beneke's 
opinion,  "  in  and  for  themselves  they  could  all  become  con- 
scious at  once."*  But  we  must  remember  from  the  preced- 
ing analysis  that  all  conscious  or  active  processes  of  the 
developed  soul  arose  from  unconscious  or  unexcited  psychical 
existences,  because  of  a  transference  to  them  of  certain  mov- 
able or  stimulating  elements.  There  are,  therefore,  three 
reasons  why  all  traces  do  not  become  consciously  active  at 
once : 

First,9  because  of  an  insufficient  quantum  of  movable 
elements.  A  chief  source  of  internal  excitation,  as  we  have 
seen,  is  the  transference  or  balancing  of  the  movable  ele- 
ments, but  these  stimulating  elements  (largely  because  of 

8  Lehrbuch,  §  305. 

9  Cf.  Ichrbuch,  §  93,  note  2;   also,  §  220. 


393]  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  !  2  7 

the  limited  character  of  immediate  outer  conscious  experi- 
ence, the  main  source  of  them),  are  not  given  in  sufficient 
quantity  to  go  round. 

Second, 10  because  the  quantum  becomes  so  diffused  that 
none  of  the  forms,  even  of  a  closely  connected  group  or 
series,  attains  to  full  (clear)  consciousness.  It  often  hap- 
pens that  the  transference  is  not  strong  enough  to  bring 
about  complete  consciousness.  Consciousness  varies  thus 
from  the  perfect  clearness  attendant  on  complete  concentra- 
tion, through  half  conscious  states,  to  that  of  utter  absent- 
mindedness  and  perplexing  confusion,  in  which  properly 
speaking  nothing  is  clearly  conscious. 

Third,11  because  of  the  partial  opposition  of  psychical 
forms.  That  totally  different  psychical  forms  can  exist 
simultaneously  side  by  side  in  consciousness  is  perfectly 
obvious  at  every  glance  of  the  eye.  Our  percept  of  the 
outer  world  (outer  experience)  is  at  every  moment  such  a 
unity  of  differing  or  opposing  forms,  while  the  conceptive 
consciousness  (inner  experience)  at  almost  every  stage  is  a 
conscious  state  whose  characteristic  is  multiplicity  in  unity. 
Opposing  or  differing  psychical  forms,  therefore,  do  not,  as 
Herbart  claimed,  tend  to  keep  each  other  from  rising  to 
consciousness,  but  only  limit  each  other  in  consciousness.12 
That  is,  while  heterogeneous  percepts  remain  outside  one 
another,  their  similar  elements,  in  consequence  of  the  first 
fundamental  psychological  process,  tend  to  coalesce,  and  so 
far  as  they  do  this,  we  have  a  clearer  consciousness.  In 
this  sense,  opposing  forms  exclude  each  other,  but  they  do 
it  in  consciousness,  and  by  drawing  attention  to  clearest 
consciousness. 

Insufficient  quantity,  then,  stimulating  of  elements,  too  great 

10  Cf.  Lehrbtich,  §  93.  "  Ibid.,  §  305. 

13  Beneke  calls  attention  to  this  as  one  of  his  most  fundamental  differences 
from  Herbart.     Cf.  Lehrbuch,  §  305,  note. 


j  28  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  [394 

diffusion  of  these  elements,  the  partial  opposition  of  coexist- 
ing heterogeneous  forms,  may  all  account  for  the  limited 
span  of  inner  conscious  experience. 

§  80.  The  Span  of  Outer  Consciousness — As  in  the  case  of 
inner  experience  the  question  arises,  why  all  the  infinite  traces 
with  which  the  soul  is  stored  do  not  arise  into  active  con- 
sciousness at  once,  so  a  pressing  psychological  question  in 
respect  to  this  system  of  innumerable  primary  powers  postu- 
lated by  Beneke,  is  why  all  the  unappropriated  primary  pow- 
ers of  which  the  soul  consists  are  not  stimulated  at  once.  A 
perhaps  more  exact  statement  of  this  question  would  be — 
why  are  these  primary  powers  not  all  clearly  represented  in 
immediate  conscious  experience?  Clear  consciousness, 
however,  we  have  seen,  arises  chiefly  because  of  the  simul- 
taneous excitation  of  the  numerous  similar  traces  which  cor- 
respond to  and  give  clearness  to  any  immediately  stimulated 
primary  power.  Immediate  sensuous  experience  is  possible, 
according  to  Beneke,  only  when  a  still  unappropriated  pri- 
mary power  is  actually  entering  into  relation  with  the  external 
stimulant.13  If  then  at  any  given  moment  our  field  of  view 
is  restricted  to  a  particularly  narrow  circle ;  if  at  any  given 
moment,  the  volume  of  sound  is  less  extensive  than  on  other 
occasions,  this  is  because  fewer  primary  powers  belonging  to 
each  of  these  systems  are  being  actually  and  immediately  stim- 
ulated from  without.  And,  where  this  is  so,  the  whole  reason 
in  general  is  that  the  amount  of  immediate  outer  stimula- 
tion is  not  enough  to  excite  all  the  primary  powers.  As  a 
fact  of  immediate  observation,  apparently  only  a  certain  few 
of  the  primary  systems  are  at  work  at  a  given  time.  This  is 
strikingly  true  in  the  case  of  sleep,  where  most  of  the  so- 
called  outer  senses  are  almost  entirely  inactive.  And  this 
relation  between   our  sleeping  and  waking   moments  is  so 

13 "  Only  by  means  of  still  tmfilled  primary  powers  can  the  soul  take  up  imme- 
diate imprints  from  without."     lehrbuch,  §  56,  note. 


2  g  c  ]  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BENEKE  \  2  9 

closely  connected  with  the  question  of  the  span  of  conscious- 
ness as  to  call  for  more  detailed  consideration. 

§81.  The  Relation  between  Sleep  and  Waking" — Beneke, 
in  his  explanation  of  the  phenomenon  of  change  from  sleep 
to  waking,  turns  to  most  ingenious  use  his  distinction  of  ac- 
tivity and  inactivity  of  the  primary  powers  and  systems.  Our 
sleeping  and  waking  moments  are  to  be  distinguished  in 
general  by  the  fact  that  under  each  of  these  circumstances 
"  various  systems  of  the  soul's  being  are  active  ox  aroused'. 
in  waking  moments,  those  senses  from  which  the  higher  con- 
scious psychical  forms  arise  and  with  which  the  muscular 
system  is  connected,  i.  e.,  those  which  are  capable  of  a  vol- 
untary movement ;  in  sleep,  the  vital  processes,  or  assimil- 
ating activities  of  the  body,  by  means  of  which  takes  place 
the  appropriation  of  the  material  consumed  for  their  nour- 
ishment. Other  systems,  like  the  circulatory,  respiratory, 
and  that  of  digestion,  show  themselves  active  in  both  cases."1' 
Beneke  therefore  assigns  a  positive  and  a  secondary  charac- 
ter to  sleep.  "  The  essential  nature  of  sleep,  or  its  funda- 
mental positive  characteristic,  accordingly,  is  to  be  regarded 
merely  as  the  ruling  activity  of  the  appropriating powers  of  the 
body.  Everything  else,  even  the  discontinuance  or  limitation 
of  (clearly)  conscious  processes,  is  only  secondary  and  unes- 
sential."16 

§  82.  Why  the  Activity  of  Various  Systems  Monopolizes 
Immediate  Consciousness — Even  though  it  be  conceded  that 
the  character  of  immediate  consciousness  is  determined 
primarily  by  that  group  of  primary  powers  which  is  being 
immediately  excited  by  external  stimulants,  the  question 
still  remains  why  at  any  given  time  the  ruling  activity  should 
belong  to  any  special  group  or  number  of  such  powers.     In 

14  Cf.  Lehrbuch,  (ch.  8,  II.,  2)  :  "  Verhaltniss  Z7viscken  Wachen  und  Sch/af." 

15  Lehrbuch,  §  312.  16  Lehrbuch,  §  312,  note  2. 


!30  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [396 

particular  we  may  ask:  (1)  Why  in  waking  moments  the 
activity  of  the  bodily  powers  is  obviously  suppressed  or 
overshadowed  by  that  of  the  higher  senses,  or  (e.  g.  where 
one  becomes  so  lost  in  abstract  thought  as  to  be  perfectly 
oblivious  of  surroundings  [immediate  outer  experience] )  by 
that  of  the  higher  spiritual  powers?  (2)  Why  it  is  quite 
possible,  at  times,  for  the  more  spiritual  processes,  which  are 
really  the  clearest  or  strongest  (Starksten)  of  all,  to  suc- 
cumb to  the  vital  processes,  the  faintest  of  all  ? 

The  first  question  Beneke  answers  in  a  simple  way.  Traces 
become  traces  by  a  partial  disappearance  of  the  stimulant. 
For  a  permanent  existence  of  a  trace  at  least  some  of  the 
original  stimulant  must  remain  appropriated  by  the  primary 
power.  On  the  basis  of  the  varying  degrees  of  completeness 
with  which  stimulants  are  retained  by  the  primary  powers, 
Beneke  assigns  to  the  latter  varying  grades  of  activity 
{Krciftigkeit) ."  In  this  respect  the  primary  assimilating 
powers  of  the  body  are  least  active  of  all.  They  therefore 
are  the  furthest  removed  from  the  spiritual  powers,  and  "are 
therefore  the  least  fitted  to  enter  into  coimections  with  these. 
As  result  of  which,  consequently,  both  these  classes  of  pow- 
ers are  able  to  operate  at  one  and  the  same  time  with  the 
greatest  difficulty,  and  the  assimilating  powers  of  the  body 
in  waking  moments  of  necessity  become  overwhelmingly 
suppressed."18 

The  answer  to  the  second  question  furnishes  an  ingenious 
explanation  of  the  phenomenon  of  sleep.  "  Active  conscious- 
ness, as  we  have  become  persuaded,"  says  Beneke,  "  is  a 
complex  process,  for  which  at  every  moment  we  require  new 
nourishment.  This  can  be  obtained  for  it  only  either  by 
still  unfilled  primary  powers  adding  themselves  to  it,  or  by 
means  of  external  stimulants,  the  taking  up  of  which  is  like- 

17  Lehrbuch,  §  33.  18  Lehrbuch,  §  313. 


3  g  j  1  FRIEDRICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  ■  3  1 

wise  conditioned  by  the  presence  of  still  unfilled  primary- 
powers.  But  now  for  every  sensuous  feeling  or  perception 
a  special  primary  power  is  consumed;19  and  in  as  much  as 
that  which"  is  consumed  is  replaced  during  waking  moments, 
perhaps  not  all  or  at  any  rate  only  in  slight  measure,  a  time 
must  come  in  which  all  the  unfilled  primary  powers  become 
employed  or  worked  up,  and  in  consequence  of  this,  con- 
sciousness discontinues,  not  from  pressure  of  that  fainter 
power,  but  in  itself."20  This  is  why  we  can  feel  ourselves 
unable  to  see  or  hear,  etc.,  and  can  actually  perceive,  or  feel, 
sleep  coming  on. 

§  83.  Fourth  Fundamental  Psychological  Process — The 
attempt  at  philosophical  explanation  of  sleep,  as  just  given, 
points  to  the  most  hypothetical  and  therefore  most  criticised 
of  all  the  fundamental  psychological  processes  contended  for 
by  Beneke, — the  formation  of  new  primary  powers*.  This 
process,  given  second  in  his  list,  is  stated  by  him  as  follows : 
"  The  human  soul  is  constantly  acquiring  new  primary  pow- 
ers."2* In  this  consists  the  "  innermost  life  process"  of  the 
soul.  The  nature  of  this  process,  more,  even  the  fact  of  it, 
is  by  no  direct  means  known  to  us.  We  can  only  postulate 
its  operation  as  the  most  plausible  hypothesis  to  account  for 
the  obvious  exhaustion  of  certain  systems  of  primary  pow- 
ers, this  exhaustion  varying  all  the  way  from  diminished  ac- 
tivity, such  as  is  exhibited  in  the  phenomena  of  fatigue,  to 
absolute  inability,  as  manifested  in  sleep,  to  form  any  sense 
perceptions  or  higher  active  psychical  forms. 

19  Great  caution  is  needed  in  understanding  this  expression.  Beneke  does  not 
mean  that  a  primary  power  in  becoming  appropriated  ceases  to  be.  The  primary 
powers  still  continue  to  exist,  but  in  modified  form.  To  say  that  they  are  "  used 
up"  is  simply  to  say  that  they  are  worked  up  into  a  structural  form. 

J0  Lehrbuch,  §  314.  21  Lehrbuck,  §  24. 


!  ^  2  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BENEKE  [398 

III    THE  NATURE  AND  MEANING  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS22 

§  84.  Introduction — The  desideratum  of  stamping  precise 
meanings  on  the  various  uses  of  the  term  consciousness,  a 
word  also  in  his  day  open  to  the  most  varying  philosophical 
interpretation  of  all,  was  expressly  recognized  by  Beneke, 
and  his  attempt  to  meet  this  desideratum  resulted  in  that 
most  profound  philosophical  distinction  which  promises  to 
prove  perhaps  the  most  permanent  achievement  of  his 
whole  psychology.  This  distinction,  as  we  have  seen,  is 
that  between  consciousness  as  a  product,  i.  e.,  consciousness 
on  the  side  of  its  presented  contents — immediate  experience 
of  the  individual  as  it  lies  before  him  open  to  direct  ob- 
servation— and  consciousness  as  a  process,  i.  e.,  conscious- 
ness on  the  side  of  its  presentative  activity — an  activity  which, 
as  the  preceding  psychological  analysis  has  attempted  to 
show,  is  involved  in  every  individual  conscious  fact,  whether 
of  inner  or  outer  experience. 

A — CONSCIOUSNESS   AS   PRESENTED   CONTENTS23 

§85.  Consciousness  DistinguisJied  as  Presented  Contents — 
The  general  character  of  the  presented  contents  of  imme- 
diate momentary  consciousness,  as  it  presents  itself  in  the 
experience  of  the  individual,  the  preceding  analysis  has 
already  sufficiently  described.  The  most  fundamental  de- 
scription of  the  phenomena  of  life  is  that  which  distinguishes 
them  into  "outer"  and  "inner,"  referring  the  former  to 
matter  or  body,  the  latter  to  self  or  soul.  In  the  variegated 
and  incessant  alterations  which   the  phenomenal  conscious- 

-■  For  the  full  discussion  of  this  subject  compare:  lehrbuch,  Ch.  3,  I.;  Ch.  8, 
II.;  also  Die  neue  Psychologie,  Sechster  Aufsatz :  "  Ueber  das  Alensc/ilichen 
Bezouss/sein." 

'-'3 1  have  borrowed  the  terminology  "  presented  contents  "  and  "  presentative  ac- 
tivity "  from  Mr.  Stout.  Compare  the  article  already  referred  to  {Mind,  January, 
i88q. 


2  99  ]  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BENEKE  \  3  3 

ness  undergoes,  this  limited  consciousness,  so  far  as  adult, 
readily  distinguishes  its  experiences  further  into  three  great 
classes:  Cognitions,  Feelings,  Volitions.  One  may  become 
absorbed  in  clear  sense  perception,  lost  in  deep  feeling,  or 
intently  engaged  in  continuous  action  (doing  or  thinking). 
Each  individual  conscious  state  of  this  sort  has  its  particu- 
lar object  or  content.  Except  so  far  as  such  concepts  are 
intuitively  implied  in  these  conscious  experiences,  these 
states  do  not  know  themselves  as  cognitive,  emotional  or 
volitional.  It  is  only  a  new,  succeeding  or  subsequent  state 
which  makes  the  concept  explicit,  that  is,  knows  conscious- 
ness to  have  been  engaged  in  any  one  of  the  ways  described. 
It  is  through  these  subsequent,  reflective,  knowing  states, 
becoming  in  their  turn  part  of  the  presented  contents  of 
other  subsequent  new  states,  that  we  gain  the  concept  of 
such  a  thing  as  an  idea,  and  ultimately  the  concept  of  inner 
experience. 

§  86.  Grades  of  Clearness  of  Presented  Contents — Much  of 
the  confusion  attendant  on  the  use  of  the  word  conscious- 
ness is  due  to  the  failure  to  keep  clear  the  distinction  be- 
tween kinds  of  presented  contents,  and  grades  of  clearness  of 
presented  contents.  So  far  as  we  intuitively  apprehend  par- 
ticular given  experiences  as  cognitions,  feelings,  or  volitions, 
such  experiences  have  attained  to  no  small  degree  of  clear- 
ness ;  and  some  particular  experience  thus  may  be  decidedly 
clear  qua  cognition,  feeling,  or  volition,  and  yet  in  compar- 
ison with  various  kinds  of  these  great  classes,  decidedly  ob- 
scure. Hence  immediate  consciousness  appears  to  vary 
from  states  where  the  whole  content  is  one  vague  undifferent- 
iated extensive  sensation  (probably  never  existent  except  in 
the  most  incipient  stages  of  infancy,  and  only  approximated 
to  in  adult  life  either  when  consciousness  is  submerged  in 
some  overmastering  pain,  or  when  all  clearness  is  removed 
from   it    by  complete    distraction    or    perplexity),   through 


134  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  V^QO 

states  where  certain  parts,  in  a  penumbra  of  more  or  less 
clear  consciousness,  are  discriminated  as  vague  or  perplex- 
ing sensations,  to  states  where  the  contents  are  characterized 
by  the  most  perfect  qualitative  clearness.  It  is  this  distinc- 
tion of  grades  of  clearness,  indeed,  which  has  become  crys- 
tallized in  ordinary  language  in  the  use  •of  the  word  con- 
sciousness, and  which  is  the  great  source  of  confusion 
respecting  it.  Even  Beneke  himself  frequently  lapses  into 
this  ordinary  use,  e.  g.,  when  he  says  that  "  sensations  of  the 
soul  first  awaking  to  life  are  not  conscious,  and  therefore  we 
cannot  attribute  consciousness  to  the  human  soul  or  an  in- 
born faculty." 2i  But  what  he  must  mean  here,  and  in  fact 
what  he  intends  to  say,  is  only  that  "  consciousness,"  in  the 
sense  of  clear  consciousness,  is  not  innate.  Beneke,  too, 
speaks  of  the  later  clear  consciousness  of  the  child  develop- 
ing itself  from  original  "  unconscious "  sensations.  But 
here  again  this  is  only  a  most  relative  method  of  expression, 
which  for  scientific  and  philosophical  purposes  is  vicious, 
just  because  it  obscures  distinctions  really  of  the  utmost 
value  for  a  true  insight  into  the  nature  and  implications  of 
conscious  life.  The  obscurest  sensation,  so  far  as  it  forms 
part  of  the  immediate  contents  of  some  individual  experi- 
ence, in  that  it  is  a  fact  in  and  for  some  experiencing  indi- 
vidual, is  as  truly  "conscious"  as  the  clearest  sense  percept 
or  concept  which  ever  engaged  the  closest  attention «of  that 
individual. 

§87.  "DTnconsciousuess"  Distinguished  as  (1)  Less  Clear 
and  as  (2)  Non-presented  Contents — There  are  really  then 
two  meanings  which  we  may  assign  to  the  term  "uncon- 
scious," from  the  point  of  view  of  presented  contents. 

First,  as  stated  in  the  last  paragraph,  it  may  refer  to  per- 
ceptive (external)    or  conceptive   (internal)   facts,  immedi- 

24  Lehrbuch,  §  57. 


40 1 J  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  1 3  c 

ately  present  in  conscious  experience,  but  of  so  vague  a 
character  as  to  admit  of  only  some  such  characterization  as 
"  sensation,"  "  feeling,"  "  external,"  "  internal,"  etc.  In  other 
words,  in  this  sense,  the  use  of  the  term  is  purely  relative, 
referring  to  more  or  less  qualitatively  clear  actually  pres- 
ented contents. 

Second,  "unconscious"  may  refer  to  percepts  (things) 
and  to  concepts  (ideas)  not  present  in  immediate  conscious 
experience  at  all.  This  second  use  calls  for  further  careful 
discrimination.  For  these  things  or  ideas  either  (a)  may 
have  already  once  formed  part  of  the  immediate  contents  of 
a  given  individual's  consciousness,  but  at  a  given  moment 
may  not  be  present;  or  (b)  they  may  have  never  at  all  en- 
tered into  the  conscious  experience  of  the  individual.  In 
the  first  case,  I  may  be  said  to  be  utterly  "unconscious"  of 
those  of  my  friends  who  are  neither  immediately  present  to 
my  perceptive  consciousness  nor  are  present  in  my  thoughts. 
In  the  second  case,  I  may  be  said  to  be  utterly  "  uncon- 
scious" even  of  the  existence  of  thousands  of  people  whom, 
though  they  live  in  the  same  city  with  me,  I  have  never 
either  seen  or  heard  of.  There  is  a  vast  difference  in  the 
meaning  of  "unconsciousness"  in  these  two  cases.  The  last 
one  does  not  and  cannot  even  exist  as  a  problem  for  the  in- 
dividual whose  experience  is  thus,  as  to  certain  individual 
facts,  regarded  as  a  perfect  blank.  It  can  exist  only  for  a 
second  individual  who  knows  both  the  particular  facts  and 
the  condition  of  that  mind  supposed  not  to  be  possessed  of 
the  facts.  The  first  case,  on  the  other  hand,  raises  what  has 
proved  one  of  the  most  troublesome  questions  in  all  philoso- 
phy— the  question  of  the  existence  and  nature  of  what  has 
once  been  the  object  of  consciousness,  when  that  object  is 
not  actually  perceived.  And  Beneke's  general  theory  is 
permanently  valuable  just  because  of  the  light  which  it 
throws  on  this  question. 


!36  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [402 

B CONSCIOUSNESS    AS    PRESENTATIVE    PROCESS 

§  88.  Consciousness  Distinguished  as  Presentative  Activity 
— Beneke  gets  at  the  very  heart  of  the  difficulty  involved  in 
the  problem  stated  in  the  last  paragraph  by  his  distinction 
between  presented  contents  and  presentative  activity.  The 
result  of  the  preceding  psychological  analysis  has  been  to 
show  that  every  momentary  or  substantive  state  of  con- 
sciousness, whatever  its  phenomenalistic  aspect  may  be, 
is  to  be  regarded  as  a  sort  of  static  condition  or  equilibrium, 
resulting  from  the  balancing  or  equalizing  of  certain  ele- 
ments— each  pulse  or  alteration  of  consciousness  being  only 
a  disturbance  of  the  old  and  a  readjusting  to  the  new  equi- 
librium. The  factors  of  this  balancing  process  in  the  case 
of  outer  perception  are  really  three :  ( I )  External  Stimu- 
lants (Reise),  (2)  Primary  Powers  (Urvermogen) ,  and  (3) 
Traces  {Spuren).  In  the  case  of  inner  perception  the  factors 
are  two :  (1)  Traces20  and  (2)  Movable  Elements;  or,  (1) 
Traces,  and  (2)  Unfilled  Primary  Powers.  The  immediate 
momentary  consciousness  of  individual  experience  then, 
whatever  its  presented  contents,  is  the  direct  product  of 
certain  primary  powers  which,  together  with  their  corres- 
ponding and  connected  traces,  are  being  directly  stimulated 
or  aroused.  Immediate  consciousness,  from  this  point  of 
view,  thus  means  only  actual  excitation  (Die  Erregtheit), 
that  is,  the  immediate  activity  of  certain  psychical  forms. 

§  89.  Clear  Consciousness  as  a  Grade  of  Presentative 
Activity — We  are  now  in  a  position  to  understand  more 
fully  the  effect  on  the  contents  of  consciousness  of  the  de- 
gree of  activity  represented  by  the  relation  between  primary 

25  Traces,  it  will  of  course  be  remembered,  are  supposed  to  be  fundamentally 
only  certain  primary  powers,  or  groups  of  such  powers,  which  have  appropriated 
external  stimulants,  and  from  which  this  stimulant  has  become  partially  disen- 
gaged. 


403  J  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  !  3  n 

powers  and  their  stimulants.  We  have  already  described 
the  general  character  of  consciousness,  or  the  constructive 
psychical  forms  resulting  from  the  varying  relation  of  power 
and  stimulant.  It  is  the  purpose  here  to  look  more  closely 
at  the  nature  of  clear  consciousness,  so  far  as  dependent  on 
presentative  activity.  The  soul  in  its  original  nature  or 
being,  we  have  seen  to  be  a  vast  system  of  primary  powers 
all  organically  combined  in  one  concrete  whole.  The 
simplest  original  sensation,  that  is,  the  simplest  "  appear- 
ance "  in  consciousness,  arises  only  when  the  primary  power 
is  stimulated  by  means  of  a  stimulant  from  without.  But 
when  once  a  stimulant  has  been  taken  up  from  without,  it 
continues  its  existence  henceforth  as  a  permanent  possession 
of  the  soul.  It  has  become  entirely  psychological  in  char- 
acter. This  of  course  does  not  mean  that  it  is  always 
clearly  represented  in  consciousness,  but  only  that  there 
always  remains  as  a  permanent  possession  of  the  soul  the 
primary  power  and  stimulant  in  a  more  or  less  firm  con- 
nection. And  this  "  permanent  possession "  continues  to 
exist  as  a  trace,  having  so  become  by  a  partial  disappear- 
ance of  the  stimulant.  So  far  as  similar  traces  become 
multiplied  in  the  soul,  these  traces,  in  consequence  of  the 
fundamental  psychological  processes,  become  closely  knitted 
together  as  a  group,  which  group,  when  active,  becomes,  on 
the  side  of  presented  contents,  represented  in  consciousness 
as  a  single  act.  Now  "  the  word  clearness"  (Klarheit),  says 
Beneke,  "  means  in  general,  nothing  more  than  that  which 
arises  as  product  from  the  fusion  of  many  similar  psychical 
products  of  the  same  fundamental  form."26  Clear  conscious- 
ness hence  "  develops  itself  out  of  the  original  sensations, 
without  requiring  anything  new  or  foreign  to  be  brought  to 
it,  by  virtue  of  the  mere  aggregation  of  like  elements  and 

26  Lehrbuch,  §  60. 


!38  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  \\0\ 

the  strengthening  (Verstiirknng)  thereby  resulting" ' 27  And 
Beneke,  therefore,  gives  as  his  ultimate  definition  of  clear 
consciousness  " strength  of  psychical  being"  (Starke  des 
psycJiischen  Seins). 28 

§  90.  Grades  of  Presentative  Activity — In  the  case  of  the 
-developed  soul  we  may  distinguish  four  important  grades  of 
activity  conditioning  the  production  or  failure  to  produce 
clear  consciousness : 

1st.  Where  the  stimulation  is  great  enough  to  bring  a 
certain  psychical  form  into  active  consciousness,  but  the 
given  form,  in  consequence  of  the  fewness  of  similar  traces, 
becomes  in  consciousness  not  a  clear  presentation  (Vorstel- 
lungsbildung),  but  a  mere  vague  sensuous  feeling  (Sinnliche 
Empfindimg). 

2d.  Where,  although  the  soul  is  supplied  with  traces  of 
similar  forms  sufficient  to  result  in  clear  representation,  the 
balancing  elements,  or  quantity  of  stimulants,  becomes  so 
dispersed'1'*  through  the  great  number  of  parts  of  an  intercon- 
nected group  or  series,  that  no  one  part  is  brought  into 
clear  consciousness.  It  is  by  this  diffusion  of  excitation 
{  Vertheilung  der  Erregtlieii)  that  Beneke  explains  the  dis- 
tracted and  perplexed  states  of  the  total  immediate  con- 
sciousness (or  even  of  partial  consciousness)  already  de- 
scribed. 

3d.  Where  the  soul  is  both  furnished  with  sufficient  traces, 
and  the  balancing  elements  are  at  work  in  sufficient  quantity, 
to  arouse  or  actively  excite  these  traces.  This  is  the  condi- 
tion of  ordinary  clear  presentations. 

4th.  Where  clear  consciousness  arises  from  the  partial  op- 
position of  forms  immediately  present  in  consciousness,  and 
reaches  a  certain  maximum  or  perfect   clearness.     In   this 

27  Ibid.,  §  57.  28  Ibid.,  §  57,  note  I. 

29  Cf.  lehrbuch,  §  93,  note.     Also  §  161. 


405]  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  {^g 

case  the  clear  consciousness  arises  from  the  obscuration  or 
darkening  of  forms  immediately  present.  For  example, 
where  momentary  consciousness,  divided  between  several  per- 
cepts, say  a  red,  a  white,  and  a  blue  ball,  at  almost  the  same 
instant,  irresistibly  and  almost  to  the  exclusion  of  the  objects 
named,  becomes  focussed  or  centred  on  the  concept  "color." 
§  91 .  "  Unconsciousness  "  Distinguished  as  N on- Ex  citation 
— We  are  now  able  to  assign  some  intelligible  meaning  to 
that  use  of  the  term  "  unconsciousness,"  which  has  already 
been  defined  as  the  non-presence  in  immediate  conscious- 
ness of  things  or  ideas  which  "  have  already  once  formed 
part  of  the  immediate  contents  of  a  given  individual  con- 
sciousness." Unconsciousness  in  this  sense  means  simply 
the  non-excitation  or  inadequate  excitation  of  elements 
already  existing  and  forming  part  of  the  being  of  the  soul. 
Traces,  whether  consisting  of  partially  stimulated  individual 
primary  powers,  or  groups  of  such  powers,  are  "  uncon- 
scious "  in  this  sense,  i.  e.,  so  far  as  their  stimulation  is  too 
slight  to  give  them  clear  representation  in  immediate  con- 
scious experience.  It  thus  results  that  the  only  absolute  or 
"true  consciousness"  is  unconsciousness  in  the  sense  of 
utter  non-excitation,  and  this  can  be  only  in  the  case  of  the 
unappropriated  primary  powers.  So  far  as  "  unconscious- 
ness" pertains  to  the  developed  soul,  it  is  only  in  respect  to 
the  still  unfilled  primary  powers.  "  Also  in  the  developed 
human  soul  under  the  usual  circumstances,  the  still  unfilled 
primary  powers  are  unconscious," 30  says  Beneke.  And 
adds,  "  They  first  become  conscious  by  being  filled  with  stimu- 
lants." The  instant  any  of  the  primary  powers  receive 
stimulation,  that  instant  the  conscious  experience  of  the  soul 
begins. 

wLehrbuch,  §  88. 


CHAPTER  VII 

Applied  Psychology — Metaphysics 

§  92.  Introduction — Psychology  was  regarded  by  Beneke 
as  the  fundamental  science,  of  which  all  the  other  philosophi- 
cal disciplines  are  merely  applications.  These  applications, 
to  Ethics,  Logic,  Pedagogy  and  Metaphysics,  Beneke  has 
worked  out  with  a  consistency  of  principle,  elaborateness  of 
detail  and  profoundness  of  insight  that  make  all  his  works 
on  these  subjects  worthy  of  more  careful  and  extended 
study  than  has  hitherto  been  given  to  them  anywhere,  Ger- 
many included.  Important,  however,  as  all  these  applica- 
tions are,  it  will  be  possible  here  to  consider  only  the  Meta- 
physics. 

Beneke's  Metaphysics  was  first  published  at  Berlin  in  1840, 
under  the  title  :  System  der  Metaphysik  nnd  Rcligions-philoso- 
pJiie  aus  den  natiirlichen  Grundverhaltnissen  des  menschlichen 
Geistes  abgeleitet.  The  work  is  divided  into  three  chief 
parts,  the  first  treating  of  the  definition  of  the  relation  be- 
tween presentation  and  being  in  general ;  the  second  being 
an  investigation  of  the  forms  and  relations  which  lay  claim 
to  reality ;  the  third  being  an  investigation  of  our  belief  in 
the  supra-sensible,  this  part  being  termed  by  Beneke  Relig- 
ions-pJiilosopJiie.  In  the  following  exposition  of  Beneke's 
metaphysical  standpoint,  I  cannot  of  course  attempt  to  follow 
his  formal  argument.  I  can  only  set  forth  the  spirit  of  his 
Metaphysics,  and  call  attention  to  its  chief  points,  with  the 
hope  that  this  may  lead  to  further  study  and  investigation. 
140  [406 


407 ]  FRIEDRICH  ED UARD  BENEKE  T  *  { 

I    THE   ORIGINAL  NATURE   AND   BEING    OF  THE   SOUL 

§  93.  Psychological  Summary  of  the  Nature  of  the  Soul — 
If  the  preceding  psychological  analysis  has  taken  true  ac- 
count of  the  facts  of  experience  and  been  correct  in  its  in- 
terpretation of  those  facts,  there  are  certain  inevitable  con- 
clusions which  must  be  drawn  as  to  the  original  nature  and 
being  of  the  soul. 

As  to  this  original  being,  the  whole  process  of  psychical 
development  has  tended  to  show  that  there  is  nothing  innate 
in  the  soul  of  man  except  those  senso-spiritual  primary 
powers  by  which  the  outer  stimulants  are  taken  up  and  ap- 
propriated for  the  formation  of  sensations,  and  those  vital 
and  muscular  powers  which  are  like  in  simplicity  with  the 
faculties  of  sensation.  We  must  of  course  regard  as  an  in- 
nate characteristic,  however,  of  this  concrete  system  of  pri- 
mary powers,  already  originally  organically  combined,  its 
ability  to  undergo  transformations  in  accordance  with  the 
fundamental  psychological  processes  already  stated.  To  the 
primary  powers,  it  is  true,  too,  we  must  assign  a  twofold 
original  definiteness  of  character.  First,  that  of  the  partic- 
ular original  fundamental  system  to  which  they  belong,  and 
second,  an  original  definiteness  of  character,  as  indicated  in 
their  varying  grades  of  reaction  on  stimulants.  In  this  re- 
spect, the  various  systems  seem  to  differ  originally  in  their 
grade  of  vigorousness  {Krliftigkeit) ,  quickness  (Lebendigkeit) 
and  irritability  or  susceptibility  {^ReizemfanglicJikcit).  The 
being  of  the  developed  soul  differs  from  that  of  the  original 
soul  only  in  the  more  highly  organized  character  of  the  in- 
terrelated systems,  due  to  their  stimulation  both  from  with- 
out and  from  within.1  Originally  each  of  the  primary  pow- 
ers was  a  blind  impulse  striving  for  its  outer  stimulation. 
When  once  stimulated  it  sinks  to  a  trace  because  of  a  par- 

1  The  inner  character  of  the  developed  soul  is  thus  partly  self-determined. 


1 42  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  [408 

tial  disappearance  of  its  stimulation.  So  far  as  it  is  a  trace 
it  is  likewise  a  striving  (Strebung) ,  longing  or  aiming  to  re- 
cover its  lost  stimulation.  Thus  it  results  that  "  in  the  de- 
veloped human  soul,  there  are  found  two  fundamental  kinds 
of  strivings :  the  still  unstimulated  primary  powers,  and 
those  which  have  again  become  free  through  the  disappear- 
ance of  stimulants.  The  latter  are  distinguished  from  the 
first  in  precisely  this,  that  they  are  strivings  after  something 
(i.  e.,  after  an  exactly  definite  stimulation).  In  other  re- 
spects the  fundamental  character  of  both  is  the  same ;  and 
all  strivings  arising  through  the  disappearance  of  stimulants 
arise  finally  from  the  primary  powers  given  originally  un- 
filled."2 

§  94.  Unity  of  Consciousness  Distinguished  from  Unity  of 
Being — The  unity  of  consciousness,  now,  is  to  be  sharply 
distinguished  from  this  "  universal  and  indeterminate  unity" 
which  pertains  to  the  original  being  of  the  soul.  The  soul 
originally  is  unconscious,  in  the  only^true  sense  of  that  word, 
but  in  virtue  of  the  "  inborn  tendency"  of  the  primary  pow- 
ers for  consciousness  (eine  angeborene  Anlage  fur  das 
Bewusstseiu) ,3  we  may  speak  of  consciousness  as  one  of  the 
possible  properties  of  it,  and  therefore  ascribe  consciousness 
to  it  in  an  adjectival  sense  of  the  word.  There  is,  however, 
a  more  substantial  sense  in  which  the  term  consciousness 
may  be  used  of  the  soul.  In  this  sense  it  pertains  to  the  de- 
veloped or  developing  soul,  and  refers  to  that  organized  tis- 
sue of  unconscious  traces  which  constitutes  the  "  inner 
being"  of  the  soul.4     By  "  unity  of  consciousness,"  therefore, 

lLehrbuch,  §  168  3  Ibid.,  §  57. 

*This  developed  inner  being  is  of  course  to  be  distinguished  from  the  original 
inner  being,  or  organic  system  of  unstimulated  and  unconnected  {i.  e.  secondarily 
unconnected)  primary  powers.  If  the  primary  power,  after  appropriating  a  stim- 
ulant, becomes  a  "  trace"  by  the  partial  disappearance  of  this  stimulant,  then  in 
the  developed  inner  being  we  have  power  and  stimulant  still  in  combination,  but 


409]  FRIEDRICH  EDU4RD  BENEKE  143 

we  may  refer  either  to  the  unity  of  the  presented  contents  of 
the  clear  momentary  experience  (or  some  particular  percept 
or  idea  forming  part  of  that  content),  or  to  the  unity  which 
would  be  possessed  for  consciousness  by  the  whole  mass  of 
accumulated  conscious  forms,  if  these  forms  by  adequate 
stimulation  of  the  whole  system  of  powers  of  the  soul,  were 
all  simultaneously  presented  as  clear  consciousness.5  But 
the  important  point  to  notice  is  that  whichever  way  we 
conceive  it,  unity  of  consciousness  is  always  to  be  distin- 
guished from  the  original  being  of  the  primary  powers, 
howsoever  dependent  it  may  be  on  the  latter. 

§  95.  The  Soul  a  Concrete  Psychical  Organism — With 
Beneke,  therefore,  the  soul  is  neither  a  tabula  rasa,  nor  a 
transcendental  unity,  somehow  pre-furnished  with  certain 
original  "  forms  "  or  "  categories,"  by  "  stamping  "  which  on 
the  raw  sense-material  fortuitously  furnished  it  from  without, 
it  constitutes  experience.  Not  a  tabula  rasa,  because  the 
character  of  sensation  is  determined  by  the  nature  of  the 
appropriating  primary  power  as  well  as  by  the  irritating 
stimulant.  "  The  human  soul  in  the  case  of  no  process  is 
purely  passive  ;  even  for  the  production  of  the  liveliest  sense 
impression   is   a  species   of  activity  necessary  on  its  part." e 

with  the  difference  that  the  strength  of  stimulation  is  not  sufficient  to  make  the 
given  psychical  form,  or  sensation,  ("or  rather  what  would  be  the  sensation  or  the 
presented  contents,  if  the  stimulation  were  sufficient),  enter  dearly  as  part  of  the 
contents  of  clear  consciousness.  There  is  no  objection  to  or  contradiction  in 
speaking  of  this  combination  of  power  and  stimulant  as  inner  "  consciousness,"  if 
we  bear  clearly  in  mind  the  meaning  of  consciousness  as  "  process,"  varying  in 
grades  from  full  excitation  (Erregtheit)  to  complete  non-excitation  (Nicht- 
Erregtheit) . 

5 This  aspect  of  consciousness,  dealing  with  "  Reality"  as  distinguished  from 
"  Being,"  appears  to  be  the  ultimate  standpoint  of  those  thorough-going  empiri- 
cists who  confine  themselves  to  what  Kant  called  "  nature  as  a  totality  of  objects 
of  experience;"  for  example,  Mr.  Lewes,  in  his  "cosmos  of  experience,"  and  Mr. 
Spencer,  in  his  phenomenal  world  of  "  the  knowable."  How  Beneke  transcends 
this  point  of  view,  the  text  shows. 

6  Lehrbuch,  §  23,  note  2. 


!44  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [4^0 

Nor  a  being  stored  with  preformed  "  categories,"  because  the 
forms  of  intuition  and  the  categories  are  but  logical  dis- 
tinctions for  consciousness,  and  as  such  are  but  the  content  of 
an  idea  in  inner  experience.7  Objective  validity  in  a  certain 
sense  they  have,  but  not  objective  existence,  or  rather  being 
in  and  for  themselves.  So  far  as  they  have  being,  their 
being  is  to  be  found  in  the  being  of  the  particular  concepts 
of  which  they  are  the  content.  And  as  to  concepts,  the 
whole  preceding  psychological  analysis  has  tended  to  show 
that  of  these  "  there  are  absolutely  none  inborn."  Their 
being  then  is  nothing  apart  from  just  those  particular  primary 
powers  in  whose  connections  and  stimulation  the  concept 
consists,  and  of  which  it  is  the  "presented  content"  aspect. 
The  soul,  therefore,  according  to  Beneke,  is  a  concrete 
psychical  organism  whose  activity  in  consequence  of  stimu- 
lation from  without  manifests  itself  in  the  form  of  conscious 
experience,  and  this  experience  for  the  developed  soul  dis- 
tinguishes itself  into  a  twofold  aspect — outer  and  inner. 

II    THE   NATURE   AND    LIMITS    OF   KNOWLEDGE 

§  96.  The  Intuition  of  Self — From  what  has  already  been 
said  it  is  obvious  now  that  we  must  distinguish  sharply  the 
true  self  from  the  knowledge  of  self.  The  true  self  Beneke 
regards  in  a  twofold  aspect :  first,  as  the  undeveloped  being 
or  self,  which  consists  in  the  original  systems  of  primary 
powers  organically  combined,  which  original  combinations 
or  relations  are  the  only  permanent  or  unchanging  relations 
of  the  soul;  second,  as  the  "concrete  Ego,"  which,  in  con- 
sequence of  its  constant  stimulation  from  both  without  and 
within,  and  the  new  connections  and  relations  thereby  estab- 
lished within  it,  changes  with  every  momentary  experience. 

7  "  Even  the  so-called  categories  ox  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  of  Kant 
show  themselves,  on  deeper  examination,  as  having  been  formed  from  intuitions, 
and  as  presentations  of  our  own  self-consciousness."     Lehrbuch,  §  122,  note  2. 


4 1  i  ]  FRIEDRICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  r  4  - 

It  is  with  this  latter  concretely  developing  self  that  our 
knowledge  endeavors  to  keep  pace  ;  but  so  far  as  we  know  it, 
we  apprehend  it  in  a  concept,  which,  in  its  being,  is  only  a 
small  portion  of  the  total  being  of  the  soul,  but  which,  in  its 
reference,  is  the  refined  essence  of  the  whole  rich  manifold  of 
our  preceding  conscious  experience,  outer  and  inner.  The 
intuition  of  self,  therefore,  is  no  innate  concept,  in  the  sense 
that  we  are  equipped  with  it  at  the  start  in  life's  journey 
through  experience.  It  is  a  concept  which  only  gradually 
and  after  a  long  attentive  process  builds  itself  up  as  a  per- 
manent possession  of  our  inner  consciousness.  This  concept, 
too,  to  be  true,  must  be  developed  by  the  experiencing  indi- 
vidual himself.  While  the  concept  of  self  as  an  outer  and 
inner  conscious  experience  combined  in  the  organic  unity 
of  a  personal  being  may  represent  the  high-water  mark  of 
philosophical  speculation,  only  those  individuals  who  have 
reached  this  intuitive  insight  through  a  long  reflective  pro- 
cess on  their  own  experiences,  by  which  they  have  mounted 
step  by  step  and  higher  and  higher  from  an  obscure  sensu- 
ous basis  to  this  clear  spiritual  insight,  can  be  said  to  have, 
in  any  true  sense  of  the  word,  such  an  intuition  of  self. 

§  97.  The  Origin  and  Content  of  "  Inner  Sense  " — The 
concept  of  experience  as  an  outer  and  inner  form  of  con- 
sciousness, that  is,  as  appearances  to  a  perceiving  self,  rep- 
resents a  very  advanced  stage  in  the  evolution  of  knowledge. 
And  since  in  inner  sense  we  seem  to  get  nearest  the  soul 
itself,  we  may  now  inquire  how  this  faculty  of  inner  percep- 
tion has  grown  up.  That  it  has  grown  is  not  lacking  in 
evidence.  How  long  it  took  human  consciousness  to  reach 
the  phenomenalistic  conception  of  itself,  such  as  it  attained 
in  the  idealism  of  Berkeley  and  the  empiricism  of  Hume,  is 
a  matter  of  philosophical  history.  How  possible  it  is  for  a 
person  to  perceive  objects,  experience  feelings,  or  perform 
actions,  without  ever  being  in  the  slightest  degree  conscious 


1 46  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  [4  j  2 

of  these  experiences  #.y  perceptions,  ^j-  feelings,  as  volitions, 
is  a  matter  of  every-day  experience.  Children  see  and  hear, 
remember  and  pass  judgment,  yet  in  the  early  periods  of 
their  career  they  are  never  conscious  of  their  particular  ex- 
periences, as  perceptions,  as  memories,  as  judgments.  In 
other  words,  "  inner  sense,"  in  the  strict  sense  of  perceiving 
certain  of  one's  experiences  as  inner,  does  not  exist  for  them. 
They  have  no  perceptive  faculty  for  their  own  soul's  develop- 
ment. How  then  is  this  formed,  and,  as  a  concept,  what  is 
its  content? 

Inner  sense  perception,  in  Beneke's  view,  is  nothing  more 
than  a  distinction  for  consciousness.  So  far  as  we  know 
memories,  concepts,  judgments,  inferences,  as  memories, 
concepts,  judgments  or  inferences,  in  other  words,  as  facts  of 
inner  experience,  we  have  already  abstracted  from  the  con- 
tents of  certain  original  experiences  and  brought  into  clear 
consciousness  particular  "  aspects "  of  these  experiences. 
These  "  aspects  "  constitute  the  contents  of  a  new  concept, 
which  in  its  turn  may  through  further  reflection  be  conceived 
as  a  fact  of  inner  experience.  Now  any  original  sense  ex- 
perience, if  repeated  a  sufficient  number  of  times  in  precisely 
the  same  way,  will  give  rise  to  a  concept,  the  concept  being 
that  apperceptive  mass  of  similar  traces,  which,  on  the 
repetition  of  the  original  experience,  rise  into  active  con- 
sciousness and  give  it  clearness.  The  like  elements  in  var- 
ious concepts,  by  a  process  of  mutual  attraction,  transference 
of  movable  elements,  and  sufficient  repetition,  give  rise  to 
other  higher  concepts,  and  just  such  a  concept  as  this  is  the 
faculty  of  inner  sense.  It  originates  in  the  coalescence  of  the 
similar  elements  in  subjective  forms.  "  Inner  sense  arises 
in  the  concepts  which  refer  themselves  to  the  psycliical  qual- 
ities, forms  and  relations.  If  those  concepts  which  have  as 
their  content  the  clear  presentation  of  these  qualities,  etc., 
become  particular  experiences  for  consciousness,  they  them- 


413]  FRIEDRICH  ED  UARD  BENEKE  \  47 

selves  thereby  become,  on  the  side  of  consciousness,  so 
strengthened  and  cleared,  that  these  particular  experiences 
become  intuitively  perceived  {yorgestellt  werden).  Conse- 
quently, as  well  in  the  case  of  inner  perception,  in  its  com- 
plete formation,  as  in  that  of  outer,  we  find  essentially  the 
same  fundamental  form  as  that  which  gave  itself  a  very  dis- 
tinct stamp  in  the  case  of  judgments.  That  is,  the  particular 
feelings,  strivings,  etc.,  take,  in  this  case,  the  place  of  the 
subject,  and  the  apperceiving  concept,  or  inner  sense,  the  place 
of  the  predicate."6 

§  98.  The  Soul  the  Only  Being  Known  in  Itself — We  are 
now  in  a  position  to  see  what  is  the  most  fundamental  out- 
come of  Beneke's  psychology,  and,  as  such,  the  foundation 
stone  of  his  Metaphysics — the  soul  is  the  only  thing  in  itself 
of  which  we  have  absolute  knowledge.  Beneke  agrees  with 
Kant  that  both  forms  of  experience,  outer  and  inner,  are  ap- 
pearances, or  phenomena,  in  the  sense  that  they  are  both 
the  product  of  two  sets  of  factors.  But  as  process,  external 
perception  and  internal  perception  are  radically  different. 
External  perception  distinguishes  itself  by  the  presence  of 
what  is,  as  it  were,  a  foreign  element.  That  is,  an  external 
presentation  is  the  product  of  the  primary  power  and  ele- 
ments outer  to  the  soul  (Reizc),  whereas  an  internal  presenta- 
tion is  the  product  of  elements  wholly  within  the  soul.  "  In 
the  case  of  inner  perception,"  therefore,  "not  only  the  being 
of  that  which  is  taken  up  and  intuitively  presented  is  attained 
to  by  the  perception  or  intuition,  but  this  being  enters  imme- 
diately into  the  presentation  as  an  ingredient,  and  in  conse- 
quence of  this  latter,  there  is  added  qualitatively  not  the 
slightest  thing  which  was  not  also  already  contained  in  the 
being  intuitively  presented."9  This  is  the  ground,  then,  for 
Beneke's  claim  that  in  inner  perception,  in  inner  experience, 
we  have  "  a  presentation  of  complete  or  absolute  truth."9  The 
soul  is  the  only  being  which  we  know  in  and  for  itself. 

8  Lehrbnch,  §  129.  9  Lehrbudi,  §  129,  note  4. 


1 48  FRIEDRICH  ED UARD  BENEKE  Ta  \ 4 

III     KNOWLEDGE   OF   BEINGS    OTHER   THAN    SELF 

§  99.  Fundamental  Starting  Point — If  the  fundamental 
question  for  metaphysics  is  the  definition  of  the  relation  be- 
tween presentations  and  the  beings  which  they  are  believed 
to  represent,  then,  in  the  insight  that  we  ourselves  are  a 
being  in  the  apprehension  of  which,  in  inner  sense,  per- 
ception and  being  coalesce,  without  the  admixture  of  any 
foreign  element,  we  have  a  sure  fundamental  metaphysical 
starting  point.  "  We  are  ourselves  a  being ;  and  conse- 
quently we  do  not  need,  in  order  to  reach  being  {das  Sein) 
to  go  out  of  ourselves  into  something  else.  Here  we  have  or 
rather  are  perception  and  being  at  once,  and  consequently  are 
able  to  compare  genuinely  and  with  complete  satisfaction 
the  perception  with  its  being."10  Beneke,  even  in  one  of  his 
earliest  works,  gave  a  sharp  and  clear  statement  of  this 
point.  He  says:11  "To  every  act  of  perception,  we  saw, 
even  though  it  were  a  perception  of  a  perception,  there  be- 
longs, as  an  activity  of  the  human  soul,  an  existence  in  this 
soul ;  this  is  so  undoubted  a  fact  for  universal  human  con- 
sciousness that  it  cannot  be  denied  even  by  the  most  ob- 
durate skeptic.  If,  consequently,  it  were  possible  for  us  to 
be  always  limited  to  mere  acts  of  perception,  at  least  in  this 
act  of  perception  itself  we  have  a  being  incontestably  within 
our  power.  But  this  act  of  perception  we  are  able  to  per- 
ceive again  without  any  difficulty ;  and  consequently  there 
lies  before  us  not  merely  a  being,  but  also  the  comparison 
of  it  with  one  and  the  same  act  of  perception  that  perceives 
it,  and,  therefore,  the  knowledge  of  the  relation  between  per- 
ception and  being  lies  open  in  at  least  one  instance." 

§  100.  How  Knowledge  of  the  Existence  of  Other  Beings  is 
Attained — But  now,  if  in  outer  perception  our  percept  always 

10  System  der  Metaphysik,  p.  75. 

11  Das  Verhaltniss  von  Seele  unci  Leib,  p.  42. 


415]  FRIEDRICH  ED  UARD  BENEKE  Y  49 

contains  a  foreign  element  to  which  we  cannot  reach  in  itself, 
how  can  we  know  even  of  the  existence  of  other  beings  be- 
sides ourselves?  Why  are  not  the  outer  world  and  outer 
beings  mere  phantasmagoria  of  my  own  imagination,  and  I 
the  only  being  that  exists?  Knowledge  of  external  being 
"would  indeed  be  utterly  impossible,  and  our  sensations  and 
sense  perceptions  of  the  outer  world  would  remain  purely 
subjective  things,  if  the  two  classes  of  perceptions  which  we 
have,  sensuous  perceptions  and  those  of  our  own  self  (or  of 
being),  were  given  entirely  without  connection  one  with  the 
other.  We  should  then  of  course  in  the  case  of  the  psychical 
processes,  which  we  call  sensations  and  perceptions  of  the 
outer  world,  have  a  feeling  different  from  that  in  the  case  of 
our  other  psychical  processes ;  it  would  feel  different  in  that 
case  to  us ;  but  without  our  knowing  how  to  explain  more 
precisely  this  difference ;  and,  consequently,  in  spite  of  this 
difference,  they  would  never  become  for  us  perceptions  or 
representations. 12 

But  man  is  more  than  a  soul ;  he  is  also  a  body,  and  this 
body  has  its  representatives  among  the  phenomena  of  ex- 
ternal perception.  Therefore  "  there  is  one  being,  of  which 
we  have  at  one  and  the  same  time  both  kinds  of  perceptions. 
This  is  our  own  being.  We  perceive  ourselves  at  one  time 
immediately  through  self-consciousness  (through  which  orig- 
inally the  concept  of  being  arises,  and  through  which  alone 
it  can  arise),  and  in  addition  we  perceive  ourselves  sensu- 
ously: our  figure,  the  tones  of  our  voice,  etc.,  in  a  word,  all 
that  we  call  our  body;  and  these  two  kinds  of  perceptions 
(or  feelings)  become  associated  together  from  the  first  mo- 
ment of  life  on,  and  continually  grow  in  the  course  of  life 
ever  more  intimately  united."13 

As  to  that  particular   group  or  series  of  external  percep- 

12  System  der  Metaphysik,  p.  79.  I3  System  der  Metapkysik,  p.  79. 


I  5  o  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  T  4  :  g 

tions  we  have  learned  to  call  our  own  body,  Beneke  asks, 
why  we  class  only  a  particular  group  with  ourselves  and  re- 
late them  to  ourselves  as  our  body  ?  One  group  of  phe- 
nomena in  the  picture  before  us  we  call  another  man's  body, 
another  group  we  call  our  own.  And  yet  originally  in  and 
for  themselves  external  sense  perceptions  have  no  predispo- 
sition either  to  appear  as  perceptions  of  things  in  themselves, 
or  to  show  any  particular  connection  with  our  internal  sense 
perceptions.  The  reason  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  those 
perceptions  which  are  foreign  to  our  own  being  sometimes 
are  given  in  consciousness  and  sometimes  not,  and  uncere- 
moniously change  without  any  reference  to  our  own  circum- 
stances. On  the  other  hand,  however,  "  the  sensuous  impres- 
sions and  perceptions  which  we  class  with  ourselves,  are  con- 
tinuously  present  to  us,  and  change  themselves  parallel  with 
that  which  our  self-consciousness  places  before  us.  Originally 
and  in  itself  the  bond  of  connection  between  the  form  of 
our  hand,  the  tone  of  our  voice,  etc.,  and  our  inner  states 
had  not  the  slightest  superiority  over  the  bond  of  union 
which  occurs  between  these  states  and  the  form,  the  noise, 
etc.,  of  a  waterfall  which  we  perceive  and  feel  accidentally 
coexisting  in  one  single  instance.  But  this  latter  connection 
becomes  dissolved  again,  or  at  least  does  not  grow  up  to  a 
high  grade  of  strength,  whereas,  on  the  other  hand,  the  for- 
mer through  a  thousand  and  ten  thousand-fold  repetition 
rises  to  the  highest  grade  of  strength ;  and  only  in  this  way, 
very  gradually,  the  perceptions  and  feelings  of  our  own  body 
present  themselves  from  out  the  assembled  throng  of  others 
as  one  specific  thing.  They  become  this  entirely  by  virtue 
of  the  intimate  association  brought  about  by  an  endlessly 
repeated  coexistence."14 

§  101.   The  Being  of  Other  Men — Here,  then,  in  the  sen- 

14  System  der  Metaphysik,  pp.  80-81. 


417]  FRIED  RICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  r  5  x 

suous  perception  of  our  own  bodies,  have  we  the  basis  of  our 
method  for  transcending  external  phenomena  so  as  to  reach 
the  being  of  other  existences.  And  this  method,  Beneke 
claims,  is  entirely  that  of  analogy.  In  inner  perception  or 
experience  the  soul  knows  itself  in  and  for  itself,  it  attains  to 
its  own  being;  in  outer  perception  or  experience,  there  is  at 
least  one  phenomenal  existence,  its  own  body,  whose  being 
it  is  able  to  appreciate  ;  since  the  close  similarity  of  another 
man's  body  to  our  own  can  be  a  matter  of  immediate  experi- 
ence, both  bodies  occurring  simultaneously,  as  phenomena 
in  outer  conscious  experience ;  by  analogy  we  conclude  that 
his  body  is  representative  of  a  being  like  that  which  we 
know  to  underlie  our  own  body.  "  Man,  just  because  he  is 
man,  cannot  apprehend  and  intuitively  perceive  in  complete 
truth  any  other  being  than  a  human  one.  Complete  truth, 
indeed,  requires  complete  agreement  between  the  perceiving 
act  and  the  being  perceived  ;  and  consequently  only  so  far 
as  our  being  reaches,  common  perceptions  reach  to  complete 
truth.  What  we  may  perceive  as  metaphysically  true,  that 
must  we  be  able  to  become,  and  whilst  we  are  perceiving  it, 
must  really  become  or  be  it.  Therefore  then  the  province  of 
this  act  of  presentation  metaphysically  true  extends  to,  be- 
sides our  own  soul's  being,  only  the  being  of  the  souls  of 
other  men  most  like  itnto  ourselves.  All  that  lies  without 
this  province  we  are  able  to  represent  to  ourselves  only  either 
by  analogies  (similes)  with  the  human  soul,  or  by  the  effects 
which  it  produces  on  our  senses :  in  the  first  case,  therefore, 
by  virtue  of  what  is  given  in  our  own  being  in  perfect  una- 
nimity with  the  foreign  being,  in  the  second  case,  by  virtue 
of  a  certain  entrance  into  our  soul  of  what  originally  was 
outer."15 

§  102.   The  Being  of  Material  Things — Further,  therefore, 

15  System  der  Metaphysik,  pp.  1 23-24. 


j  c  2  FRIEDRICH  ED  UARD  BENEKL  [4 1  8 

in  respect  to  the  existence  of  material  things,  so  far  as  we 
descend  in  the  scale  of  organic  existences  more  and  more  un- 
like our  own,  so  far  are  we  decreasingly  unable  even  analogi- 
cally to  represent  these  to  ourselves  in  their  inner  being. 
While  usually  we  are  prone  to  assign  more  objective  reality 
to  our  external  perceptions  of  material  things,  because  of 
their  greater  clearness,  we  must  not  forget  that,  as  the  pre- 
ceding psychological  analysis  has  made  out,  this  superiority 
in  clearness  is  really  grounded  purely  subjectively.  Since  in- 
ternal perceptions  can  gain  an  even  greater  clearness,  it  is  a 
mistake  to  regard  the  substratum  of  external  perceptions  as 
the  only  truly  real,  or  a  "being  in  the  highest  sense  of  this 
word."  We  must  conclude  then  that  "  the  presentations  of 
material  things  are  only  appearances,  to  which  of  course  a 
true  being  or  a  being- in-itself  corresponds,  but  which  we  are 
able  to  comprehend  at  best  only  incompletely  and  by  analogies 
more  or  less  close  and  enduring.  We  have  of  them  no 
being-yielding-knowledge,  (Au-sich-Erkenntniss) ,  but  merely 
a  knowledge  of  effects,  i.  e.,  a  knowledge  by  means  of 
those  processes  which  the  imprint  of  the  thing  in  connection 
with  our  faculties  of  perception  and  sensation,  causes  to  arise 
in  us.  These  products,  consequently,  or  the  intuitions  of 
material  things,  exist  as  such  only  in  us ;  and  we  are  able  in 
no  manner  to  resolve  them  into  their  factors,  so  that  we 
might  be  able  to  apprehend  the  real  which  is  without  us  in 
its  complete  truth  or  in  its  in-itselfness."16 

§  103.  The  External  World,  so  far  as  Concerns  our  Fellow 
Beings,  Neither  Unknown  nor  Unknowable — Thus,  while  so 
far  as  material  things,  in  the  sense  of  lower  organisms,  inor- 
ganic matter  and  chemical  atoms,  are  concerned,  we  may 
have  no  adequate  knowledge  of  the  supra-sensible,  it  is  not 
true  that  the  external  world,  in  the  sense  of  meta-phenomenal 

16  System  der  Metaphysik,  p.  120. 


419]  FRIEDRICH  ED  UARD  BEN  EKE  l  5  3 

being,  is  entirely  unknown  and  unknowable  to  us.  In  the 
knoivledge  of  the  existence  of  our  fellow  creatures,  we  have  a 
knowledge  that  is  at  once  profoundly  and  scientifically 
grounded  on  immediate  experience,  and  yet  which  transcends 
that  experience. 

IV     GOD    AND    IMMORTALITY 

§  104.  Introduction — The  third  main  division  of  his  Mcta- 
physik  Beneke  terms  Religions-philosophie,  as  having  to  do 
with  such  suprasensible  being  as  constitutes  the  peculiar  ob- 
ject of  religion.  A  distinguishing  characteristic  and  a  radi- 
cal departure  of  Beneke's  Metaphysik  in  this  respect,  is  its 
relegation  of  the  question  of  the  freedom  of  the  will  to 
Ethics  as  a  purely  scientific  and  empirical  question.  This 
question,  as  well  as  that  of  the  cause  of  evil,  and  the  means 
of  removing  it,  "  have  to  do  through  and  through  with  what 
is  given  in  experience,  or  with  facts,  and  these  allow  them- 
selves to  be  completely  understood  and  treated  in  accord- 
ance with  the  natural  laws  of  our  own  soul.""  The  two 
chief  questions,  therefore,  to  be  considered  concern  God  and 
Immortality. 

§  105.  The  Existence  of  God — In  his  treatment  of  the  ex- 
istence of  God,  Beneke  shows  most  the  influence  upon  him 
of  Jacobi,  and  the  "  Glaubensphilosophie."  So  far  as  the  ob- 
ject of  religion  is  the  suprasensible,  in  a  sense  differing  from 
our  fellow  beings  and  similar  beings,  to  this  we  can  only  ap- 
proximate in  that  most  highly  developed  subjective  state  of 
feeling  called  conviction  or  faith.  This  feeling  "  can  acquire 
the  highest  certainty  of  conviction  ;  but  we  cannot  objectify 
it,  i.  e.,  with  complete  truth  perfect  it  as  an  object  of  our 
knowledge."18  Beneke,  therefore,  in  summing  up  the  matter, 
says :   "  Of  only  a  single  class  of  existences  are  we  able  to 

17  System  der  Metaphysik  :    Vorrede,  xi.  18 Metaphysik,  p.  565. 


154  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [420 

gain  a  completely  clear  and  profoundly  comprehensive 
knowledge — human  souls.  Of  everything  else,  whether  it 
be  ever  so  near  us  and  be  given  in  manifold  ways,  we  appre- 
hend first  of  all  only  the  superficies,  or  appearance,  not  its 
inner  being,  its  own  individual  existence ;  and  however  we 
strain  our  faculty  of  knowledge,  we  are  able,  in  respect  to 
these  latter,  to  form  nothing  further  than  an  obscure  and  in- 
definite analogy  with  our  own  being.  Beyond  the  whole 
province  of  what  becomes  immediately  given  or  presented 
to  us,  there  opens  up  besides  the  unending  realm  of  the  non- 
presented  {Nicht-Gegeben)  :  (from  the  lowest  being)  up  to 
the  Being  of  all  beings,  the  Author  and  Ruler  of  all  that  ex- 
ists. But  of  this  realm  still  less  are  we  in  a  position  to 
know :  not  through  our  knowledge  do  we  attain  to  it,  but 
our  flight  thereto  must  be  reached  from  another  side,  from 
the  side  of  emotion,  which  gives  us  wings  in  Faith  and 
Hope."19 

§  106.  Immortality® — Beneke's  doctrine  of  the  immortality 
of  the  soul  is  perhaps  one  of  the  most  profoundly  scientific 
attempts  at  the  resolution  of  this  problem  ever  put  forth. 
It  promises  not  an  immortal  atomism,  but  an  immortal  per- 
sonality. It  has  its  basis  entirely  in  his  scientific  psy- 
chology. 

Beneke  attempts  first  to  answer  the  question,  what  is 
natural  death  ?  We  have  come,  in  the  preceding  psy- 
chology, to  regard  the  soul  as  an  organic  system  of  primary 
powers,  and  to  postulate  that  for  every  outer  sensuous  im- 
pression a  special  unfilled  primary  power  of  the  soul  is  used. 
For  the  existence  of  these  primary  powers  two  hypotheses 
are   possible.     Either  the   entire  number    necessary  for  the 

19  Metapkysik,  pp.  598-99. 

20  Compare  Lehrbuch,  Chap.  8,  IV:  "  Von  den  innersten  Grundformen  des 
Lebens  und  des  Todes."  Also,  Metapkysik,  Part  III,  Section  2 :  "  Die  Fortdauer 
der  menscklichen  Seele  nach  de?n   Tode." 


42  I  ]  FRIEDRICH  ED  UARD  BENEKE  !  r  r 

whole  life  of  an  individual  is  already  and  originally  given  at 
birth,  or,  the  soul  has  the  power  to  form  ever  anew  fresh 
like  powers.  We  have  had  to  postulate,  as  the  innermost 
life  process,  the  continuous  production  of  new  primary 
powers.  Now  we  have  seen  how  all  psychical  processes 
tend  to  remain  in  the  inner  being  of  the  soul  as  traces,  and 
how,  in  the  course  of  life,  this  inner  being  gains  in  increasing 
richness.  We  have  seen,  too,  how  by  unnumbered  repeti- 
tion these  traces  not  only  gain  in  strength  and  in  intimacy 
of  union,  but,  with  this  increased  strength,  require  less 
stimulation  either  by  external  elements  or  internal  stimulants, 
to  become  aroused  into  clear  consciousness.  The  child  and 
the  youth  seek  ever  new  sensations  and  stimulation  from 
without,  the  activity  of  the  man  is  rather  spent  in  reproduc- 
ing and  working  out  the  assembled  mass  of  previously 
gathered  experiences.  As  life  progresses,  then,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  activity  of  the  soul  being  turned  more  and 
more  upon  its  inner  self,  the  formation  of  new  powers  be- 
comes limited.  In  consequence  further  of  this  limitation  of 
the  outer  life  of  the  soul,  the  concentration  of  the  psychical 
processes  upon  the  inner  being  mounts  higher  and  higher. 
A  time  then  must  come  when  the  formation  of  new  powers 
like  unto  the  primary  ones  either  entirely  ceases,  or  is  not 
sufficient  to  produce  enough  powers  to  maintain  the  usual 
span  of  outer  consciousness.  Outer  consciousness  conse- 
quently ceases,  and  this  is  natural  death. 

As  to  the  continued  existence  of  the  soul  after  death,  a 
psychology  grounded  entirely  on  experience  of  course  can 
present  only  conjectures.  But  this  psychology  has  tended 
to  show  that  death,  in  the  natural  sense,  is  a  daily  process. 
The  more  highly  organized  a  man's  inner  consciousness  be- 
comes, the  nearer  he  approaches  natural  death.  Death,  then, 
is  not  a  dulling  of  the  inner  powers,  but  rather  a  "  continuous 
strengthening  of  the  inner  upbuilding."     The  essential  aspect 


jrg  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [422 

of  death  is  to  be  found  in  the  destruction  of  the  coherence 
between  the  inner  being  of  the  soul  and  the  outer  world, 
upon  which,  of  course,  during  the  progress  of  our  earthly- 
life,  the  conscious  developments  of  our  soul  have  been  de- 
pendent. Consciousness,  therefore,  must  cease,  too.  But 
the  iuner  or  more  spiritual  consciousness,  which  has  arisen  on 
the  original  basis  of  sensuous  experience,  has  become  a  per- 
manent possession  of  the  soul.  If,  then,  the  soul  have  a 
continued  existence  hereafter,  for  the  excitation  and  further 
perfection  of  its  inner  organization,  there  "  would  not,  per- 
haps, be  necessary  again  a  new  sensuous  system,  but  merely 
such  e7ivironment  as  would  have  the  power  to  make  active 
or  consciousness-producing  those  powers  (  Vermogen)  which 
were  founded  in  this  life  and  have  become  unconscious  traces 
or  elements  tending  to  produce  active  consciousness  "21  (An- 
gelegtheiten) . 

21  Metaphysik,  p.  460. 


CONCLUDING  CHAPTER 


I    BRIEF  CRITICAL  ESTIMATE 


THE  most  important  general  characteristic  of  Beneke's 
philosophical  system  is  its  remarkable  combination  of  sound 
common  sense  with  profound  metaphysical  insight.  This 
alone,  not  to  mention  its  admirable  clearness  of  statement, 
ought  to  commend  the  system  to  all  English  philosophical 
students.  It  has  been  justly  said  of  the  system,  too,  that  it 
begins  and  ends  with  experience.  This  is  only  a  brief  way 
of  paying  tribute  at  once  to  its  profoundly  scientific  char- 
acter, and  to  its  value  for  practice. 

Whatever  may  be  said  in  criticism  of  detailed  points  of 
this  system  of  philosophy,  I  believe  it  will  be  some  day  gen- 
erally conceded  that  Beneke  has  made  four  cardinal  and  per- 
manent contributions  to  philosophical  theory.  These  may 
be  summarized  as  follows : 

i .  In  internal  sense-perception  we  are  able  to  know  ourselves, 
not  as  a  phenomenon,  but  with  complete  metaphysical  truth.  In 
the  insight  that  the  only  being  we  truly  know,  i.  e.,  know  in 
itself,  is  that  of  our  own  soul,  Beneke  marks  his  great  ad- 
vance on  Kant.  As  Beneke  himself  claimed,  in  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  being  of  self  we  have  for  "  in-itselfness,"  for  true 
being,  a  clearly  defined  standard  which  can  guide  us  with  its 
clear  light  through  all  the  other  labyrinthine  paths  of  meta- 
physical discussion. 

2.  Consciousness  or  knowledge  is  to  be  clearly  distinguished 
in  its  aspects  as  clear  presentation  or  appearance,  and  as  prescn- 
tative  process.  In  its  former  aspect,  it  must  be  regarded  in  the 
423  x57 


jcjg  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [424 

case  of  external  perception,  as  the  product  of  objective  (or 
"external")  and  subjective  factors;  in  the  case  of  internal 
perception,  of  subjective  factors  entirely.  When,  therefore, 
it  is  asserted  that  we  know  our  own  soul's  being,  this  means, 
not  that  we  have  an  innate  idea  or  intuition  of  self,  co-exten- 
sive or  identical  with  our  soul's  complete  organic  being,  but 
that  in  these  entirely  derived  forms  of  knowledge  or  con- 
sciousness discriminated  as  facts  of  inner  sense  or  experi- 
ence, neither  of  the  component  factors  is  "sense-material"  in 
the  Kantian  sense  of  a  foreign  element  from  without,  but 
both  factors  are  psychical,  that  is,  both  are  ingredients  or 
parts  of  our  own  soul's  being. 

3.  /;/  consequence  of  the  distinction  of  unity  of  conscious- 
ness from  unity  of  being,  the  individual  soul  or  self  must  be 
regarded,  not  as  an  undifferentiated  abstract  unity,  but  rather 
as  a  concrete  psychical  organism,  consisting  in  various  sub- 
systems or  organic  groups  of  primary  powers.  The  demon- 
stration of  self  as  a  concrete  system  of  distinct  but  organ- 
ically interrelated  parts,  arrived  at  by  a  purely  empirical 
method,  is  a  valuable  achievement. 

4.  /;/  the  knowledge  that  back  of  the  external  perceptions 
called  our  own  body  there  exists  a  true  psychical  being — a 
being  in  itself  that  is  directly  known  to  us — we  have  an  an- 
alogical but  valid  means  of  escape  from  a  purely  subjective 
idealism.  In  internal  perception  we  know  ourselves  as  a 
psychical  being.  In  external  perception  we  know  ourselves 
as  a  corporeal  being.  Through  this  twofold  knowledge  of 
self  we  are  able  to  transcend  self  and  get  at  the  existence  of 
like  beings. 

These  cardinal  contributions  to  philosophical  theory, 
moreover,  result  in  a  general  metaphysical  conception  of  the 
individual  self  or  soul  that  is  particularly  valuable  as  offering 
a  rational  and  satisfactory  explanation  of  many  vexed  psy- 
chological and  philosophical  questions.     While  it  will  be  im- 


42  5  ]  FRIEDRICH  ED  UARD  BENEKE  !  5  9 

possible  to  take  up  the  consideration  of  these  questions  here 
with  any  detail,  I  should  at  least  like  to  call  attention  to  the 
particular  significance  of  Beneke's  theory  for  such  problems 
as  the  association  of  ideas,  subconscious  mental  life, 
latent  mental  modifications,  and  the  general  doctrine  of 
evolution. 

While  Beneke  is  a  thoroughgoing  associationist,  with  him, 
as  the  preceding  text  has  attempted  to  show,  it  is  not  ideas 
that  become  associated.  That  is,  ideas  in  the  sense  of  the 
qualitative  details  of  the  presented  contents  of  conscious  ex- 
perience. Ultimately  it  is  not  sensations  that  combine  to 
make  up  the  complex  of  adult  conscious  experience,  since 
sensations  themselves,  even  if  realizable,  would  be  only  ap- 
pearances. It  is  the  underlying  factors  of  sensations  that 
become  associated.  Moreover,  the  mooted  problem,  if  such 
an  inconceivability  can  be  called  a  problem,  of  how  a  series 
of  events  could  ever  become  conscious  of  itself  as  a  series,, 
becomes  fully  and  rationally  provided  for  in  the  organic 
unity  which  must  be  conceived  as  already  belonging  to  the 
fundamental  elements  of  the  sub-systems  of  the  soul  and  to 
these  systems  as  a  whole.  Matter  too  is  scarcely  to  be  de- 
fined as  a  mere  "  permanent  possibility  of  sensation."  A 
mere  possibility  is  nothing.  Matter  is  something  truly  real, 
and  so  far  as  it  exists  in  an  organic  form  approximating  to 
our  own  bodily  organism,  we  have  some  true  knowledge  re- 
garding its  nature. 

Beneke's  general  theory  of  the  self  throws  valuable  light, 
too,  on  the  psychological  problems  of  subconscious  mental  life 
and  latent  mental  modifications.  Both  these  problems  in- 
volve the  nature  of  retention,  that  is,  the  nature  of  supposed 
facts  not  immediately  present  in  conscious  experience.  They 
therefore  are  insoluble  except  on  a  metaphysical  basis, 
meaning  by  this  some  general  conception  of  the  nature  of 
conscious   experience  as  a  whole.     It   is    usual   to   interpret 


T60  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [426 

retention  in  either  of  two  ways.  The  first  interpretation 
conceives  retention  as  the  continued  existence  of  an  idea,  AS 
an  idea;  the  second,  as  the  mere  psychological  persistence  of 
a  modification  of  nerve  structure.  Beneke's  general  concep- 
tion, while  precluding  either  of  these  as  ultimate  interpreta- 
tions, embodies  the  partial  truth  of  both.  The  usual 
objection  to  the  first  interpretation  is  that  if  all  experience 
is  to  be  regarded  as  a  form  of  consciousness  or  knowledge, 
then  it  is  a  contradiction  in  terms  to  speak  of  an  "  uncon- 
scious "  or  even  a  "subconscious"  idea.  An  idea  is  essen- 
tially a  form  of  consciousness.  But  this  rigid  insistence  on 
terminology  ignores  the  common  ambiguity  in  the  uses  of 
the  term  consciousness.  Beneke  meets  this  objection  in  his 
distinction  of  varying  grades  of  presented  contents,  and  also 
in  the  insistence  that  it  is  not  qualitative  content  as  such 
that  is  retained,  but  primary  powers  and  stimulants  in  a  more 
or  less  durable  connection.  This  last  statement  reveals  the 
basis  of  what  would  be  his  objection  to  the  purely  physio- 
logical interpretation  of  retention.  Nerve  structure  and 
nerve  process  are  not  the  ultimate  facts.  Nerve  structure 
is  known  only  so  far  as  perceived.  As  perceived  it  is  a 
phenomenon  in  some  individual  conscious  experience.  As 
phenomenon  it  is  the  product  of  objective  and  subjective 
factors — the  external  stimulants  and  the  internal  primary 
powers.  These  stimulants  or  these  powers  may  become 
structurally  "  modified,"  but  this  is  a  different  thing  from 
making  retention  a  modification  of  nervous  structure  as 
known. 

Finally,  Beneke's  general  theory  is  of  peculiar  value  for  the 
general  doctrine  of  evolution.  It  has  been  acutely  said  of  Mr. 
Spencer's  valuable  contributions  to  this  doctrine  that  almost 
all  of  what  is  said  on  this  score  would  be  equally  true  and 
valuable  on  a  metaphysical  basis  entirely  and  radically  differ- 
ent from  that  furnished  by  the  synthetic  philosophy.     In  the 


42  7  J  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BEN  EKE  jgj 

synthetic  philosophy  the  lack  of  adequate  appreciation  of 
the  true  metaphysical  problem  always  has  been,  and  will  be, 
the  stumbling  block  to  its  full  acceptance.  In  Beneke's 
theory  we  have  a  most  thoroughgoing  evolutionary  concep- 
tion combined  with  the  profoundest  metaphysical  insight. 
Evolution  may  be,  and  doubtless  is,  both  an  individual  and 
a  cosmical  process,  but  in  either  case  it  is  one  which  takes 
place  in  an  essentially  psychical  being,  that  is,  in  a  being 
which  exists  primarily  in  and  for  itself,  and  which  is  already 
originally  an  organic  unit. 

It  is  not  to  be  inferred  from  what  has  been  said  above  that 
Beneke's  system  is  without  defects  and  not  in  need  of  any 
further  supplementing.  His  most  serious  metaphysical  de- 
fect, perhaps,  is  in  assigning  a  qualitative  difference  to  exter- 
nal stimulants,  and  yet  regarding  these  not  only  as  entering 
into  connection  with  the  primary  powers  of  the  soul,  but  as 
being  actually  transformed  into  psychical  elements,  and  thus 
being  made  permanent  possessions  of  the  psychical  organ- 
ism. The  logic  of  the  situation,  however,  is  such  as  to  lead, 
not  to  the  rejection  of  Beneke's  view,  but  rather  to  the  ex- 
tension of  his  conception  of  organism  to  include  all  being. 
This,  however,  is  not  to  identify  the  individual  with  the  cos- 
mos or  God,  whichever  we  chose  to  call  all  being,  any  more 
than,  for  example,  the  system  of  primary  powers  constitut- 
ing the  sense  of  sight  is  to  be  identified  with  the  whole  being 
of  the  individual  self  or  soul  possessing  it.  Both  are  distinct 
differentiations  of  the  total  organism,  both  are  centres  of 
activity  determining  the  action  of  and  being  determined  by 
the  action  of  the  whole.  The  true  source  of  the  conception 
of  organism  is  mind,  not  matter. 

II    PERMANENT  INFLUENCE  AND  FOLLOWERS 

A  word  now  remains  to  be  said  as  to  Beneke's  permanent 
influence  and  principal  disciples.     This  influence,  which,  for 


l62  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [428 

accidental  reasons  already  in  part  pointed  out,  has  been 
chiefly  pedagogical  rather  than  either  psychological  or 
philosophical,  it  will  be  convenient  to  speak  of  first  as  re- 
gards Germany  itself,  and  then  as  regards  other  lands. 

It  is  scarcely  too  much  to  say  that  in  Germany,  Beneke's 
philosophical  influence  has  been  almost  nil.  The  two  chief 
reasons  for  this  have  been,  on  the  one  hand,  the  overwhelm- 
ing weight  of  Hegelianism  ;  on  the  other,  the  preponderat- 
ing influence  of  the  Herbartian  Psychology.  And  yet  it  is 
not  far  from  the  truth  to  say  that  this  eclipse  of  Beneke's 
philosophical  standpoint  has  been  the  direct  result,  not  of  a 
fair  contest,  but  of  injustice  and  misrepresentation.  The 
unjust  attempt,  originating  in  Hegelian  sources,  to  stifle 
Beneke's  thought,  has  already  been  sufficiently  pointed  out 
The  equally  unfair  attempt  to  dispose  summarily  of  Beneke's 
psychology  as  well  as  of  his  pedagogics,  as  a  mere  modified 
Herbartianism,  has  likewise  been  shown  to  be  ungrounded, 
although  it  has  since  been  perpetuated  by  numerous  writers. 
Perhaps  the  only  more  distinctly  philosophical  work  largely 
influenced  by  the  thought  of  Beneke  is  that  of  C.  Fortlage, 
whose  work  Ueberweg  speaks  of  as  "a  compound  of 
Beneke's  empiricism  and  Kanto-Fichtean  speculation  with 
independent  modifications."  Fortlage's  chief  works  are : 
System  der  Psychologic  (Leipzig,  1855);  Psychologische 
Vortriige  (Jena,  1868),  and  Philosophische  Vortriige  (Ibid., 
1869). 

On  the  pedagogical  side  Beneke's  influence  has  been  much 
greater.  The  most  prominent  among  his  pedagogical  fol- 
lowers, and  the  man  who  has  done  most  to  elucidate,  defend 
and  extend  his  thought,  was  Johann  Gottlieb  Dressier'  (died 
1867),  one  time  director  of  the  Seminar  in  Bautzen.  Another 
name  that  deserves  always  to  be  associated  with  Beneke  is 

1  See  Bibliography. 


429]  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  ,5, 

that  of  Dr.  G.  Raue,  whose  exposition  of  the  outlines  of 
Beneke's  psychology  {Die  neite  Seelenlehrc,  already  referred 
to  as  afterwards  enlarged  and  extended  by  Dressier)  did 
perhaps  more  than  anything  else  to  popularize  his  system 
among  teachers.  Others  who  made  various  applications  of 
Beneke's  principles  to  the  theory  of  education  are  mentioned, 
with  the  titles  of  their  works,  in  the  bibliography  which 
follows. 

Outside  of  Germany,  Beneke's  work,  while  not  unknown, 
has  so  far  exerted  no  appreciable  influence.  In  two  com- 
paratively recent  and  important  psychological  treatises  in 
America,1  Beneke  in  one  case  is  not  even  mentioned ;  in 
another,  he  is  dismissed  in  a  few  sentences.  A  third  work2 
shows  considerable  traces  of  Beneke ;  but  with  a  tendency 
to  reflect  the  undue  emphasis  of  Beneke  as  scientific  peda- 
gogist  only.  In  England,  too,  attention  to  Beneke  has  been 
slight.  Sully'  avails  himself  of  some  of  Beneke's  pedagogi- 
cal results.  The  only  real  attempt  in  the  English  language 
at  a  serious  study  of  some  of  Beneke's  results,  has  been  the 
paragraphs  on  Beneke  in  the  article  in  Mind,  by  Mr.  G.  F. 
Stout,  already  referred  to.  In  France,  M.  Ribot,  in  the  first 
edition  of  his  Psychologie  Allemande  Contemporaine,  called 
attention  to  the  neglect  of  Beneke  in  Germany,  but  gave 
only  a  meagre  exposition  of  his  system.  His  attempt,  there- 
fore, as  reproducing  the  letter  rather  the  spirit  of  Beneke, 
proved  unsuccessful,  and  so  was  withdrawn  from  the  second 
edition. 

'James:  Principles  of  Psychology   (2  vols.,  New  York,  1893);    Ladd:    Ele- 
ments of  Physiological  Psychology  (New  York,  i{ 

a  Dewey :  Psychology  (New  York,  1 893) . 

■"■  Outlines  of  Psychology  (New  York,  1S93). 


164  FRIED  RICH  EDUARL)  BENEKE  [430 

III   BIBLIOGRAPHY 

I.  LIFE — The  chief  and  almost  only  source  is  Diesterweg's 
Pddagogisches  Jahrbuch  fur  1856.  In  this  is  contained,  be- 
sides an  excellent  portrait  of  Beneke,  first,  a  short  comment 
by  Diesterweg;  second,  the  fullest  account  of  Beneke  extant, 
by  Dr.  Schmidt;  third,  a  valuable  biographical  addition  by 
Dressier.  Of  the  summaries  in  the  histories  of  philosophy 
Ueberweg's  is  the  best  (pp.  282-283,  Vol.  II).  In  some  of 
his  own  writings,  however,  Beneke  has  left  an  interesting 
record  of  his  intellectual  development,  particularly  in  Die  neue 
Psychologie  (Berlin,  1845),  third  essay:  "  On  the  relation  of 
my  Psychology  to  Herbart's."  The  brief  memorial,  Kant 
und  die  pliilosopJiiscJie  Aiifgabe  unserer  Zeit,  is  very  valuable 
as  showing  his  relations  to  contemporaries.  Fortlage,  in  the 
fourth  of  his  Acht Psychologische  Vortrdge  (Jena,  1872),  "On 
Character,"  turns  aside  to  pay  a  glowing  tribute  to  Beneke. 

2.  WRITINGS — Many  of  Beneke's  writings  are  hard  to  pro- 
cure, no  complete  edition  of  his  works  having  ever  been  pub- 
lished. The  bibliography  in  Ueberweg  (pp.  283-86,  Vol. 
II.)  is  very  complete.  The  most  complete  and  best  list  is 
that  of  Dressier,  given  as  a  supplement  to  the  fourth  edition  of 
Beneke's  Lehrbuch  dcr  Psychologie  (Berlin,  1877)  '■>  a^so  pub- 
lished separate.  Its  value  lies  in  its  being  also :  "  A  Brief 
Characterization  of  the  Complete  Writings  of  Beneke,  in  the 
order  of  their  publication."  For  Beneke's  writings  not  men- 
tioned in  the  preceding  text  consult  these  sources.  Deserv- 
ing of  special  mention,  however,  since  so  far  Beneke's 
influence  has  been  greatest  in  the  field  of  education,  is  his 
ErzieJiungs  und  Unterrichts-lehre  (2  vols.,  Berlin,  1835  and 
1836). 

3.  Expositions  of  the  System — Of  the  general  exposi- 
tions of  Beneke's  philosophy  in  German  histories  of  philoso- 
phy, by  far  the  best,  since  the  most  complete  and  apprecia- 


43  I  ]  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKL  { ft  r 

tive,  is  the  most  recent,  viz.,  that  of  Julius  Bergmann,  in  his 
Geschichte  der  Philosophic  (Berlin,  1893):  Vol.  II.,  "  Die 
deutsche  Philosophic  von  Kant  bis  Beneke"  pp.  544-583. 
Ueberweg's  exposition  (History,  Vol.  II.,  pp.  281-292)  is 
a  good  summary  for  one  already  familiar  with  the  spirit  and 
method  of  Beneke.  The  account  by  Dr.  Albert  Stockl,  in 
his  Geschichte  der  neneren  Philosophic  von  Baco  und  Cartesius 
bis  zur  Gegenivart  (Mainz,  1883),  Vol.  II.,  pp.  258-282,  is 
valuable  for  a  certain  fulness  of  exposition,  but  particularly 
as  showing  at  once  the  nature  and  impotence  of  the  hostile 
criticism  directed  against  Beneke.  The  account  by  Falcken- 
berg  (op.  cit.),  while  brief,  is  excellent. 

Besides  the  above-mentioned  general  sketches  of  Beneke's 
system,  a  thorough  and  complete  popular  exposition  of  his 
psychology  has  been  made  in  German  by  G.  Raue,  in  Die 
nene  Seelenlchre  Dr.  Beneke 's  nach  methodischen  Grundsatsen 
in  einfach  entwickchider  Weise  fur  Lehrerbearbeitet  (Bautzen, 
1847)  !  later  editions,  including  the  fourth  (Mayence,  1865) 
edited  by  Dressier  (Translated  into  Flemish,  by  J.  Black- 
huys,  Ghent,  1859;  into  English,  Oxford  and  London,  1 87 1  ; 
also  into  French,  says  the  Encyclopedia  Britannica).  A 
most  complete  popular  summary  of  Beneke's  whole  system 
is  that  by  Dressier  in  Diesterweg's  Padagogisches  JaJirbucJi 
fur  1856,  pp.  33-105  :  "  Ueber  Beneke's  Forschungen."  A 
complete  epitome  of  Die  Lcrhbuch  der  Psychologic,  preserving 
so  far  as  possible  the  sentences  of  the  original,  has  been 
made  by  Gustav  Haufte,  under  the  title  "Professor  Dr.  Ed- 
iiard  Benecke's  Psychologieals  Naturwissenschaft,"  Borna- 
Leipzig,  (vi.  and  116  pp.).  For  a  good  exposition  of  Be- 
neke's educational  standpoint  see  Lange's  revised  edition 
(Kothen,  1876)  of  Dr.  Karl  Schmidt's  Geschichte  der  Pada- 
gogik :  Vol.  4,  article  37,  pp.  1059-78.  (Translated  into 
English  by  Louis  F.  Soldan,  Journal  of  Speculative  Philoso- 
phy, October,  1876.)      Compare  also  :      Die  Unterrichtslehre 


1 66  FRIEDRICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  [432 

Beneke  im  Vergleiche  zur  padagogischen  Didaktik  Herbart, 
by  Otto  Emil  Hummel  (Leipzig). 

In  English  no  independent  investigation  of  Beneke's  com- 
plete work  exists.  So  far  as  his  psychology  is  concerned, 
however,  we  have  a  brief  critical  and  expository  account  in 
an  article  by  Mr.  G.  F.  Stout:  "  Herbart  compared  with 
English  Psychologists  and  with  Beneke."  (Mind,  January, 
1889.)  His  educational  views  are  set  forth  in  Barnard's 
Amer.  Journal  of  Education,  vol.  28:  54;  vol.  24:  54. 

For  M.  Rib  of  s  attempt  to  resuscitate  Beneke,  compare  the 
first  French  edition  of  his  Psychologic  allcmande  contempo- 
raine. 

4.  Works  of  Beneke's  Followers — Beneke's  followers 
have  extended  his  system  and  its  principles  mainly  in  the 
field  of  education.  The  most  prominent  is  Johann  Gottlieb 
Dressier.  Besides  the  works  already  mentioned,  he  pub- 
lished :  Beitrage  zu  cincr  bessern  Gestaltung  dcr  Psychologic 
und  Padagogik,  also  entitled  Beneke  odcr  die  Seelenlehre  als 
Naturwisscnschaft  (Bautzen  1840-46)  ;  Praktische  Denklelire 
(Ibid.,  1852);  1st  Beneke  Materialist?  Ein  Beitrag  zur 
Orientirung  i'tber  Beneke's  System  der  Psychologic,  mit  Riick- 
sicht aufverschiedene Einw'iirfe gegen  dasselbe  (Berlin,  1862)  ; 
Die  Grundlehren  der  Psychologic  und  Logik  (Leipsic,  1867, 
2d  ed.  by  F.  Dittes  and  O.  Dressier,  1870)  ;  and  numerous 
contributions  to  pedagogical  journals,  particularly  Diester- 
weg's  Padagog.  Jahrb. 

The  following  list  of  other  writers  largely  influenced  by 
Beneke  is  given  on  the  authority  of  Ueberweg,  Dressier,  and 
the  article  on  Beneke  in  Richard  Lange's  revised  edition  of 
Dr.  Karl  Schmidt's  History  of  Pedagogics.  J.  R.  Wurst,  in 
his  Die  zwei  ersten  Schulfahre,  applies  Beneke's  psychology 
to  the  theory  of  education ;  his  Sprachdcnklehre  derives  its 
didactic  form  from  Beneke.  Kammel,  on  the  basis  of 
Beneke    doctrines,    made   numerous   contributions  to    Her- 


433]  FRIED  RICH  EDUARD  BENEKE  Y^y 

gang's  Piidagog.  Realencyclopadie.  Other  writers  of  Beneke's 
school  are :  Otto  Bonier,  Die  Willensfreiheit,  Zurcch- 
n it ng  und  Strafe  (Freiberg,  1857);  Friedrich  Dittcs,  Das 
AesthetiscJie  (Leipsic,  1854),  Ueber  Religion  und  religiose 
Menschcnbildung  (Plauen,  1855),  Natnrlehre  dcs  Moralis- 
chen  und  KunstleJire  der  moralischcn  Erzichung  (Leipzig, 
1856),  Ueber  die  sittliche  Freiheit  (Leipsic,  i860),  Grun- 
driss  der  Erziehungs  und  UnterrciJitsleJire  (Leipsic,  1868,  3d 
ed.,  1 871)  :  Heinrich  Neugeboren  and  Ludvvig  Korodi,  who 
published  the  Viertelj ahrssclirift  fur  die  SeelenleJire  at  Cron- 
stadt  from  1859  till  1861  ;  F.  Schmeding,  Das  Gem'utJi 
(Duisburg,  1868)  ;  also  Ueberweg,  who  is  frequently  classed 
with  the  school  of  Beneke  on  account  of  his  prize  essay — 
Die  Entwickelnng  des  Bewusstscins  durcli  den  Lehrer  und 
Erzieher  (Eine  ReiJie padagogiscli-didaktischer  Anwendungcu 
der  Beneke' schen  BewusstseinstJicorie ,  bcsondcrs  auf  den  Un- 
terricht  an  Gymnasien  und  Realsc/mleu.     Berlin,  1853). 


VITA. 


Francis  Burke  Brandt  was  born  in  Philadelphia,  June 
13th,  1865.  His  early  education  was  received  in  the  public 
schools  of  that  city.  In  1880,  after  a  two  years'  course  at 
the  Central  High  School,  he  left  to  enter  business.  In  1888 
he  entered  the  Brown  Preparatory  School,  Philadelphia,  and 
the  following  year  was  admitted  to  Harvard  College.  Here 
he  specialized  in  philosophy  under  Professors  Royce,  James, 
and  Palmer,  and  Dr.  Santayana.  He  was  graduated  from 
Harvard  in  1892,  after  a  three  years'  course,  with  the  degree 
A.  B.,  magna  aim  lande,  and  "  honorable  mention"  twice  in 
philosophy  (in philos.  {bis)  excellcntem).  He  also  had  con- 
ferred on  him  at  graduation  "honors"  in'  philosophy  (in 
philosophia  HONORES),  in  recognition  of  special  examination 
and  a  thesis — "  The  Relation  of  the  Kantian  Philosophy  to 
the  Problems  of  the  Present  Day,  and  the  Permanent  Influ- 
ence of  this  Philosophy  as  a  Criticism  of  the  Powers  of  the 
Human  Reason,  both  Theoretical  and  Practical."  For  two 
years  after  graduation  he  was  instructor  in  English  and 
Mathematics  at  Columbia  Grammar  School,  New  York  City. 
During  this  period  also  he  pursued  graduate  studies  under  the 
Faculty  of  Philosophy,  Columbia  College,  attending  ad- 
vanced courses  in  philosophy  and  education  under  Prof. 
Butler,  and  performing  experiments  in  educational  psychol- 
ogy under  Prof.  Cattell.  In  April,  1894,  he  was  appointed 
for  the  succeeding  academic  year  University  Fellow  in  Phil- 
osophy at  Columbia  College.  During  the  term  of  his  fellow- 
ship he  continued  his  studies  in  education  and  engaged  in 
original  research  in  German  philosophy  under  the  direction 
of  Prof.  Butler ;  attended  the  seminary  of  Dr.  Hyslop  ;  and 
studied  sociology  under  Prof.  Giddings,  of  the  Faculty  of 
Political  Science. 

169  435 


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